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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2009 Iran witnessed the Green Movement, a popular uprising that challenged the status 
quo of the socio-political structures of the Islamic Republic. In this research, I attempt to develop 
an understanding of the conditions that contributed to the demise of the movement. 
This study takes a Critical Theory approach, and the theoretical foundations of this work are 
the Theory of Structuration of Giddens and the Theory of Communicative Action of Habermas. The 
data is drawn from YouTube videos and analyzed through Critical Discourse Analysis.  
This research identifies the key stakeholders of the movement and investigates weather their 
aspirations regarding the uprising were aligned or stood in contrast. My investigation uncovers 
evidence of systematic communication distortion in the public discourse of the leaders of the 
movement which greatly impacted demobilization and led to its failure. The results of my study 
also disprove the viability of the Reform philosophy as a pragmatic political path to democracy.  
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DEDICATION 
 
تس یزار کشا 
تس یزار دنخبل 
 قشعتس یزار  
دوب مقشع دنخبل بش نآ کشا 
ییوگب هک متسین هصق 
یناوخب هک متسین همغن 
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 یمومع قشع– دمحا ولماش  
 
 
 
Tear is a secret 
Laughter is a secret 
Love is a secret 
The tear of that night was laughter of my love 
I am not a story you can tell 
Not a melody you can sing 
Not a voice you can hear 
Or something you can see 
Or you can know 
I’m the common pain 
Cry me out 
 
Common love, Ahmad Shamloo 
 
I dedicate this work to all the courageous people of Iran who cried the common pain. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Following the presidential elections held on June 12th, 2009 in Iran, massive protests took 
place contesting those results declaring Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad, the then sitting president, the 
winner by large margins for a second term. The two Reformist candidates, namely Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and Hojatol Islam Mehdi Karoubi, contested the results calling on their supporters to hold 
a peaceful street rally. People responded in large numbers (millions by some estimates) by holding 
a peaceful march of silence on June 15th, 2009 down the streets of Tehran, the capital city, and 
other major urban centres. While many wore or carried green artifacts, others held signs that 
simply read “where is my vote?” referring to the alleged election fraud. Originally, Mousavi’s camp 
introduced green colored artifacts and signage as their unifying color and also signaling devotion 
to Islam since that particular shade of green symbolizes allegiance to Shi’ite Islam.  
The government, however, broke up the peaceful protests violently and Iran witnessed yet 
another popular uprising that was reminiscent of the Islamic revolution some 30 years earlier. 
Women and youth had a significant presence in the movement many of whom were arrested, 
harassed, tortured, shot at or killed by the government forces loyal to the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khameneyi. While the protesters were not victorious in pressuring the government 
to meet their demand and President Ahmadi Nejad stayed to complete his second term, they 
continued their efforts led by Mousavi and Karoubi, until their house arrest in February 2011. 
Social media was at its peak and Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube were some of the key tools used 
by the protesters, and their leaders alike, to communicate their stories to the rest of the world, 
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filling the void that was created by the expulsion of foreign journalists and independent news 
outlets.  
My research looks at the aspirations of those involved in the movement by analyzing their 
political communications. I critically examine the public discourse of the primary actors of the 
Green Movement through social media, which was the medium of communication of choice for 
many, in order to develop an understanding of the movement, and the conditions that contributed 
to its demise which could then be applied to the greater Iranian political scene.  
There is very little disagreement amongst politicians and scholars alike of the discontent 
felt by the Iranian public, although there is a wide spectrum of ideas about the degree to which it 
is felt. People of Iran, especially the youth, students, women and the middle classes, have 
manifested their discontent of the current state of affairs through two major events: first in the 
1997 presidential election, by bypassing the government approved candidate to elect the little 
known cleric Mohammad Khatami and his platform of reform and dialogue which became known 
as the 2nd of Khordad movement; and second in the Green Movement of 2009. While there is much 
speculation about the driving motivations of those events, it is clear that the dominant narrative 
of the regime is being challenged by a rather considerable cross section of the society.  
To further study the state of Iranian dissent, I have organized my research to focus on the 
utilization of social media, YouTube particularly, by the leaders of the Green Movement for 
political communications. Those communications are further analyzed in order to understand the 
impact of their discourse on the movement, to discern the aspiration of the protesters, and finally 
to understand the factors contributing to the movement faltering. In what follows, I will outline 
the objectives and motivations of this study as well as theoretical and methodological frameworks. 
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1.1 Research Question and Objectives 
In this MA thesis research, I explore and seek answers to the following question: What were 
the impacts of the discourse of the leaders of the 2009 Iranian Green Movement? A key objective 
of the research is to develop an understanding of the complex nature of the political unrest that 
resulted in the birth of both the 2nd of Khordad and the Green Movement and the reasons for its 
subsequent failure. The 2009 Green Movement against the Islamic Republic of Iran was last in a 
series of uprisings for freedom and democracy by the Iranian people, starting with the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905, the 1949-53 movement for the nationalization of the oil 
industry, the 1963 protests against the white revolution, as well as the 1979 movement against 
the Pahlavis’ monarchy regime.  
Studying Iran’s socio-political state is important because several factors place this ancient 
country in a unique position to influence world affairs significantly. According to the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), by the end of 2013 Iran had the 3rd largest proven crude 
oil, and 2nd largest proven natural gas reserves in the world (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2015) 
and thus is critically important to the world economy. Additionally, Iran is of geopolitical 
importance for it is located in the oil producing hot bed of the Persian Gulf and has strategic control 
over the Strait of Hormuz through which 40% of the world’s traded oil flows (Cordesman, 2007).  
Moreover, Iran’s sheer size and its population of 79 Million (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2012) in addition to the regime’s tendency to “export the 
revolutionary ideas”1 make it a significant power in the region.  
                                                     
1 A common phrase coined by Ayatollah Khomeini  
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Through examination of the Green Movement, this study aims to facilitate a greater 
understanding of the complex nature of political power struggles and opaque decision making 
process in Iran. Studying the increasing dissent in the Islamic Republic that is manifested through 
political uprisings, allows us to better understand the social and political complexities that rule this 
country and their inevitable impact in the region.  
1.2 Research Question and Theoretical Framework 
The news media dubbed the Iranian political uprising of 2009 “Twitter revolution” 
("EDITORIAL: Iran’s Twitter Revolution," 2009) and went on to portray the protesters as web savvy 
internet users who relied heavily on social media, including YouTube and Facebook, to organize 
and communicate during the protests. Tusa (2013) and Cross (2010) both question this assertion 
and I will further discuss this in chapter 2. Notwithstanding the fact remains that for the first time 
in the history of political uprisings, modern internet-based social media played a significant role in 
the political communications of a movement. This emphasis on social media in general and Twitter 
in particular, has prompted several studies that investigate this phenomenon in the context of the 
Green Movement from various angles (Tusa, 2013; Cross, 2010; Harris, 2012). 
However, YouTube as a social media form has been largely overlooked by researchers of 
Iranian politics. By virtue of its audio-visual capabilities and its potential for viral reach, YouTube 
provides a much richer medium of communication, and thus presents us with a unique lens 
through which social interactions can be studied. The literature review that I have conducted 
reveals gaps in examining how YouTube was utilized by various social actors involved in the 
protests as a tool to communicate, organize and exchange information.  Thus, I have organized this 
research to focus on investigating how the leaders of the movement, i.e. the Reformers, used 
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social media to facilitate communicating to the public their intention to change social and political 
structures. Further, I will examine two social structures that were the target of change, generally 
addressing political repression, and the structures of patriarchy, women’s rights, and the economic 
structures in particular. Through studying the communications of the Green leaders, this project 
attempts to unravel communication distortions and their impact on the demise of the movement.  
I will investigate how YouTube was utilized as steering media to further the political agenda 
of the protesters. Habermas (1984) indicates that steering media, such as money and power, 
enable the state and corporations to control the process of everyday life, thus undermining the 
democratic values, the public sphere and the moral and communicative interactions. Through 
studying the social media practices and the content generated by those actors this study aims to 
facilitate a greater understanding of the current political unrest in Iran, focusing on the root causes 
of dissent, and analyzing the viability of the Reform movement as a political alternative.   
The study also contributes to the existing scholarship on political communication, social 
movements and political activism, which is predominantly conducted in Western and democratic 
settings. By applying Western concepts of social movements and political communications to a 
none-democratic setting, my study tests the applicability of such concepts to none-Western 
nations and contexts. In addition, this inquiry further illuminates the role of social media as 
alternative channels of communication in authoritarian regimes such as Iran where traditional 
media predominantly serve the interests of the ruling elite. Moreover, this project helps to 
illustrate how increasingly popular social media, such as YouTube, are contributing to demands for 
civil liberties and democratic social movements by challenging authoritarian, theocratic regimes. 
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In order to address the overall research problem, it is first necessary to answer the following 
questions: 
RQ 1. Who are the key stakeholders and participants of the discourse of the Iranian Green 
Movement of 2009? In other words, who were the principal ‘social actors’ of the movement, and 
what were their political orientations and socio-economic positions? 
RQ 2. What were the primary aspirations of the key stakeholders of the movement? In other 
words, what social structures were the principal categories of social actors attempting to 
alter/preserve by involving in the movement? 
RQ 3. Did the above groups of actors involved in the movement have equal access to political 
power? 
RQ 4.  Were the aspirations of the key social actors involved in the Green Movement aligned with 
one another or stoned in contradiction?  
RQ 5. If contradictory, was there any attempt in the discourse of the movement to bridge the gap? 
In other words, was the discourse of the leaders of the Green Movement oriented towards building 
mutual understanding or was it systematically distorted communication oriented to success? 
 
My research is grounded in Critical Social Theory, more specifically, the theoretical 
framework for this study is informed by the Theory of Structuration of Anthony Giddens (1984) 
and the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) of Jorgen Habermas (1984). Broadly speaking, 
Structuration is a tool for studying the interactions of social structures and the agency which is at 
the core of the Green Movement.  
To create a wider lens for this research, I have altered the Structuration framework to study 
“Social Action” based on Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (1984). Habermas has 
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devoted considerable time and effort to developing the Theory of Communicative Action, which is 
a rigorous tool for the study of social action and public discourse.  
1.3 Thesis Methodology and Data Collection  
My research relies on the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, grounded in critical 
Hermeneutics and based on the Habermasian Theory of Communicative Action and Ideal Speech 
Situation, operationalized by Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton (2009). Specifically, I rely 
on Habermas’s four-part validity test, which focuses upon comprehensibility, truth, legitimacy, and 
sincerity.  These elements are the foundations for our framework for a “heuristic” (Stahl, 2007) 
approach to identify the Green leaders’ claims through empirical observations of 
communication in form of YouTube videos.  
The CDA application was used to investigate the leaders’ validity claims regarding altering 
structures of signification, domination, and legitimation for the period of January 2009 to February 
2011, when the leaders were put under house arrest and their communications with supporters 
cut. 
1.4 Findings 
My research points to evidence of systematic communication distortions on the part of the 
leaders of the Green Movement. The evidence illustrates the contradictory and irreconcilable 
nature of the aspirations of the key stakeholders of the movement and links it to the failure of the 
uprising. This study also questions the viability of the Reform strategy in the current situation in 
order to achieve democracy and discusses the role of the civil society in that context.  
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1.5 Outline of the Chapters 
The rest of this document is organized as follows: 
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
This chapter will place the research in a historical context by providing a comprehensive 
account and analysis of events leading to the Green Movement. A detailed chronology of the 
Constitutional revolution, the Islamic revolution of 1979, the 2nd of Khordad events will all provide 
a background into the Green Movement and serve as an introduction to this study. The chapter 
then examines the present discourses of the Green Movement to provide a greater understanding 
of the phenomenon of dissent in Iran. Lastly, the chapter provides an overview of various forms of 
social media, particularly YouTube, and their role in political communications. 
CHAPTER 3: The Theoretical Framework  
Chapter three will situate the research in a sociological framework and will identify the 
paradigmatic assumptions to which this research belongs. In this chapter, I will detail the key 
concepts of the Giddens-Habermas framework of Structure-Agency, and provide an in-depth 
discussion of social action as it pertains to this research. 
CHAPTER 4: The Research Methodology and Design 
This chapter will describe and provide justification for the use of Critical Discourse Analysis 
as a research methodology in general and the operationalized version developed by Cukier et al. 
in particular. Chapter four will also offer a detailed description of the means and methods of data 
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collection and analysis, the software that were utilized and strategies for data coding and 
interpretation. Limitations and scope of study will also be reviewed in this chapter. 
CHAPTER 5: Participating Actors of the Green Movement 
This chapter will provide an overview of the actors participating in the Green Movement 
and the social structures they attempted to alter. I will provide a brief overview of both the 
ideological orientation and the intellectual underpinnings of the different actors that participated 
in that political uprising, their goals, their roles and their aspirations. This exploratory approach 
allows for a better understanding of the composition of the “Green Wave” and those in opposition 
to the movement, thus drawing a more comprehensive picture of the movement and the actors 
involved.  
The key actors of the Green Movement can be categorized into three groups: the Civil 
Society Groups, the Islamic Reform Front, and the Conservative Bloc. While civil society groups are 
by definition none-government organizations, the Reformers and the Conservatives are the 
outward manifestation of the two ideological factions amongst Iran’s political leadership elite. 
Reformers represent the Islamic-Left and the conservatives the Islamic-Right, among each of which 
there are smaller factions. Within this chapter some of the complexities of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s (IRI) political establishment are also explained, which helps better understanding of the 
movement. 
CHAPTER 6: Analysis of the Public Discourse  
Chapter six will examine the political communications of two Reformist campaigns in the 
movement through YouTube videos and detail the structures that were targeted for change, and 
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the type of social actions that were taken to achieve that. This chapter will rely on Critical Discourse 
Analysis and Ideal Speech situation claims as detailed in chapter five to investigate the content 
generated by above actors through social media. 
CHAPTER 7: A Theoretical Discussion of Research Findings  
This chapter draws on the analysis of chapter 6 to outline the impact and implications of 
the political discourse of the Green leaders on the movement and its failure. The findings are 
tested against the theoretical framework for broader implications, including examining the 
effectiveness of the Reform Movement, and the broken conditions of the public sphere in Iran 
amongst other findings. 
Chapter Eight: Contribution, Limitations and Future Research 
In the final chapter of this study a summary of the findings are presented along with the 
study’s contribution to the field of Iranian Studies and critical theory. Next, limitations of the study 
and challenges encountered while conducting my research will be discussed.  Lastly, the 
implications and potential for future research is proposed.  
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 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 An Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter, I will provide a brief historical background to the movement to provide 
context for my research. Next, I will conduct a literature review of some of the major scholarship 
conducted to unpack the role of social media in mass movements, particularly the Green 
Movement of Iran. The chapter then describes Social Media and its various platforms, comparing 
this emergent technology with the traditional mass media and their role in a democratic society. 
Lastly, the chapter details the concept of the Public Sphere informed by Jürgen Habermas’s 
extensive work on the subject. This document also examines the role of media in general and social 
media in particular in the public sphere in democratic societies as a benchmark for comparison to 
the function they assume in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
2.1 Background of the Movement 
In order to understand the Green Movement we must study it at its roots in the greater 
historical context within which it was shaped, namely the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and 
the Islamic revolution of 1979. In what follows, I will briefly chronicle those events that are key to 
this study, beginning with the encounters of Iran with the western world in early 1800s. 
In 1812 and again in 1828, following two consecutive military defeats to Russia, the ruling 
Qajar dynasty (1789–1925) was forced to surrender vast territories under humiliating terms to its 
northern neighbor, Czarist Russia. Many scholars consider this point in the history of Iran as the 
onset of the encounter of Iran with the modern west (Kamrava, 2008). Unlike countless others 
before it, the defeats to Russia came to be viewed beyond the military superiority of the 
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opponents, highlighting the social and scientific advances of the modern world in comparison to 
the dark conditions of traditional Iran (Jahanbegloo, 2002). The stark contrast was not lost on the 
ruling elite of the Qajar, prompting them to adopt a more critical view of the state of affairs of a 
country plagued with poverty, backwardness and loss, impressing upon them the need to search 
for a solution (Behnam, 1996). The government first responded to western pressure by taking a 
number of ambitious initiatives to reform military, bureaucracy, and economic and education 
systems (Abrahamian, 1979), which were met with strong resistance from both the Qajar 
traditionalists of the Royal court and the Shiite Ulama (jurists) who dominated the ruling classes.  
While the Qajars initiated reforms to strengthen their position, they also created a twofold 
problem that ultimately undermined their rule. On one hand, the same institutions that were 
created to implement change gave rise to a modern generation of intelligentsia, known as 
monawarolfekran (the enlightened minded), who’s aspirations: constitutionalism, secularism and 
nationalism, went beyond institutional reform and aimed to alter the governing body at its roots 
(Abrahamian, 1979). The Shiite Ulama, holding significant mass mobilizing power, were split on the 
issues, some siding with the intelligentsia in demanding a constitutional monarchy and 
establishment of a parliament, while others supported the absolute rule of the Shah and Shari’a. 
This contentious relationship ultimately lead to the Constitutional Revolution of 1907 in which the 
enlightened minded succeeded in drafting the country’s first constitution aimed at curbing the 
Shah’s absolute and arbitrary rule, establishing an independent judiciary and promoting personal 
liberties.  The decades that followed those historic events witnessed the erosion of the 
constitution, once again giving rise to tyranny and oppression.  
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In 1979, while the Pahlavi dynasty ruled, the continuation of similar aspirations of justice, 
liberty, and independence lead the nation to yet another revolution, which resulted in the 
establishment of The Islamic Republic of Iran. Led largely by Ayatollah Khomeini, a cleric in exile, 
the revolution swept through the country with promises of democracy, equality, and freeing the 
nation of the tight grip of the monarchical oppression.    
However, the 2nd of Khordad events and the widespread protests of June 2009, despite 
government’s violent crackdown on protesters are a clear indication that three decades later, the 
revolution has failed to deliver on its promises for a large majority of Iranians. Many including the 
candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, later argued that the promises of the revolution were not fulfilled 
("Iran's Mousavi Says He Will Continue Fight for Reform," 2010). 
2.2 The Green Movement and Social Media 
During the events of the 2009 Green Movement the news media dubbed the movement 
“twitter revolution” (Keller, 2010; "Iran’s Twitter Revolution," 2009; Morozov, 2009; Weaver, 
2010) and went on to portray the protesters as web savvy internet users who utilized this media 
form as the main tool for organizing the protests (Tusa, 2013). The Washington Times ran an 
editorial titled “Iran’s Twitter Revolution” ("EDITORIAL: Iran’s Twitter Revolution," 2009) on June 
16, 2009, and, at the behest of the U.S State Department, Twitter delayed maintenance scheduled 
for June 15th to correspond to night time in Iran to aid the opposition (Pleming, 2009).  
 While this assessment of the movement may have seemed interesting in the early stages 
when a revolution seemed increasingly possible, a closer look casts doubt on the accuracy of this 
assertion. By mid-May 2009, there were only 8,654 Twitter users registered in Iran, which rose 
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dramatically to 19,235 by June 21, 20092 (Evans, 2009). Considering the population of Iran was 
estimated at 70 million at that point, these numbers are only representative of a tiny fraction of the 
population. Additionally, there are reasons to suspect that these numbers may have been artificially 
inflated by those in the Iranian Diaspora by changing their time-zone to match that of Iran when 
registering for a Twitter account. Moreover, the chart below (Figure 2.1) demonstrates that the 
majority of the Iranian Twitter users (93%) were concentrated in Tehran, the capital city, followed by 
0.94% in Shiraz: 
 
Figure 2.1 : Twitter accounts created in Iran by June 21, 2009. Source: Evans (2009) 
 
Judging by the graph, one can conclude that the Twitter users in Iran were “few in number, 
urban, overwhelmingly focused in Tehran, and most likely educated. The level of education can be 
surmised from the amount of tweets that were in English, judging by the fact that a majority of the 
“buzz words” (most popular discussion words) were in English (although this does not necessarily mean 
that the majority of users were English speakers)” (Tusa, 2013, p.12). While Twitter was certainly 
                                                     
2 Elections were held on June 12, 2009 
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utilized in the Green Movement, the above evidence makes it difficult to conclude that it was 
significantly beneficial to the opposition protests. It is undeniable however, that social media such as 
YouTube and Twitter is largely to credit for reporting to the outside world the events unfolding in Iran 
in 2009 in the absence of independent news media3. 
Kevan Harris (2012) studied the effects of moral shock on the protesters of the Green 
Movement and the role of the internet on demobilization. He observes that the events of the first 
week of post-election protests provoked numerous displays of moral shock which in face-to-face 
situations proved cathartic and recharged emotional energy. Jasper (2011) defines moral shock as 
“when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that 
she becomes inclined towards political action” (p.409). Individuals would hold up pictures of the 
dead and wounded of previous days and take pictures and videos to post on social media and show 
others that had not attended the rallies. Harris (2012) further argues that “this was not a 
postmodern exercise but a highly emotional interaction ritual that drew in participants and 
convinced them to convince others to join” (p.441). However, after Neda’s death all of that 
changed: “the mobilization effect of moral shocks, at some point, reversed to a demobilization 
effect on many as they went online and witnessed the spectacles of repression” (Harris, 2012, p. 
444). He argues that this is by no means to suggest the violence and repression was not real but 
points to the demobilizing role played by the amplified impact of graphic imagery as facilitated by 
internet capabilities. Such powerful shocks pushed the masses that may have otherwise been 
willing to participate in demonstrations off the streets, forcing them to take refuge online and 
turning many into “internet activists”. 
                                                     
3 Most foreign and independent news media were banned from the country in the early days of protests. 
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In a study comparing the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and the Iranian Green Movement in 
2009, Felix Tusa (2013) discusses the effects of social media and computer based communications 
on social movements. He argues that while social media has played an important role in both cases, 
they did not have a decisive role in the success or failure of the movements. The study reveals that, 
especially in the case of the Green Movement, social media were far more effective tools for 
framing the movement than they were for organizing it. The paper argues that while social media, 
particularly twitter, were used widely to organize the protests in Iran, the overreliance on those 
tools had negative effects. Like Harris (2012), Tusa (2013) states that the social media created an 
illusion that people were participating in protests, when in fact they were not physically on the 
ground but engaging in online activism. The paper concludes the Iranian movement failed in part 
due to its organization methods: relying too heavily on tools like Twitter to organize on the ground 
protests.  He goes further to say “it was the Egyptian protesters’ focus on traditional methods of 
organization, rather than relying on the Internet, that was largely to thank for the success of their 
movement” (Tusa, 2013, p.17). Tusa (2013) and Harris (2012) both ultimately argue that the social 
media created a “free riding” effect in Iran, where would-be protesters felt they could counter the 
regime from the privacy of their homes. However, as K. Ehsani (May 28, 2012) notes “corporate 
technology does not create a social action. In the end people have to come out, talk, coordinate, 
disagree, and put their lives on the line”. 
Cross (2010), on the other hand, studies the movement from a different angle: the cross 
section of social media use and increased world oil prices. He argues that while social media 
contributed to the size and intensity of the movement, which presumably, exerted political 
pressure on the regime, it also had a more subtle effect of increasing world oil prices. This turn of 
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events indirectly aided the Iranian government by raising its revenue sources. Thus, he concludes, 
“the effect of social media on the Green Movement was ambiguous, since it both helped and 
hindered its aims; that is, it increased the challenge to the regime, but also increased revenues 
used to defuse that very challenge” (Cross, 2010, p. 169). 
The literature review that I have conducted shows little has been done in terms of scholarly 
work to examine how social media was used as steering media. Habermas (1984) indicates that 
steering media, such as money and power, enable the state and corporations to control the 
process of everyday life, thus undermining the democratic values, the public sphere and the moral 
and communicative interactions. The public sphere is the arena of social life where individuals 
gather to discuss matters of public concern (Habermas, 1991), and will be more thoroughly 
examined later in this chapter. My study instead focuses on investigating how YouTube, a rich 
medium of communication, was utilized as a steering media by the three groups of actors involved 
in protests, namely: civil society groups, the Islamic Reform Front and the ruling conservatives. 
Through YouTube videos, I will examine the socio-political structures that were targeted by the 
Green protesters, how the proposed change was approached and how the government 
responded. The rich audio-visual nature of YouTube video provides a suitable medium to study the 
nature of a variety of social actions the actors were participating in and how this social media form 
was utilized as an instrument to generate power, i.e. as a steering media. 
It is, however, important to note that while the effect of social media, especially YouTube, 
is undeniable in the post presidential protests, it is also distracting. Like many revolutions and mass 
movements before it, the Green Movement was in part made possible by new technology. The 
Reformation in Europe was helped by the revolutionary invention of the printing press; the 
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European political upheavals of 1848 were aided largely by the invention of the telegraph, which 
help transmit news about the protests across the continent overnight; at home in Iran, the 1979 
revolution is in no small part indebted to the invention of the cassette tape. Regardless of the 
remarkable effects that social media have had on the mass movements of the region, including 
the Green Movement, it is important to keep in mind that in none of these events does the 
technology illuminate the underlying causes of the movements. For, as Tusa (2013) states, a focus 
on technology essentially leads the investigator to ignore the role of agency, since how technology 
shaped an event can only be explained by examining its context, how used it, and to what end.  
Next, I will discuss social media and its various platforms in detail since they are the medium 
through which communications that are in interest to this study are documented. This section will 
also discuss the advantages of social media over traditional mass media for ordinary citizens, which 
perhaps contribute to their widespread use during the movement. 
2.3 The Social Media: An Overview 
Social media is the social interaction among people in which they create, share or exchange 
information and ideas in virtual communities and networks (Ahlqvist, Bäck, Halonen, & Heinonen, 
2008). Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein (2010) define social media as "a group of Internet-
based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and 
that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content" (p. 61). In other words, social 
media is content that is created by its audience (Comm, 2010). Furthermore, social media depends 
on mobile and web-based technologies to create highly interactive platforms through which 
individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content. Joel 
Comm (2010) argues that social media describes a form of publishing in which stories are 
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“swapped rather than published and that the exchange of content happens within a community, 
rather like a chat at a restaurant (p. 3).” He also argues that social media is an efficient way for 
publishers (i.e. users) to broadcast their content to thousands of people, encouraging them to form 
strong connections with the message and with others in the community (Comm, 2010). As a 
functional definition, Kangas, Toivonen, & Bäck (2007) refer to social media as the personal 
interactions of individuals as well as creating, sharing, and communicating content on virtual 
communities and networks facilitated by Web 2.0 technologies. 
Lon Safko and David Brake (2009) define social media as “activities, practices, and 
behaviors among communities of people who gather online to share information, knowledge, and 
opinions using conversational media” (p. 6). Built on the technological foundations of Web 2.0, 
social media are internet-based applications that facilitate the creation and exchange of user-
generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Moreover, social media relies on mobile and web-
based technologies to create their highly interactive platforms that allow individuals and groups 
to share, co-create and modify user-generated content (Kietzmann, Hermkens, Mccarthy, & 
Silvestre, 2011). From social networking (Facebook, LinkedIn), to blogs and microblogs (Twitter, 
Tumbler), content communities (YouTube), forums and wikis, social media are founded on three 
key elements: content, community and Web 2.0 (Ahlqvist, et. al, 2008). 
Content generally refers to user generated content (UGC) which could take the form of text, 
video, photo or pictures, but it could also contain presence information such as tags, reviews and 
playlists, that people create, modify and publish on the web. The social nature of such activities 
implies the second concept: communities, where individuals are motivated to create and share 
content with other individuals in their communities who are also participating in this practice. 
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Personal communication, either direct (Skype) or through media objects (YouTube, Flicker), is a 
central goal of the social media. Advances in digital and video cameras, camera phones and 
broadband internet have equipped social media with the necessary tools to facilitate personal 
communications in recent years (Ahlqvist, et. al, 2008). Social media places a great emphasis on 
interpersonal communication, as the term “social” indicates. This motivation is evident in the value 
proposals of the different platforms as well as the enormous amount of person-to-person 
communication that is carried out within these services. 
Social media would not have been if it weren’t for the digital and web technologies and 
applications that together facilitate social communication online. Those technologies are 
collectively termed Web 2.0 and refer to the technical aspect of the social media. Without Web 
2.0 technologies, online communication would not have been available to the extent that it is 
available today, especially at such an ease and low cost to the participants (Ahlqvist, et. al, 2008). 
Figure 2.2 below is a graphical representation of the above concepts: 
 
 
                    Figure 2.2: Social media triangle (Ahlqvist, et. al, 2008) 
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The literature review thus, reveals a common thread that runs through various definitions 
of social media: the common denominator appears to be a blend of web-based technologies and 
social interaction for the purpose of collaborative creation of content. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) 
classify social media into six distinct categories based on their work in the fields of Media Richness 
and Social Processes. In what follows, I will briefly describe each category: 
Collaborative Projects: These projects are by far the most democratic form of UGC on the web. 
They allow multiple users to simultaneously create, edit, add and remove content on the same 
projects. Collaborative projects are further divided into two categories: websites that allow users 
to create, edit and remove text-based content such as Wikipedia (the online encyclopedia), and 
social bookmarking applications which enable groups to collect and rate online links or media 
content, such as the social bookmarking service Delicious (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). 
Blogs: are typically considered as the social media equivalent of personal webpages and take a 
variety of forms from chronicles of the author’s personal life, to those in which the author shares 
their expertise in any given content area (baking blogs, home improvement, mobile application 
building blogs, etc.), to a collection of all relevant information in a given area. Blogs commonly 
have a limited number of authors (usually only one) that are authorized to contribute to the 
contents of the blog, but they also enable interaction with readers through comments (Kaplan & 
Haenlein, 2010).  
Social Networking Sites: Social Networking Sites are web-based applications that allow users to 
connect with each other through a multitude of functionalities including: creating personal 
profiles, inviting friends, colleagues and peers to access those profiles, and emailing and instant 
messaging capabilities between users. These applications enable users to create profiles that 
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contain photos, audio and video files. Facebook and Myspace are two of the most popular social 
networking sites (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).   
Virtual Game Worlds: are defined as “platforms that replicate a three-dimensional environment 
in which users can appear in the form of personalized avatars and interact with each other as 
they would in real life” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p.64). These types of virtual worlds require 
their massive multitude of users to abide by a strict set of rules and codes of conduct. The authors 
further assert that Virtual Game Worlds owe their popularity in recent years largely to the 
development of game consoles such as Microsoft’s the Xbox and Sony’s Play Station. Examples 
of these virtual worlds are the cod-medieval World of Warcraft, and Sony’s creation EverQuest. 
Virtual Social Worlds: Virtual Social Worlds are the second group of virtual worlds, although 
similar in concept to the Virtual Game Worlds, this second group allows its users more freedom 
in their behaviours, effectively enabling them to live a virtual life quite similar to their real one. 
The inhabitants of the Virtual Social Worlds are called “residents” and similar to Virtual Game 
Worlds, they too appear in the form of avatars interacting in a three-dimensional virtual 
environment mimicking real life situations such as swimming, enjoying the virtual sunshine etc. 
However, this second type of virtual worlds doesn’t impose any possible restrictions on the 
interactions of its avatars other than the basic laws of physics such as gravity. Second Life is an 
example of one of the most popular Virtual Social World applications (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). 
Content Communities: Kaplan and Haenlein (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), observe that the main 
intention of content communities is to share “media content between users” (p.63). There are a 
variety of content communities for every type of media format such as BookCrossing for the 
exchange of text and sharing books, Flicker (photos), YouTube (videos), and even multimedia 
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content communities such as SlideShare for PowerPoint presentations. Although the content on 
these applications is in large part user generated, their main focus is on the sharing of the media 
content regardless of its creator.  
The corpus of the empirical observations for this research is based on video files posted on 
YouTube, specially the video communications of the campaigns of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi 
Karoubi. Large number of videos documenting the events of the Green Movement were taken via 
participants’ personal mobile phones and other recording devices and uploaded onto YouTube to 
share with each other and with the rest of the world. In an environment where foreign journalists 
were expelled and the state tightly guarded the spread of information within the country and 
beyond, YouTube became an invaluable asset for the protestors to communicate what was taking 
place on the streets.  The informative nature of YouTube videos along with the ease of accessibility 
and media richness of video data compared to texts and images, were the main reasons for 
selecting this application for my study. While videos make up the bulk of the empirical 
observations for this study, other media including websites, newspaper articles, audio files, twitter 
feeds etc. are also employed to assist with my research. 
2.3.1 Advantages of Social Media for Ordinary Citizens 
Inherent in the nature of social media are characteristics that have shifted the role ordinary 
citizens play in the process of creating and disseminating information. This shift in roles has 
provided the premise for the democratization of content (Solis & Breakenridge, 2009). In the 
traditional broadcast mechanism, industrial media influence the flow of information by controlling 
the creation and distribution of content. However, social media have provided an alternative to 
the traditional one-to-many model by offering citizens a many-to-many broadcast model in which 
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they widely participate in the creation and dissemination of information, thus exhorting enormous 
power over the flow of information. 
Like the traditional industrial media, social media are capable of reaching both global and 
small local audiences (Morgan, Jones, & Hodges, 2012). For example, both a tweet and a television 
production may reach millions of people or they may reach few. However, social media hold some 
advantages over the industrial mass media that make them more appealing to the ordinary citizen. 
Below I will describe some of these factors based on the work of Morgan, Jones and Hodges 
(Morgan, Jones, & Hodges, 2012):  
Accessibility: the means of production for traditional mass media are usually owned either 
by the government or large corporations, which makes them inaccessible to ordinary people. 
Social media on the other hand are widely available to the public at little or no cost. 
Usability: production and dissemination of content in the context of industrial media 
generally requires specialized skills and training. Similar productions involving social media 
require modest training and often a simple reinterpretation of existing skills would suffice. 
Theoretically, anyone with web access could participate in the production of content in social 
media. 
Immediacy: The nature of production in industrial media sometimes can create long time 
lapses between when an event occurs and when it is communicated. Social media however is 
often capable of instantaneous recording and reporting of information.   
Permanence: Once content is created by means of industrial mass media, alterations to 
that content are often impossible (once a TV documentary has aired it cannot change), whereas 
social media content are highly adaptable to editing. 
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The above attributes are partly what differentiate social media from traditional mass 
media, making it more adaptable by citizens, especially in their quest to draw attention to social 
and political affairs. In the past several years social media have been central to social, political 
and democratic  movements such as the Occupy movement, the Iranian Green Movement, the 
so called Arab Spring, and even Barack Obama’s first and second presidential campaigns. Through 
social media the protesters in Iran were able draw attention to the events that followed the June 
2009 presidential elections and became known as the Green Movement. Within hours and 
sometimes minutes of an incident, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter feeds were buzzing with 
detailed accounts of that incident. At some point when most foreign journalists covering the 
elections were forced to leave, Western industrial media’s sole source of information regarding 
the events in Iran, were ironically those social media feeds. A phenomenon that known as: Citizen 
Journalism.  
Studying the 1979 revolution reveals a common pattern of media usage by the Iranian 
protesters, leading one to conclude that while the medium of communication has changed in the 
Green Movement, the trend and the rationale remain the same. Audio cassettes played a major 
role in the Islamic Revolution over 30 years ago. During 1978-79, while in Paris, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s sermons, messages and revolutionary instructions were recorded on the cassette tapes 
for the consumption of the revolutionary crowd. These tapes were then phoned in to Iran, and 
from there Khomeini’s disciples distributed copies of the tape, by playing them through the loud 
speakers of the mosques or transcribed and distributed them in the form of leaflets called “Shab 
Nameh” (literally: letters of the night, since they were often distributed secretly).  Sreberny and 
Mohammadi (1994), dub the audio cassette tape “Small Media” for its role in the Iranian revolution 
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in comparison with the traditional broadcasting tools (Television, Radio, the Press) which they 
refer to as “Big Media”. The authors argue that since Big Media was in the control of an 
authoritarian regime, the average citizen turned to Small Media which they could easily possess 
and control, and we can observe that this pattern repeats itself with Green Movement.  
In 2009, the radio, Television and the press, a.k.a. Big Media are still largely owned and 
controlled by the Islamic government, and those stations aired via satellite by the Iranian expats, 
although largely sympathetic to the Green Movement’s cause, too are inaccessible by the general 
public. To reiterate, Accessibility in this context refers to an individual’s access to the means of 
production of media not to be confused with access to the means of consumption of media. 
Therefore, the protesters turn once again to “Small Media”, which 30 years later is taking the form 
of social media. Despite the government tightly monitoring internet activities and limiting the 
bandwidth and at times even cutting internet service to the general public, the advances in anti-
surveillance and anti-filtering technologies in recent years greatly aid the public in accessing this 
remaining lifeline, granting them access to social media. 
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 CHAPTER 3: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0 An Overview of the Conceptual Framework 
The theoretical framework for my research is grounded in critical social theory and is based 
on the Theory of Structuration of Anthony Giddens (1984) and the Theory of Communicative 
Action (TCA) of Jorgen Habermas (1984). Structuration theory is a widely tested social theory based 
on the interactions of social structures and agency (Giddens, 1984), which are at the core of this 
research. Structuration is an ontological framework for the study of human social activities, that 
is, recurrent social activities and their transformations (Giddens, 1984). The Green Movement of 
2009 witnessed the activities of a set of social actors attempting at transforming the socio-political 
structures of domination of the Islamic regime. Structuration theory focuses on understanding 
conflict, contradiction and modes of domination and forces of emancipation, all of which are key 
to my research.  
However, since the study of production and consumption of media content that takes place 
through the interaction of structure and agency is ultimately the goal of this study, I have decided 
to alter the framework to examine “Social Action”, an integral part of the theory, through TCA 
(1984). Media usage in the context of public sphere and of the movement, as demonstrated by 
both theorists, falls within the realm of social action and must be studied as such. Theory of 
Communicative Action in my view provides greater maneuverability and offers deeper 
understanding of social action, especially as it pertains to media usage, since Habermas has done 
extensive work on the subject. Both frameworks are essentially similar in terms of falling into the 
same Humanist paradigm (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) within the broader critical social theory and in 
that they both examine the interactions of human agents with social structures within the context 
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of the public sphere. However, I believe by combining the two frameworks, I have created a 
stronger, more appropriate lens through which to conduct my study.  
The social interactions of the structure and agency occur in the context of Public Sphere, a 
discursive arena of social life where private individuals gather to discuss matters of public concern 
(Habermas, 1991). Thus, I will examine both theories against the backdrop of the Public Sphere. 
Jürgen Habermas has done extensive work on developing this concept and thus this inquiry will be 
based on his conception of the notion of Public Sphere. 
 The remainder of this document is organized as follows: situating the research in a 
sociological framework, a brief description of the various concepts of the theory of structuration, 
next various types of social action are discussed based on the Theory of Communicative Action, 
the third section will detail the concept of public sphere and its guiding principles and discusses 
those conditions in the context of Iran, lastly the various concepts above are particularized for this 
study and coded for later analysis of the data.  
3.1 Situating the Research 
My research broadly and primarily falls into the humanist paradigm and anchored in Critical 
Social Theory (CST). Traditional social theorists view themselves as observers of social conditions, 
and focus on describing and understanding social phenomenon. On the other hand, critical social 
theorists, including Habermas and Giddens, believe the researchers are not mere observers but 
their very presence influences and is influenced by socio-political systems (Ngwenyama & Lee, 
1997). In other words, critical social scientists go beyond developing a sound explanation of a social 
situation and extend their responsibilities to include the critique of unjust and oppressive 
conditions from which the actors seek emancipation.  I am interested in critically interrogating 
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what I believe are deep-seated, structural contradictions within the present socio-political and 
economic systems in Iran, instigating widespread dissent.  
Additionally CST researchers are sensitive to the lifeworlds of the social actors they study. 
Lifeworlds are the taken-for-granted stocks of knowledge; the shared normative social and cultural 
backdrop against which individuals interact (Habermas, 1984b, p. 119-52). Meaning they observe 
and extract meaning from within the social context of the actors. In other words, CST is concerned 
with interpreting and mapping the meanings of the actions of social actors from their own 
perspective, therefore it recognizes that social context is imperative not only to meaning 
construction but also to the activities the social actors participate in (Habermas, 1979; 1984). Thus, 
CST considers social actors as intelligent beings who can create and enact their own meaning, and 
thus can be critical of it (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997).   
Critical social theory is concerned with critique of oppressive socio-political situations, 
hegemony and emancipatory forces from domination, thus provides the suitable theoretical 
grounds for this research. Additionally, Habermas, one of the main contributors to CST, has already 
developed a communication theory, Theory of Communicative Action.   
In situating my research in a theoretical framework, I was looking for a theory that would 
explain the structural contradiction and communicative styles of the prominent social actors in 
Iran. Giddens Theory of Structuration (1984) and the Habermasian Theory of Communicative 
Action (1984) within the broader CST context provided this framework. 
In order to situate my research, I will try to place it in the context of a well-researched 
sociological framework articulated by Burrell & Morgan (1979). This framework illustrates four sets 
of paradigmatic assumptions underlying different social theories based on opposing assumptions 
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about the nature of social reality (ontology) and the orientation of social systems.  Figure 3.1 below 
represents Burrell and Morgan’s “Four Paradigms of Social Research” framework that I will use to 
situate my research. While there are other ways of situating my research, this framework is a well-
accepted (and well criticized) model used by many studies. I will now briefly outline the framework 
and locate my work within it. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) assumptions about ontology, the nature of social 
reality can be divided into two categories: subjective and objective. From a subjectivist point of 
view ‘reality’ is continually created by the individual and collective consciousness of the actors 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.1). On the other hand, the objectivist assumes social reality to have a 
real and objective existence prior to the cognition of the actors. This realist’s position defines the 
social world as tangible, objective and existing “out there”. Therefore to a realist, “reality” exists 
independently from the individual (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.1). To complete this short 
description of Burrell and Morgan’s model, it is necessary to summarize the assumptions about 
the nature of society as tending to regulation and stability on one hand and the other tending 
towards radical change. The sociology of regulation is concerned with understanding social 
integration and cohesion and how the social order can be maintained in society. Alternatively the 
sociology of radical change is concerned with understanding conflict, contradiction, modes of 
domination and forces of emancipation. These two sets of assumptions influence approaches (the 
epistemology) that social researchers use to inquire into and obtain knowledge about the social 
world and social affairs. 
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The Sociology of Radical Change 
 
SUBJECTIVE 
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist 
OBJECTIVE 
Interpretive Functionalist 
 
The Sociology of Regulation 
 
 
Figure.3.1: Burrell & Morgan’s four Paradigms of Social Research. Source: Burrell & Morgan (1979) 
 
In their model, Burrell and Morgan divide assumptions of epistemology into two opposing 
philosophical approaches, positivism and anti-positivism (more recently they have been criticized 
for lacking a post-positive dimension). The positivist approach is based on the assumption that the 
individual understands the nature of knowledge to be real and hard. This approach considers 
knowledge is something to be acquired and can be transmitted in a tangible form. Anti-positivism 
on the other hand, considers knowledge to be “of a softer, more subjective, spiritual or even 
transcendental kind” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 1). This approach is based on the assumption 
that knowledge has to be personally experienced by the individual and as such is essentially of a 
unique and personal nature (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Different ontology and epistemologies lead to different methodological approaches; 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) divide them into nomothetic and ideographic. In the first approach, the 
researcher perceives the social world to be an objective, external reality. Consequently the 
32 
 
research focuses on the relationships and regularities of the elements encompassing the social 
world. Ideographic approach on the other hand, relies on a more subjective view of the social 
world. As such, this approach emphasizes on understanding how the individual creates, modifies 
and interprets the world. This approach is based on the assumption that the nature of the social 
world is relative and subjective and as such unique to each individual. Thus making sense of the 
social world is only conceivable by getting close to the subject and studying their background and 
history (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
3.2 Theory of Structuration 
“Structuration theory views agency and structure as a duality in which human agents draw 
upon understandings of interpretive schemas, norms, and power during social action, and in so 
doing, produce and reproduce social structure” (Ngwenayama & Lyytinen, 1992). Thus, Giddens 
does not give primacy to either agency or structure and treats them as an interdependent 
phenomenon in this theory.  Structuration theory asserts that structures do not exist in any 
concrete sense but they are “instantiations of social actions over time intervals.” In this way, 
Structuration suggests a duality between structure and agency, in which social structures enable 
and constrain the actions of human agency. Human agents draw upon the rules and resources 
presented by structures to enable them in their social activities while at the same time being 
constrained by those structures.  Let’s take the example of the traffic laws: while this structure 
provides rules and resources for the drivers to draw upon while operating a vehicle, they also 
constraint the actions of those drivers, i.e. one is not allowed to pass a red light. 
In other view, social structures constitute both the medium and the outcome of social 
interactions. They constitute the medium because they provide the rules and resources necessary 
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to facilitate interactions. Social structures also constitute the outcome since they only exist 
through instantiation, and the rules and resources only exist as long as they are acknowledged and 
applied by the agency. They have no existence independent of the social practices they constitute 
(Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992). In a university setting, rules and regulations, whether explicitly 
stated such as the academic code of conduct or taken for granted rules such as the rules governing 
student-teacher relations, form the medium. At the same time, the concept of a university is only 
meaningful through its instantiation, i.e. as long as students attend the institute and follow its rules 
for the purpose of higher learning. If one day all students, teachers and staff decide to abandon 
the institute, all that will be left are buildings and objects. Below, I will briefly discuss the various 
concepts of the theory of Structuration. Figure 3.2 is a graphical presentation of the theory, and 
although we are mostly focusing on Social structures, Modes of Mediation, and Action and 
Interaction (discussed below), it provides a general overview of model.  
 
                               Figure 3.2: Theory of Structuration. Source: Giddens (1984) 
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3.2.1 The Agency 
Agency is the capability of human agents to consciously act in social settings. Giddens 
(1984) draws a distinction between the capability and the intention to act, stating that agency is 
not the intention of performing an act but it implies the power to do so. A student protester in the 
streets of Tehran may be capable of joining the ranks of his fellow protesters setting a police car 
on fire but have no intention to do so for fear of retaliation or just out of principle. Giddens asserts 
that the concept of agency refers to what an agent ‘does’ regardless of intentionality. Along the 
same lines, actions that agency performs may have known and intentional consequences as well 
as unknown and unintentional ones. Nevertheless, even unintended consequences may 
systematically feed back into the system and contribute to the unacknowledged conditions of 
future acts. By way of an example, I may pour salt into my coffee thinking it is sugar and after 
finding out it was salt decide not to drink the coffee. When I actually intended to sweeten my 
coffee and drink it, salty coffee is an unintended consequence of my action, which has contributed 
in my further action not to drink the coffee.   
3.2.2 Agency and Power 
 On another note, it is important to point out that agency occurs in a continuous flow of 
action, rather than individual yet combined series of acts. Therefore, agency can be viewed as the 
power that enables an individual actor to intervene in this flow and alter the events should he 
choose to (Giddens, 1984). As such the agents are not merely routinely following the rules 
presented by the social structure within which their actions fall. But they have the power, i.e. the 
choice, to intervene in the flow of actions, which grants them the possibility to modify or radically 
alter social structures (McIntosh & Scapens, 1990). Intervention is exercise of power, and “is a 
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necessary feature of action that, at any point of time, the agent ‘could have acted otherwise’ either 
positively in terms of attempted intervention in the process ‘events in the world’ or negatively in 
terms of forbearance” (Giddens, 1979, p. 56). 
In its broader sense, power implies the ability to ‘act otherwise’, i.e. to intervene in the 
flow of action or refrain from doing so with the intent of influencing particular processes or course 
of events. Power entails the ability to get things done or to alter the pre-existing states of affairs 
or processes. As mentioned above, without the ability to exercise power, that is ‘to act otherwise’, 
the agency ceases to exist. Power in a narrower sense simply entails domination.  
Nevertheless, power should not be confused with a resource. Resources are inherent in the 
social structures and are drawn upon in production and reproduction of social structures by 
knowledgeable agents. As such, although power is present in all social actions, it is not a resource, 
but resources constitute the media through which power is drawn and exercised.  
As it was mentioned above, power is not restricted to specific types of action but all social 
interactions involve power. Agency, in all social relations, assumes autonomy and independence 
to some extent. Even at their most dependent level, subordinates have resources through which 
they can influence and sway the actions of their superiors. This concept Giddens calls the dialectic 
of control. Employees withholding information from their supervisors, farmers leveraging their 
produce to bargain a higher profit and refusing to provide manpower by way of strike are examples 
of this concept.    
3.2.3 Rules and Resources 
Rules, from the Structuration theory perspective, are generalizable procedures and 
schemes that human agents apply in the production and reproduction of social structures. Thus, 
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Giddens’ (1984) definition of rules includes communication codes, linguistic rules, codes 
sanctioning morality, and other rules and norms governing social interaction of the agents. Rules 
could be articulated and explicit such as religious guidelines, and civil, constitutional and criminals 
laws, or exist as unarticulated implicit shared background knowledge such as semantic and 
grammatical rules.  
Resources on the other hand are the capability to generate command over material and 
social objects, which in turn generates power. In their social reproduction, Giddens argues, all 
agents exercise power in one form or another through controlling two types of resources, namely 
authoritative and allocative resources: Authoritative resources stem from the capability to 
coordinate the activities of social actors. Allocative resources, on the other hand, are derived from 
the control of material artifacts such as command over objects and goods, and are derived from 
the dominion of humans over nature. (Giddens, 1984).   
Macintosh and Scapens argue, ‘‘both types of resources facilitate the transformative 
capacity of human action (power in the broad sense), while at the same time providing the medium 
for domination (power in the narrow sense)” (Macintosh & Scapens 1990).  
3.2.4 Social Structures 
Giddens defines structure as “generative rules and resources that members draw upon, 
but also thereby, change in their production of society” (Giddens, 1979). Contrary to the 
functionalist perspective where structures are descriptive patterns of social interactions, in 
Giddens’ terms structures are recursively drawn upon and instantiated through the social actions 
of the human agency. Giddens (1984) identifies three types of structures in social systems: 
signification, domination and legitimation.  
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It is important to note that although distinct, these dimensions are interlinked and must be 
studied both independently and in relation to one another. For example: while signification is 
structured through language, language use always mediates aspects of domination and has a 
normative-force. Therefore, it is useless to analyze structures of signification without grasping 
their connections with domination and legitimation. Social action, the second pillar of the duality, 
is also broken down into three dimensions of communication, power and morality, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  Figure 3.3 is a graphical demonstration of this model.  
 
STRUCTURE 
 
Signification Domination Legitimation 
MODALITY Interpretive scheme Facility Norm 
INTERACTION Communication Power Morality 
 
Figure3.3 . Analytical elements of the duality of structure. Source: Giddens (1984) 
 
Structures and social interactions of humans are recursively interlinked via three 
modalities.  Modalities are the modes of mediation that human agents draw upon in the 
production and reproduction of social structures. Lyytinen & Ngwenyama (1992) define modalities 
as “modes of mediating interaction and structure.” Giddens identifies three such modalities: 
interpretive schemes, facility and norm, which will be discussed in the next section.  
Each structure is associated with particular social actions mediated through a modality. I 
will briefly explain the relationship connecting the vertical components of the diagram.  
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STRUCTURES OF SIGNIFICATION:  
In the context of social systems, signification structures are structures that signify meaning 
and understanding such as language. Interpretive schemes are the cognitive means through which 
actors communicate understanding and meaning in social interactions. In other words, the 
interpretive schemes are the shared stocks of knowledge that human agents draw upon to make 
sense of the actions and speech of other agents.  
STRUCTURES OF LEGITIMATION:   
These structures are the moral constitution of social action.  Legitimation structures are 
mediated through shared morals, norms and values of a society, and they institutionalize the rights 
and obligations of social actors (Macintosh & Scapens 1994 Structuration theory in management 
accounting). For instance, religion is a legitimation structure on which norms and values believers 
draw in social interactions to determine what is moral and just and what is not. For example, taking 
a life is a sin in Islam, but under certain conditions it is not only justified but is demanded i.e. in 
case of homosexuality, apostasy or treason.  
STRUCTURES OF DOMINATION:  
Lastly domination structures are those of power, with the intent of exerting authority and 
dominion over other social actors. Patriarchy and slavery are examples of such structures.  
Facilities are the resources through which agents draw upon the domination structures. Giddens 
identifies two types of facilities (resources):  allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources are 
those capabilities that command control over objects, goods, or material life. Authoritative 
resources refer to control over people.  
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3.2.5 Modes of Mediation 
 
Modalities are meaning generation processes that mediate production and reproduction 
of similar social practices across time and space. In other words, they link social action to the 
patterns of social structure. Giddens (1984) notes that while the modalities facilitate reproduction 
of social patterns and practices, they also allow subtle changes and variations in practice that later 
enable changes in the very structures they were reproducing. This phenomenon is dubbed duality 
of structure by Giddens (1984), which will be further discussed below.  
Social actors draw upon stocks of implicit background and explicit foreground knowledge, 
as well as material and none material resources, to mediate between social action and structures. 
Giddens (1984) defines such modalities discussed next. 
INTERPRETIVE SCHEMES:   
The implicit background knowledge or the interpretive schemes that humans accumulate 
over time from their past experiences, socializations, customs and traditions.  Signification 
structures signify meaning and facilitate symbolic representation. These processes are made up of 
interpretive rules that represent shared stocks of knowledge and organizing regimes that guide 
social interaction. Communication, which is how actors interact with the structures of signification, 
imply tapping into shared interpretive rules which are the stocks of knowledge human actors use 
to make sense of their own and other actor’s communicative action (Ngwenyama & Lyytinen, 
1992).  
FACILITY:   
It includes explicit foreground knowledge, as well as material and none-material 
resources. Explicit foreground knowledge is comprised of policies, procedures, rules of action 
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and explicit social and political norms (the constitutions, and civil and criminal codes of a country, 
etc.) that guide social actors in the process of social production and reproduction. Material and 
none-material resources on the other hand refer to social status, political position, charisma and 
special skills, etc., that some actors possess which can affect an action situation. Facilities are the 
basis by which material and none-material resources are allocated within social settings, and are 
manifested through power interactions. Wielding of power by those human agents who are 
capable of drawing on facilities to allocate material and none-material resources, in turn use this 
modality to produce and reproduce structures of domination. 
NORM:   
Those rules (religion, moral codes, etc.), norms and standards of morality that human 
agents sanction their actions base upon, and in that process they produce and reproduce social 
structures of legitimation. Norms are shared within the society where they enable understanding 
as well as sanction human interaction and thus give rise to structures of legitimation within the 
society.  
The three dimensions of structure, social action and modes of mediation are intricately 
interlined. Ngwenyama and Lyytinen (1992) state “while signification is structured through 
language, language use always mediates aspects of domination and has a normative-force. 
Therefore, it is useless to analyze structures of signification without grasping their connections 
with domination and legitimation” (p.23). 
3.2.6 The Psychological Makeup of the Agent 
Intervention in the ongoing flow of social life demands agents to continually monitor their 
actions and their consequences and respond by drawing upon the implicit stocks of mutual 
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knowledge. This concept is introduced by Giddens as the Reflexive Monitoring of Action, and 
defined as: “the purposive, or intentional, character of human behaviour, considered within the 
flow of activity of the agent; action is not a string of discrete acts, involving an aggregate of 
intentions, but a continuous process” (Giddens, 1984). 
Giddens argues that although those stocks of mutual knowledge are not directly accessible 
to the consciousness of the agent, human agents are ‘purposive’. Meaning agents not only hold 
reasons for their actions they can “routinely and for the most part without fuss maintain a 
continuing “theoretical understanding” of the grounds of their activity” (Giddens, 1984, p.5). In 
other words, Agents hold reasons for their activities and if asked can discursively detail those 
reasons.  
Associated with reflexive monitoring are two levels of consciousness: practical and 
discursive. Practical consciousness is what actors know about their social settings, it’s that 
“theoretical understanding” that was discussed above. If asked, most actors can explain ‘what they 
do’ in social settings, Giddens refers to this behavior as rationalization of action. At the practical 
level agents are aware of the implicit stocks of mutual knowledge they rely on to act and interpret 
social events but cannot express them discursively.  Absence of discursive reasoning should not be 
confused with that of rationalization of action, since the latter doesn’t entail providing discursive 
reasoning for any particular conduct, or even the capability to do so. Rationalization of action 
implies an ‘intentionality’ in the actions of an agent Giddens describes, carried out in a taken for 
granted manner.  
Discursive consciousness, on the other hand, is reflexive, enabling actors to utilize their 
linguistic skills to express their social conditions, especially those conditions surrounding their 
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actions. At the discursive level, agents are capable of rationalizing ‘what they do’, explicitly 
describing the intentions behind their actions. Contrary to practical consciousness, at the 
discursive level actors are not just aware of their activities, but they can discursively express the 
reasons and intentions that motivate those actions. The two levels of consciousness are driven by 
motivation lodged in the agent’s unconscious. Although agents can generally discursively express 
reasons for their activities and rationalize their actions, they can not necessarily do the same for 
their motives (Giddens, 1984). 
In Giddens’ construction of the agent, the primary need for psychological and ontological 
security is the foundation of the unconscious. Situations that are predictable, stable over time, and 
ordered in space are an important means of coping with unconscious anxiety (McIntosh & Scapens, 
1990). The unconscious motivation for psychological security is a significant component of the 
theory of Structuration. The unconscious motivation for ontological security explains, why agents 
routinely reproduce social terms, even those which they might clearly recognize as excessively 
coercive. Although there are no clear barriers between discursive and practical levels of 
consciousness, Giddens argues, there are boundaries centered principally on repression, between 
discursive consciousness and the unconscious (Giddens,1984). 
3.3 Social Action: Theory of Communicative Action 
In critical social theory, social action refers to: action that is oriented towards others against 
a social backdrop (i.e. an organization, in a society etc.) (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). In Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas (1979; 1984; 2000) argues public speech can fall into one of two 
categories of strategic action and be oriented to success, or communicative action and oriented to 
reaching mutual understanding. He makes a clear distinction between two different categories of 
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speech acts by stating “types of interaction can be distinguished according to the various 
mechanisms…I speak either of ‘communicative action’ or of ‘strategic action’, depending upon 
whether the actions of different actors are coordinated by way of ‘reaching an understanding’ or 
‘exerting influence’ ” (Habermas, 1992, p.70). 
Action orientation refers to the basic goal or focus of the action type. Orientation is what 
ultimately the action type is trying to achieve. Communicative action has the potential to obtain 
cooperation among social actors and could lead to conflict resolution and solidarity. Moreover, 
Habermas (1979; 1984; 2000) also distinguishes between conditions of conscious and unconscious 
deception in communication, recognizing that strategic action “could lead to a range of outcomes 
some of which are antithetical to democratic discourse (Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 
2009, p. 178). Dramaturgical action is another goal-oriented action type that may be present in a 
discourse. Habermas defines this type of action as presentation of the self in a stylized manner 
(Habermas, 1984a). Table 3.1 describes the various action types and their potential outcomes 
relevant to public communications: 
Table 3.1 Action types and potential outcomes. Source: Adapted with some changes from Cukier et al. (2009) 
SOCIAL ACTION ACTION SUB-TYPE ORIENTATION POTENTIAL OUTCOME 
Communicative None  Achieving 
understanding 
Cooperation 
Dramaturgic None  Achieving success Influencing 
Strategic Open strategic  Achieving success Influencing 
 Concealed strategic Conscious deception Achieving success Manipulation 
  Unconscious deception Achieving success Systematically distorted 
communication 
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3.3.1 Strategic Action 
Orientation to success implies social actors essentially act with the intention of achieving a 
desired state of affairs (Habermas, 1984).  To reach those goals actors primarily engage in activities 
that are expected to deliver success efficiently. Habermas dubs this action type teleological action 
and describes it as purposive-rational, or goal oriented: behaviour directed at obtaining rational 
measureable objectives, i.e. achieving success. Success is measured by how closely the actor has 
met his goals. Actors may engage in arbitrary exercise of power and/or manipulation to attain their 
objective.  
A form of teleological action is called strategic action. Following the rules of rational choice, 
strategic action focuses on influencing the behaviour of opponents (other social actors) and 
transforming their behaviour into conforming to the agent’s preferred outcome. Actors engaged 
in strategic action essentially predict the behaviour of other agents directed by a goal, and hence, 
try to manipulate the process. Strategic action is distinguished from other types of action in two 
fundamental ways: 1) strategic action focuses on influencing and manipulating human behavior, 
2) agents engaged in strategic action are conscious their opponents may also attempt to influence 
their behaviour by engaging in counter-action (Ngwenyama & Lyytinen, 1997). This trend is 
described by Giddens (1984) as the dialectic of control. Actors engaged in strategic action recognize 
that “all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinates can 
influence the activities of their superiors” (Giddens, 1984, p.16). While involved in strategic action, 
actors rely on their knowledge of the rules of the process to examine the goals that can be 
successfully reached and to similarly gauge their opponent’s potential for counter action. 
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CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC ACTION:   
Strategic action may be openly admitted or covert depending on the conflict situation. In 
case of open or manifest strategic action, at least one of the parties openly admits to using 
language in a way that indicates clearly their goal to reach success or to serve their self-interests, 
thus influencing the outcome. Strategic action stems from authoritative resources, as per Giddens’ 
definition, thus there is an associated claim to power. Giving an order to a subordinate is one such 
example where the person in the position of authority openly attempts to influence her 
subordinate. Strategic action could also be concealed or latent, in which case Habermas (2000), 
further divides this type of strategic action into two categories of conscious deception and 
unconscious deception. In the case of conscious deception or manipulation “at least one of the 
parties behaves with an orientation toward success, but leaves others to believe that all the 
presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied” (Habermas, 2000, p.169). Furthermore 
manipulation means “at least one of the participants is deceiving the other(s) regarding the non-
fulfillment of the conditions of communicative action which he or she apparently accepted” 
(Habermas, 1982, p.264). Unconscious deception on the other hand is a more complex case of 
strategic action and leads to systematically distorted communication, which occurs when the 
internal organization of speech is interrupted. Systematically distorted communication occurs 
when “at least one of the participants is deceiving himself or herself regarding the fact that he or 
she is actually behaving strategically while he or she has only apparently adopted an attitude 
oriented to reaching understanding” (Thompson & Held, 1982, p.264). 
While manipulation involves deception, systematically distorted communication is about 
self-deception. While in both cases a border is crossed and the goal is no longer mutual 
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understanding, manipulation involves deliberately hiding an end from one or more of the 
interlocutors. But in systematically distorted communication “interlocutors deceive themselves; 
they think they are in control of exchanges whose purpose is mutual understanding; in fact, they 
have ceded control” (Gross, 2010, p.338). Systematically distorted communication is a powerful 
tool used by systems of domination and oppression and as such are important to examine.  
3.3.2 Dramaturgical Action 
Dramaturgy is the “presentation of self” (Habermas, 1984a, p.86) in a favourable light to 
others, and thus falls into teleological (goal-oriented) action category (Habermas, 1984). “The 
concept of dramaturgical action refers primarily neither to the solitary actor neither to the 
member of a social group, but to the participants in interaction constituting a public for one 
another, before whom they present themselves. The actor evokes in his public a certain image, an 
impression of himself…” (Habermas, 1984a, p.86). In other words, social agents can monitor public 
access to their intentions, thoughts, and desires, a system only they have privileged access to. 
Thus, the agent’s action does not signify a spontaneous expression of the self, but a stylized 
presentation with a view to the audience (Bolton, 2005).  
3.3.3 Communicative Action 
Communicative action on the other hand, is oriented towards reaching mutual 
understanding where the driving factor is the force of a better argument. Habermas explains 
(Habermas, 1984a, p.86 ) “communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two subjects 
capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-
verbal means).  The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their 
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plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement” (Habermas, 1984a, 86). 
Habermas stresses that the process of reaching mutual understanding cannot be undertaken while 
trying to reach an agreement about something and exerting influence on one or more participants 
simultaneously. Thus, mutual understanding can only be reached via the power of rational 
argument and cannot be imposed strategically or otherwise by one party on the other (Habermas, 
2000).  
Orientation to understanding implies social actors seek to communicatively coordinate and 
reach an agreement with other communicating actors in their world. Although seeking a mutual 
agreement, it is critical to understand that such actors are also in pursuit of their own goals. The 
key difference, however, is the actors coordinate their action plans based on a communicatively 
reached agreement and a common understanding of the state of affairs instead of direct power 
exercise or manipulation of other actors. Communicative action is oriented towards reaching 
common understanding amongst social actors. In this case, the desire to reach mutual 
understanding replaces the orientation to success. Habermas asserts that communicative action is 
an individual action concerned with reaching consensus in a group via cooperation (Habermas, 
1984a, p. 85-101 and 284-288).  
Mutual understanding is achieved via rational argumentation, negotiating a shared 
understanding of the norms, values, and objectives, and by defining shared expectations, and 
assumptions. Success of communicative action is highly dependent on the spirit of the cooperation 
under which consensus is achieved and the extent to which individual plans of action were 
coordinated.   
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Communicative action is enacted by way of language and other symbolic interactions 
present in communication (i.e. body language). Social actors draw upon common interpretive 
schemes, and a pool of shared background knowledge, assumptions and beliefs to engage to make 
sense of the world and reach a mutual understanding of their surroundings. Ngwenyama and 
Lyytinen (1997) argue that actors engaged in communicative activity presuppose a common 
language, media and shared interpretive schemes. Habermas further explains, while engaged in 
communicative activity, social actors claim validity to the four criteria of ideal discourse, namely 
truth, legitimacy, sincerity and comprehensibility. In other words, theoretically speaking, 
communicative activity takes place in the ideal discourse situation.  
Although the goal of communicative action is to reach consensus and mutual 
understanding, Habermas doesn’t deny the possibility of conflict amongst participants. When 
conflict arises in a situation and participants no longer agree on the truth, legitimacy, sincerity and 
comprehensibility of a communicated message by an actor(s), communicative action can no longer 
take place. Instead, he argues, in situations of conflict, social actors either resort to discursive 
activity to restore the conditions of understanding, or to strategic action to influence and coerce 
other actions to achieve success. 
3.3.4 Validity Claims and Speech Acts 
In order for human agents to understand communication, decode a discourse and interpret 
the meaning, they first decide on the orientation of the speaker. Habermas argues every 
communication among actors implies a set of four validity claims, namely the truth, legitimacy and 
comprehensibility of the utterance and the sincerity of the speaker. “An engaged listener (or 
reader) will interrogate the speech (or text) to test the implied validity claims. When any of the 
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validity claims are contested or found wanting, such speech (i.e. strategic communication) can be 
viewed as deviating from achieving mutual understanding and may be oriented towards open or 
concealed strategic action on the part of the speaker” (Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 
2009, p. 178). These validity claims facilitate understanding communication but they also provide 
the general basis for critically examining speech, according to Cukier et al. This paper will therefore 
use the four-part validity claim test developed by Cukier et al., to determine the orientation of 
speech acts. Chapter 5 will discuss this methodology in detail. 
3.4 The Public Sphere  
The public sphere is an arena of social life where private individuals gather to hold rational 
discussion about matters of public concern or common interest and to influence political action 
through that process. It is against this backdrop that the structuration unfolds and will be studied 
as such in this project.  
In other words it is to discuss and identify societal problems, and influence political action 
through debate. It is "a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss 
matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment” (Hauser, 1998). 
Public sphere encompasses a wide array of public institutions, such as the parliament, political 
parties, mass media (mainstream and social), lobby and special interest groups, corporations, as 
well as clubs and gatherings where socio-political matters are discussed. Jürgen Habermas (1996), 
the most influential figure on the topic, defines the public sphere as an “intersubjective shared 
space” governed through principles of “communicative rationality” (p.361). While autonomous 
from both the state and the private sphere, Public sphere mediates between the state authority 
and the society and as such is the cornerstone of democracy since it empowers and organizes 
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citizens to stand up to public authority. Therefore, a strong democratic state requires a public 
sphere of informal citizen deliberation that forms public opinion through rational debate and 
steers political systems critically (Dahlberg, 2005). 
Through his work, Habermas provides a socio-political history of the inception and 
transformation of the public sphere in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Europe. In 
this historical analysis, Habermas points out that although public sphere is considered a theoretical 
concept, the discursive arenas of social life such as France’s salons, England’s coffee houses and 
Germany’s Tischgesellschaften are considered the physical manifestations of this sphere 
(Habermas, 1991). He also describes how after the emergence of the printing press, this arena 
slowly moved to the newspapers and other print media. Following that logic, one can extend that 
definition and draw the conclusion that with the emergence of the digital media and the internet, 
public sphere, although not completely but to a great extent, moved to the virtual world. It is the 
intention of this paper to study the public sphere and its manifestation in the virtual space and 
analyzing those discussions and debates that take place on the various social media platforms in 
the context of the Iranian Green Movement. 
Although widely discussed by theorists, Jürgen Habermas’s theories of the public sphere 
remain central to the discussion because his account is the most systematically developed critical 
theory of the concept to this date (Dahlberg, 2005; Dahlgren 2005; Fraser 1990). Additionally, 
Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), the concepts of which are intertwined with 
those of the public sphere, is central to this paper and as such this study will adopt a Habermasian 
approach to the principles of the public sphere.  
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3.4.1 Communicative Rationality 
Habermas views the role of public sphere as mediating between the society and the sphere 
of the public authority or the state via “publicity” (Habermas, 1991). Publicity refers to the “public” 
nature of the discourse taking place in the public sphere that shapes the “public opinion” and 
permits the formation of political will (Dahlgren 2005).  Habermas defines "public opinion" as “the 
tasks of criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally and, in periodic elections, 
formally as well practices vis-á-vis the ruling structure organized in the form of a state” (Habermas, 
Lennox, & Lennox, 1974). Central to the Habermasian public sphere is the concept of 
communicative rationality which describes a rational critical discourse also referred to as 
argumentation, where participants’ actions are coordinated based on reaching mutual 
understanding rather than manipulation or domination, oriented towards achieving success. 
Mutual understanding is achieved via rational argumentation, negotiating a shared understanding 
of the norms, values, and objectives, and by defining shared expectations, and assumptions 
(Habermas, 1984). The result is a communicatively constituted public sphere where rationally 
formed public opinion can critically guide the political system. In other words, the Habermasian 
public sphere presupposes a form of communicative rationality: a reflexive and impartial space 
where arguments are critical, rational and validity claims well-reasoned (Dahlberg, 2005).  
While Habermas and others often refer to the public sphere in a singular form, it is essential 
to understand the plural nature of the public sphere in that it is constituted of a shared collective 
of many different communicative spaces (Dahlgren, 2005). As Lincoln Dahlberg (2005) notes: 
 “when talking of the public sphere, Habermas is not talking about a homogenous, specific public, 
but about the whole array of complex networks of multiple and overlapping publics constituted 
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through the critical communication of individuals, groups, associations, social movements, 
journalistic enterprises, and other civic institutions” (p.112). Private Citizens hence become public 
actors in the public sphere, exercising public reasoning and rational argumentation standing up to 
public authority.  
3.4.2 Conditions and Principles of the Public Sphere 
Habermas’s conception of the public sphere includes the two vital organs of information 
and political debate such as the print, broadcast and social media, as well as the institutions of 
political debate such as parliaments, public assemblies, literary and political clubs and other public 
spaces where socio-political discourse ensues (Kellner, 2000). These organs enable individual 
citizens and groups to critically express their opinion on all matters of general interest, shaping the 
public opinion and thus influencing the political process. The public sphere essentially allows the 
establishment of a realm of critically debated and formed public opinion that ultimately stands up 
to the sphere of public authority (the state, corporations, special interest groups, etc.). As 
previously discussed, public sphere is a realm of open debate about all matters of public interest 
employing the tools of discursive argumentation for the purpose of reaching consensus and mutual 
understanding. Inherent in this definition are the principles of freedom of press, speech, assembly 
and political participation, which guarantee an individual’s right to freely argue their opinion and 
participate in political debate and decision making without any fears or threats of reprisal and 
punishment. To further protect the rights and freedoms of citizens and groups from infringement 
by the state authority, the establishment of an independent judicial system in crucial.  In most 
Western democracies the judiciary is mandated with mediating the claims between individuals and 
the state as well as between various individuals (Kellner, 2000). Media is central to a thriving public 
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sphere as it is the vehicle through which information is disseminated and public debate facilitated, 
thus it will be discussed next. 
3.4.3 Role of Media in the Public Sphere 
Media assumes a central role in the political conception of the public sphere as it has the 
power and the tools to shape public opinion and exhort social control. For Habermas the primary 
function of media is facilitating rational discourse and critical argumentation (Kellner, 2000). In the 
absence of discursive argumentation, Habermas (1991) argues, the institutions of public sphere, 
i.e. mass media, pose a threat to democracy, since they have the power to “select, shape and 
present messages and to strategically use political and social power to influence agendas and 
frame public issues without deliberation of citizenry” (Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 
2009, p.177). Mass media mold public opinion, and in the absence of critical discourse citizens 
have become spectators of media presentation and their key role as the primary actors of the 
public sphere is reduced to objects of news, information and public affairs (Kellner, 2000). 
Habermas calls this phenomenon the “colonization of the public sphere” by the state, corporations 
and special interest groups (Habermas, 1991). To this extent, Habermas has devoted significant 
consideration to the critical analysis of the roll of mass media in the public sphere, stating “those 
who work in the politically relevant sectors of the media system (i.e., reporters, columnists, 
editors, directors, producers, and publishers) cannot but exert power, because they select and 
process politically relevant content and thus intervene in both the formation of public opinions 
and the distribution of influential interests” (Habermas, 2006, p. 419). 
Furthermore, he argues that while media is structurally independent, particular actors in 
the public sphere hold a powerful position when it comes to negotiating privileged access to the 
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media.  The political elite (politicians and political parties) are by far the strongest in that they 
supply a large share of the media content (news and commentary). However, considering the high 
level of both material and organizational resources that representatives of functional systems 
(corporations and lobbyists) and special interest groups hold, they too enjoy privileged access to 
the media. Their position enables them to use professional techniques and employ corporate 
communication management methods to “transform social power into political muscle”, 
colonizing the public sphere for their market imperatives (Habermas, 2006, p. 419). As a 
consequence of this privileged access to mass media, the actors of civil society are placed in a 
weaker position compared to politicians, lobbyists and the advocates of special interest groups 
(Habermas, 2006). 
3.4.4 Systematically Distorted Communication, Ideology and Hegemony 
In this section, I will sketch a genealogy to describe the relationship between systematically 
distorted communication, ideology and hegemony implemented by totalitarian regimes, all taking 
place within the context of the public sphere. This will help us develop a more clear understanding 
on the impacts and implications of distorted communication in ideological regimes such as that of 
the Islamic Republic. 
In Knowledge and Human Interest (Habermas, 1971, p. 274-284), Habermas describes 
ideology as the shared networks of belief that ground self-deception and impede improvement 
yet remain unexamined. The self-deception involved in this practice is rooted in the justification 
of inequalities in power and in economic, social and political life.  Therefore, to preserve their 
gains, that segment of the society that benefits from such inequalities intervenes through the 
power of state to substitute for the legitimacy that can only result from rational and critical debate 
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in the public sphere. In other words, ideology can be thought of as the fake substitute for 
communicative rationality in the public sphere (Gross, 2006; 2010). Habermas stresses that such 
power manifests itself not as blatant imposition of force but as a barrier to critically interrogating 
and exposing ideological justifications in the public sphere: 
Structural violence is not manifest as violence; instead it blocks in 
an unnoticed fashion those communications in which are shaped and 
propagated the convictions effective for legitimation. Such a hypothesis 
about unnoticed yet effective barriers to communication can explain the 
formation of ideologies; they can make plausible how convictions are 
formed by which the subjects deceive themselves about themselves and 
their situation. Illusions that are afforded the power of common 
convictions are what we name ideologies (Habermas 1983, 184). 
 
Thus, structural violence gives rise to ideologies, and ideologies are justified through 
systematically distorted communication. Moreover, systematically distorted communication is the 
linguistic manifestation of a regime that dominates through real and structural violence; such 
regimes are dominated by an ideology (Habermas, 1983, p. 176).  
At this point it is important to make a conceptual distinction between ideology and 
hegemony, a distinction that Habermas does not make (Gross, 2010). Ideology is a network of 
taken-for-granted convictions that remain critically unreflect upon, while hegemony is a network 
that consists of “the whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living; our senses 
and assignments of energy, or shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world” (Gross, 2010, 
p.341). In other words, hegemony means ideological domination, and “ideologies expressed in the 
form of systematically distorted communication are the visible manifestations of hegemonic 
regimes” (Gross, 2010, p.341).  
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Hegemonic regimes limit critical debate and mutual understanding by colonizing the public 
sphere with systematically distorted communication. While hegemonic regimes are not in and of 
themselves coercive, in totalitarianism however, hegemony fully identifies with the coercive state 
(Gross, 2010). Thus, in totalitarian regimes such as Iran, the physical and structural violence of the 
hegemonic state dominating through ideology, trumps the force of the better argument (i.e. 
communicative action), increasing the potential for the political elite to engage in distorted 
communication. In turn, communication distortions impede freedom of speech, and threaten the 
survival of the public sphere and by extension freedom of speech, which are central to this study. 
3.4.5 Steering Media, Lifeworlds, and the Public Sphere 
In the Habermasian critical theory, the society functions via three ‘steering mechanisms’ of 
power, money and solidarity (Between facts and norms, Habermas, 1996). The first two are 
enacted in systems, the political system and the economic system respectively, and the third 
operates within the lifeworlds of individuals. Lifeworlds are the taken-for-granted stocks of 
knowledge; the shared normative social and cultural backdrop against which individuals interact 
(Habermas, 1984b, p. 119-52). Systems are dominated by Strategic action which is goal-oriented 
and aims to deliver successful plans but lifeworlds, on the other hand, are governed by 
communicative action which is oriented towards mutual understanding and whose sole force is 
the power of the better argument, and collective self-understanding (Habermas, 1998, p.278-79). 
Thus, Habermas creates a system-lifeworld dualism that is situated within the political 
public sphere, which acts as a vehicle for communication or a “switching station” (Habermas, 1998, 
p.409). The political public sphere is the arena where conflicts arising from social and economic 
disparities, inequalities and dissatisfactions are rationally, and communicatively discussed and 
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perhaps solved (Gross, 2006). It is this rational argumentation that Habermas considers the basis 
of consensus conflict resolution amongst citizens: "the communicative mastery of these conflicts 
constitutes the sole source of solidarity among strangers-strangers who renounce violence and, in 
the cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the right to remain 
strangers" (Habermas, 1998, 308). Nevertheless, Habermas also recognizes that in the 
contemporary societies, the lifeworld is increasingly subject to imperatives from the two systems 
of polity and economy, thus now more than ever communication and social interaction play a vital 
role in politics and in the economy. 
3.5 Particularizing the Theory to My Research 
My research will use this theoretical framework to choose which social and political 
structures were targeted for change by the leaders of the Green Movement, Mousavi and Karoubi. 
To this end, I will study their communications, including campaign promises and protest messages, 
to understand the type of social action that was taken to achieve those goals. I will conduct a 
critical discourse analysis on the validity claims of those leaders regarding changing oppressive 
structures to determine the orientation of their action, i.e. success or mutual understanding. My 
analysis will look for three types of structures as defined by Giddens, namely structures of 
signification, domination and legitimation. The type of structures addressed in the Green 
Movement’s communications and the orientation of social action taken, will determine the 
outcome and thus help us understand the Green Movement, its goals and its place in Iran’s socio-
political arena. Table 3.2 summarizes the concepts that guide my inquiry: 
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Table 3.2 Code Table 
THEORETICAL CONCEPT OPERATIONALIZED DEFINITION 
Social Structures: are 
the rules and resources 
that human agents 
draw upon and also 
change in their 
production of society 
Structures of Signification: Structures that 
signify meaning and understanding such as 
effective use of language 
Those social structures targeted 
by the protesters such as 
women's right, human rights, 
the economy, the election 
process 
Structures of Domination: Structures of power, 
with the intent of exerting authority and 
dominion over other social actors 
Structures of Legitimation: Structures that 
reside over the moral constitution of social 
action 
Social Action: action 
that is oriented 
towards others 
Strategic Action: Goal oriented action aimed at 
achieving success 
The type of action the leaders of 
Green Movement engage in 
while campaigning and during 
the protests 
Dramaturgical Action: Goal oriented action 
aimed at presenting one's self in a favourable 
light to others 
Communicative Action: Oriented towards 
reaching mutual understanding and  
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 CHAPTER 4: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
4.0 An Overview of the Chapter 
In order to address RQs 4 and 5 as well as the overarching research question, this 
investigation uses a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method based on Habermas’s universal 
validity claims present in the ideal speech situation, namely, truth, legitimacy, comprehensibility, 
and sincerity (Habermas, 1984). This paper relies on an operationalized approach to CDA based on 
the work of Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton (2009), that proposes a set of questions and 
speech elements for examining and revealing the potential violations from the validity claims in 
public discourse (Cukier et al., 2009). Considering the empirical material for this study are in the 
form of videos, a descriptive content analysis (Dale 1935; Berelson 1952; Baxter, Riemer et al. 
1985; Perlmutter 1998; Neuendorf 2002; Krippendorff 2004) method will be applied in order to 
code the data for interpretation. Descriptive visual content analysis is the methodology that is used 
to “systematically code, characterize, observe, and quantify the representations within the 
population of video clips meeting set criteria” (Rutledge 2009, p. 7). An exploratory or descriptive 
visual content analysis of the collected videos helped identify the common themes in the videos 
and extract the social structures targeted for change by the actors.  
I will begin this chapter by outlining the key concepts and principles of the Habermasian 
critical discourse analysis. Next, I will define the corpus of data, including outlining the reasons for 
selecting YouTube as the medium for this study. Lastly, I will discuss content analysis, data 
collection and coding. 
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4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
As a means of analyzing discourse, critical social theorists have developed the Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology. This study uses CDA to examine the discourse of the two 
Reformist leaders in the public unrest which resulted in the Green Movement of 2009. I will 
specifically focus on their validity claims regarding two different yet interrelated structures of 1) 
patriarchy, and 2) economy. The corpus of empirical materials for the study will be drawn from the 
public speeches, interviews, and official campaign videos of the two candidates opposing the 
election results, namely Mir Hossein Mousavi and Hojatol Islam Mehdi Karoubi, before and after 
the June 2009 elections: the period of January 2009 to February 2011, when the movement largely 
lost steam, and the two leaders were under house arrest.  The CDA method for this research is an 
operationalization Habermasian critical approach proposed by Cukier et al. (2009).   
The strategy of the research will be critical interpretive focused on examining the promises 
of improving women’s rights and economic inequality made by the two Green leaders prior to and 
post elections in order to reach and mobilize the electorate in order to assume the country’s 
presidency, and implement change. Such an analysis provides a better understanding about what 
demands drove the Green Movement of 2009, and why the movement faltered. Through Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), I will examine the speeches of the two Green leaders, captured on 
YouTube videos that imposed enormous impacts on mobilizing and organizing different factions of 
the Iranian society from women and youth to moderate clerics as well as a significant segments of 
the political establishment, under the umbrella of Islamic Reformism.  
My research aims to understand how they were able to appropriate the public sphere 
discourse in order to appeal to such a wide spectrum of the society to the point of a mass uprising. 
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Specifically, I designed my project to critically interrogate the Green leaders’ speeches from two 
perspectives: a) women’s rights, b) economic inequality. Those speeches and their subsequent 
capture on videos that were later posted and widely shared on the social media, especially 
YouTube, were central and strategic to the substantial support they garnered that led to the 
violent protests of 2009. 
Within the last three decades there has been a growing resistance to the Islamic Republic, 
which has led a large segment of the society to look for an alternative that corresponds to the 
people’s demands for freedom, social justice and prosperity without the violence, cost (human 
and capital), and uncertainty involved in overthrowing yet another regime. One such alternative 
that has emerged in the late 90’s is the Reform Front, which will be discussed in chapter 5. For 
over 15 years, the Reformers have been putting forth a message of change and arguing economic 
prosperity, democracy and freedom could be achieved by reforming constitutional framework and 
political order from within. This message was articulated again in the 2009 presidential elections 
and reached its heights when the people who believed in that articulation took to the streets to 
support those ideals.  
I was especially interested in critically analyzing the speeches of the Green leaders with the 
aim to uncover their strategies of systematically distorted communication (in the Habermasian 
sense, cf. Habermas 1975, 1962, 1984). I conducted this research in an effort to find out what a 
critical interrogation of their discourses will uncover, and weather some of the inherent 
contradictions present in the Islamic Republic had found their way into the discourse of the 
movement.  While some scholars have examined the discourse of the Green Movement, no one 
has taken a systematically critical-interpretative approach. In my research I will rely on the Critical 
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Discourse Analysis approach developed by Cukier et al. (2009), which operationalizes Habermas’s 
four-part validity test of comprehensibility, truth, legitimacy, and sincerity of communication.  
While traditional discourse analysis and interpretive approaches are rooted in traditional 
hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1989) CDA is rooted in the critical hermeneutics of Habermas (1967a), 
which is concerned with uncovering power relationships and the ways in which social structures 
undermine and inhibit the emancipatory interest of citizens. The goal of Habermas’s critical 
approach is to assist citizens in emancipating themselves from ideological superstructures of 
society, such as patriarchy, which inhibit their full participation in creating the kind of society they 
want (Habermas, 1971). Within the context of the Habermasian theory of Communicative Action 
(Habermas, 1984), CDA is a method of critical investigation into the use of language and its 
implication for human beings to emancipate themselves from all forms of domination. In other 
words, CDA is the study of language that offers scholars with various backgrounds to adopt 
a social perspective in the cross-cultural study of media texts (Dellinger, 1995). It allows 
researchers to better understand deep structure, systematic communicative distortions and 
power-relations that underline communication discourse (Cukier et al., 2009).  
Cukier et al. (2009) detail the fundamental principles for applying the universal pragmatics 
to the analysis of discourse according to the Theory of Communicative Action as follows: 
The reader or hearer assumes all speech is oriented to achieving mutual understanding, 
but at the same time tests the validity claims present in the speech against the four principles of 
ideal speech. In other words, Habermas assumes that every discourse is communicative and yet 
redeemable if its implicit validity claims are thrown into question. 
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In the event any of the validity claims present in the discourse fail, the researcher must 
judge the intent of the discourse, which is done by interrogating the orientation and the objective 
of the discourse. In other words, should any of the validity claims fail, implying the discourse is no 
longer communicative, the analyst must then make a judgement call about the type of strategic 
action taken based on the objective of the discourse and the intention of the speaker. The 
discourse must be examined from the perspective of all four validity claims. 
In other words, from Habermas’ perspective while every discourse is open to critical 
interrogation, it is also redeemable based on the orientation of the speech (mutual understanding 
vs. success). Additionally, he suggests public discourse be analyzed based on the orientation and 
intentions of the speaker and impact and implications of the speech (Habermas, 2000), and thus 
draws our attention to the corpus of the argument. Therefore, in this methodology developed by 
Cukier et al. (2009), while the strategy to understand the argument and analyze public speech is 
by parsing it to the level of the sentence, the final judgement about its orientation is made based 
on the entire argument (Cukier et al.). Furthermore, Habermas emphasizes “It is possible, of 
course, for individual validity claims to be thematically emphasized… however, they are universal, 
that is, they must always be raised simultaneously, even when they cannot all be focalized at the 
same time” (Habermas, 1976, p.160).  
While Habermas lays out CDA in a conceptual framework through the Theory of 
Communicative action (TCA), he does not offer a practical methodology to conduct empirical 
analysis of text and speech. My research will utilize an operationalized version of CDA developed 
by Cukier et al. (2009) based on TCA principles. This application will be used to investigate two 
main categories of claims made by the Green leaders during the 2009 protests.  These categories 
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are the main promises that were made in regards to altering the structures of patriarchy and 
economy. Below, I will briefly outline the details. 
4.2 Operationalizing the Method 
This research is interested in investigating the speeches of the two Reformist candidates 
for the period of the January 2009 to February 2011 that imposed enormous impact on reaching 
and mobilizing different factions of the Iranian society. The theory of communicative action 
establishes that implied in every communication are four sets of validity claims, truth, 
comprehensibility, legitimacy, and sincerity that represent the context-independent and necessary 
conditions for critical interpretation and analysis of the discourse.  
The truth claim is mainly concerned with misrepresentation and whether statements are 
factual or can be refuted. Truth claims generally deal with half-truths and omissions. The validity 
test for truth claims deals with biased arguments, false statements, omissions and incomplete 
statements against which rational counterarguments cannot be formed, which could lead to 
manipulation (Van Dijk, 2006). To establish the validity of truth claims, the method tests weather 
an utterance corresponds to the ‘objective world’ but argue: “this correspondence is not always 
directly observable and must sometimes be inferred. This requires a contextualized reading of the 
text and analysis of the argument (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997), where each text is analyzed in the 
context of the entire discourse and general standards of rational argument (logical consistency, 
completeness and defensibility [cf. Toulmin et al., 1978]). Contextualization allows a consolidated 
understanding of the specific texts (text element) within the discourse context, while the standards 
of logical consistency, completeness and defensibility allow for an analysis of the quality of 
argumentation” (Cukier et al. 2009, p.180). 
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The CDA views the comprehensibility claim as the syntax and symbolic representation of 
language by investigating into if what is said audible, legible and intelligible, and whether or not 
the level of detail is too burdensome for the reader and/or hearer (Stahl, 2007). Cukier, et al (2009) 
argue that while the other three claims refer to the pragmatics of language, comprehensibility 
addresses syntax and semantics as necessary preconditions for pragmatic analysis. Indicators of 
comprehensibility in public discourse are completeness of the symbolic representation, the 
presence of a shared language and the utterance’s syntactical and semantic correctness” (Cukier 
et al., 2009, p.179). Information overload, and excessive use of a language difficult for the 
participants to comprehend, e.g. use of Arabic and hard to understand phrases by the clergy 
community, are all violations to the comprehensibility claim.  
On the other hand, the legitimacy claim is focused on the conformity of the norms and 
social context embedded in the claims. In other words, legitimacy claims test the congruity 
between an utterance and its social context (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997). Additionally, Habermas 
contends that actors can come to mutual understanding only in the context of ideal speech 
situation, which includes equal representation of all stakeholders, where everyone has an equal 
opportunity to participate in the dialogue. Therefore, an indicator of legitimacy in public discourse 
is the degree of representation of those in power and silencing of dissenting voices. Thus, it is 
important to examine the validity claims to determine which groups are marginalized or excluded 
from the discourse. 
Sincerity deals with examining the consistency of the claim (i.e. what is said is what is 
meant) and action of the speaker. Sincerity, unlike the other 3 claims, must be inferred from the 
discourse of the speaker, since we cannot observe intentions directly (Habermas, 1984). Sincerity 
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of the speaker is put to test by examining the inconsistencies between the speaker’s speech and 
action. Particularly, sincerity of the speaker is tested by interrogating what the speaker says, how 
she says it, and what she does. This methodology pays “particular attention to emotionally charged 
adjectives and nouns, to hyperbole, to metaphors and to jargon, which can be used to invoke 
powerful associations, values and larger discourses” (Cukier et al., 2009, p.181). Additionally, 
stylistic choices, e.g. wearing a chador, are of particular importance because they often have social 
and ideological implications and often signal a particular school of thought, opinion, or biases 
without being explicitly expressed but have an impact on the hearer (Van Dijk 1991).  Table 4.1 
summarizes the general approach and guiding questions for this methodology. 
Cukier et al. (2009) combine qualitative along with quantitative techniques to develop a 
rigorous method and to remedy the common criticism of CDA’s selectiveness (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002). They lay out this methodology in the following four iterative steps (for detailed discussions 
see Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 2009, p.182): 
1- Defining the corpus of data to be analyzed 
2 - Content analysis and coding procedure 
3 - Reading and interpreting the empirical observations 
4 - Explaining the findings 
Steps 1 and 2 will be detailed as follows, while 3 and 4 will be discussed in chapters 6 - Data 
Analysis and 7 - Findings respectively.  
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Table 4.1: Categories and principles of the Habermasian Critical Discourse Analysis. Source: Cukier et al. (2009) 
 
VALIDITY CLAIM 
CRITERIA FOR IDEAL 
COMMUNICATION 
POTENTIAL DISTORTION VALIDITY TEST 
SPEECH ELEMENTS FOR 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Comprehensibility 
 
What is said is audible 
(or legible) and 
intelligible. 
 
Confusion 
 
Is the communication 
sufficiently intelligible? 
 
Completeness of 
physical 
representation; 
Syntactic and semantic 
rules 
Is the communication 
complete? 
Is the level of detail 
too burdensome for 
the reader or hearer? 
Truth The propositional 
content of what is said 
is factual or true. 
Misrepresentation Is evidence and 
reasoning provided 
sufficient? 
Argumentation 
Sincerity The speaker is honest 
(or sincere) in what 
she says 
False Assurance Is what is said 
consistent with how it 
is said? 
Connotative language; 
Metaphors; 
Jargon 
Legitimacy What the speaker says 
(and hence does) is 
right or appropriate in 
the light of existing 
norms or values. 
Illegitimacy Are competing ‘logics’ 
(e.g. Stakeholders) 
equally represented? 
Use of ‘experts’ and 
‘authorities’ 
Silences 
 
4.3 Defining the Corpus of Data to be Analyzed 
The corpus of data for this research comes from official campaign releases, state TV 
interviews, and speeches prior to and post elections for the period of January 2009 to February 
2011. In what follows, I will discuss my choice of medium of communication, i.e. YouTube. 
4.3.1 What is YouTube? 
A Google company, “founded in February 2005, YouTube allows billions of people to 
discover, watch and share originally-created videos. YouTube provides a forum for people to 
connect, inform, and inspire others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original 
content creators and advertisers large and small” ("About YouTube," n.d.). The YouTube – 
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Broadcast Yourself is also the second largest search engine in the world and one of the most 
popular social media platforms in the Middle East including Iran (Qualman 2012). 
According to the published statistics by YouTube ("YouTube Statistics," n.d.): 
1. More than 1 billion unique users visit YouTube each month  
2. Over 6 billion hours of video are watched each month on YouTube—that's almost an hour 
for every person on Earth  
3. 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute  
4. 80% of YouTube traffic comes from outside the US  
5. YouTube is localized in 61 countries and across 61 languages   
The above evidence thus concludes that YouTube is equally popular amongst viewers and 
producers of video content. It is particularly important to note YouTube’s global reach, which is 
evident in the fact that 80% of its content comes from outside of the United States. Majority of 
YouTube videos are now shot and uploaded using smartphones, in fact, Google claims that more 
than 40% of global YouTube views come from mobile devices ("YouTube Statistics," n.d.). 
Additionally, 3 hours of video are uploaded to the platform each minute via mobile devices 
available on “over hundreds of millions of devices” ("YouTube: The Press," n.d.). More importantly, 
according to the statistics, every week at least 100 million people take a social action (like, share, 
comment) on YouTube (Arif, 2014), and social action is the focus of this study. 
4.3.2 YouTube as a Data Source 
Bennett and Segerberg (2011) claim that “design of a social technology can greatly 
determine the kinds of actions that people may coordinate through it” (p. 34), a view that is shared 
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by many digital media communications scholars. Like the famous claim that the medium is the 
message (McLuhan & Fiore 1967), my choice to study the Green Movement through YouTube 
videos over other forms of social media was based on the objectives of this investigation to explore 
social media as an alternative channel of communication in this political uprising. But first, I will 
discuss some statistics about the penetration and popularity of internet as a new medium of 
political communication in Iran and worldwide. 
According to the most recent reports, the number of internet users worldwide will exceed 
3 billion in 2015 ("Internet Society Global Internet Report 2014: Open and Sustainable Access for 
All," 2014), which covers almost half the world’s population of 7.3 billion, around the same time 
(World Bank, 2015). In 2011, 50% of the internet users had a mobile broadband connection; in 
2012, video made up 50% of the internet traffic; in 2013, developing countries (including Iran) had 
more than 50% of the world’s mobile broadband subscribers; and in 2014, smartphones comprised 
over 50% of all mobile phones. Thus, while internet is becoming considerably more accessible in 
the developing world, mobile and smartphone internet users are also on the rise, as is video traffic, 
all of which are directly related to this study.  
Based on The Internet Society’s ("Internet Society Global Internet Report 2014: Open and 
Sustainable Access for All," 2014) estimates Iran’s Internet User Penetration at 31% and on a 
steady rise for the past 10 years. Interestingly, in terms of the broadband internet Affordability 
Index, Iran scores in the middle (73rd place out of 153 countries), higher than China, India and 
neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The popularity of the social media in Iran began with 
blogging in response to increasing government pressure to restrict freedom of expression, 
especially of journalists. 
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“In light of this editorial censorship, many journalists who were willing to suffer the 
penalties associated with crossing the Red Line, especially the younger generation, felt 
marginalized and sought other mediums in which to report and share their opinions. They 
migrated to the Internet” ("Ctrl+Alt+Delete: Iran's Response to the Internet," n.d.) 
On the internet, blogs provided an easily accessible yet powerful means of communication 
for individual citizens and quickly became an important platform for the voice of dissent unable to 
express itself via traditional forms of media. Over the years, that trend has shifted towards other 
forms of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Despite the encouraging trend of 
Internet Penetration and despite the popularity of mobile broadband internet, restrictive and 
discriminatory internet related laws from content censorship (Iran ranks number 1 in the world in 
terms of Limit on Content), to bandwidth limitations remain the biggest challenge in Iran ("Internet 
Society Global Internet Report 2014: Open and Sustainable Access for All," 2014). 
While I am aware that Facebook, Twitter, Blogs, YouTube, and various instant messaging 
platforms were used during the Green Movement protests as a platform to communicate the 
narrative of that political uprising with the rest of the world, my study focuses on YouTube videos. 
This decision was made, in part, because in the absence of traditional media sources, YouTube was 
widely used by protesters as an alternative platform of communication and dissent in the 
aftermath of the 2009 elections with the clampdown on domestic journalists, expulsion of  
independent foreign reporters and with the state media controlled ever more tightly by the ruling 
elite. Some scholars believe that these “emergent social media networks often achieve impressive 
results, from toppling corrupt regimes to putting pressure on governments to consider popular 
feelings” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011, p.5). My study is situated within these perspectives of 
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social media and treats YouTube as a communicative tool that has proved to be popular amongst 
the crowd of the Green Movement.  YouTube not only acted as a platform of communication for 
the protesters, it also allowed their narrative to be heard worldwide. Major media outlets such as 
CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera began to frequently televise as well as upload those videos online and 
thus disseminated the voice of Iranian dissent and the subsequent political uprising worldwide 
(Rahimi, 2011).    
Another deciding factor in choosing YouTube over other forms of networked social media 
such as Twitter and Facebook is the platform’s inherent ability to become an alternative to 
traditional TV media due to its rich communicative abilities: both audio-visual and textual. As 
discussed elsewhere, the mass media in Iran is under the direct control of the regime and is in the 
service of the leadership elite. Because of the significance of the mass media and their influence 
over the masses, the Iranian leadership has always kept direct control of the Television media (Eko, 
2014). It is suffice to say that broadcast media are state owned in Iran and the head of the Radio 
and Television organization is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader to ensure compliance 
with the overall state narrative.    
Strict control of the broadcast media further hindered freedom of expression, and left 
people with no choice but to look into other sources such as BBC Persian, Al Jazeera and Voice of 
America4, as well as internet sources for access to independent information, news and 
commentary. It is worth noting that all of the above broadcasting services are only available in Iran 
via satellite dishes which are officially banned but nevertheless widely accessible to the public.  
                                                     
4 The official external broadcast institution of the United States federal government which has a Persian 
broadcasting section  
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According to Arif (2014):  
YouTube, however, bridged this gap not only for citizens to have an 
alternative to TV media, but also gave them an opportunity to become 
producers of their own narratives at the same time. It was not only 
protesters who benefitted from YouTube as an alternative to TV media 
during the political uprisings, but also traditional media organizations 
such as Al-Jazeera also followed YouTube to get updated information and 
protest-related videos shot (p. 14). 
 
In other words, YouTube plays a counter hegemonic role in authoritarian regimes such as 
Iran’s, where mass media are colonized by the ruling class. Therefore, in the absence of 
independent broadcast media, I believe studying YouTube videos will help us develop a better 
understanding of the 2009 political uprising in Iran.  
Since this investigation involves political protests in an authoritarian regime intolerant of 
dissent in any shape or form, according to Rohlinger and Brown (2009) anonymity becomes an 
important aspect of online activism enabling the protesters to engage in political communications 
without fearing for their safety. Iranian authorities routinely jail, and otherwise punish online 
activists such as bloggers Arash Sigarchi and Hossein Derakhshan, for expressing views not 
sanctioned by the regime.  Bennett and Segerberg (2011) argue the inherent anonymity of internet 
tools such as YouTube partially explain why online political activism is more popular in 
authoritarian regimes than in open societies:  
It is easy to grasp why personalized networking is so appealing in 
authoritarian regimes such as Tunisia, or Egypt, where conventional 
political organization—particularly of the democratic reform variety—is 
often policed and punished. Joining online protest networks offers at 
least a measure of anonymity and safety in the numbers of people with 
mobile phones, access to Internet cafes, or friends with tech skills, often 
resulting in dense recombinant networks (p. 41). 
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Understandably, YouTube’s cloak of anonymity played an important role in the political 
communications of the Green Movement protesters where activists continued to upload videos of 
the uprising under fake and anonymous profiles, thus keeping the dialogue alive while protecting 
their lives and their safety. This level of anonymity, however, is rather difficult to maintain on other 
popular social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. This excerpt from an article in the New 
Yorker best describe web-censoring governments’ frustration with YouTube: 
Google has diverse presences in other Web-censoring countries. In 
China and Iran, where censorship is the norm, YouTube is completely 
blocked, but in Saudi Arabia a state agency filters pornographic and other 
“immoral” sites. From 2007 to 2010, YouTube was repeatedly blocked in 
Turkey for posting videos that “insulted Turkishness” and the country’s 
founder, Kemal Ataturk. Eventually, a company in Germany asserted a 
copyright to those videos and took them down, and YouTube was 
unbanned. Google blocked the trailer for “Innocence of Muslims” in 
Indonesia, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, and Turkey after 
the governments of those countries requested removal of the video from 
YouTube. So the censorship that the site has accommodated, in various 
ways and to various extents, does not pose a dilemma for YouTube, per 
se. But it leaves possible security issues for any in-country staff, along 
with potential legal liabilities. Google would need exemption from 
country-specific laws in the window of time that exists between a 
potentially offensive video being uploaded and it being removed or 
restricted on the site. But, as Google stated in its letter to the Lahore 
High Court, it hasn’t been offered that protection in Pakistan. (The letter 
says that Google requires more than just an expression of goodwill from 
the Lahore High Court; it needs a “legislative change” in Pakistan that 
insures Intermediary Liability Protection for Web forums in general)” 
(Sethi 2013, p.3). 
 
Next, not only anonymity but the integrated and networked nature of YouTube also makes 
it an important focus in the study of social media’s role in political uprisings. Arif (2014) describes 
YouTube’s integrated and networked nature as the site’s ability “to be accessed, viewed, 
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commented, and disseminated via Facebook and Twitter by simply having access to smartphones, 
computers, and the availability of an Internet connection” (p. 14). Furthermore, some scholars 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2011; Arif 2014) maintain that YouTube not only serves as an empowering 
tool of political communication, it also allows ordinary citizens to engage in reporting activities by 
further disseminating the content online. 
Additionally, YouTube’s global reach and broad accessibility, were important deciding 
factors: even in countries like Iran where the site has been banned since December 6, 2006 (Tait, 
2006), citizens can download software such as V.P.N to bypass firewalls and internet filtering. 
Lastly, for the purpose of this investigation, YouTube proved to be an excellent source of archival 
data compared to other social media platforms that could be accessed and collected without 
raising user privacy concerns (Facebook), considerable expense (Twitter) or specialized software 
(Blogs). 
4.4 Content Analysis and Coding Procedure 
My study is of deductive nature, meaning it involves testing an empirical situation, e.g. the 
Green Movement, against a theory or set of theories, e.g. Structuration-TCA framework, thus 
validating or extending the conceptual framework (Blaikie, 2010). Content Analysis is one of the 
qualitative techniques suited to conducting research based on deductive reasoning (Patton, 2002). 
Although less common in deductive qualitative research, the content analysis approach is 
increasingly being used in this field (Arif (2014); Hazra (2014); Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2006; 
Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007; Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2003), and as such is adopted for this 
inquiry. 
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While Content Analysis was developed within communication studies in the 20th century, 
empirical inquiries into the content of communications dates back to the 16th century, when the 
Church was concerned about the spread of non-religious propaganda by newspapers 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p.3). Klaus Krippendorff (2004), a prominent scholar in the field, defines 
Content Analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from text (or 
other meaningful matter) to the context of their use” (p.18). Content Analysis is a reliable, 
multipurpose and rigorous technique that may be applied to many empirical situations 
(Neuendorf, 2002) from social identities associated with smartphones (Hazra, 2014), to the 
analysis of naturally occurring language (Markel, 1998 got this from p. 1 of Neuendorf), and from 
organizational culture and software process improvement (Ngwenayama & Nielsen, 2003) to video 
analysis of social movements (Arif, 2014). The Content Analysis approach is adaptable to “all kinds 
of communications—texts, images, interviews, and observational records” (Krippendorff & Bock 
2009, p. 2), which is why it was selected for this inquiry. 
Neuendorf (2002) argues that what distinguishes content analysis from other qualitative and 
interpretive message analysis, is the extent to which it attempts to meet the standards of scientific 
method (Bird, 1998; Klee, 1997 which includes satisfying the following criteria among others: 
reliability, validity, and replicability. Accordingly, reliability is “the extent to which a measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Neuendorf 2002, p.12). Validity on the other 
hand, “refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects what humans agree 
on as a real meaning of a concept” (Neuendorf 2002, p.12). Finally Replicability “is a safeguard 
against overgeneralizing the findings of one particular research endeavor” (Neuendorf 2002, p.12). 
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The above criteria testify to the scholarly rigor of the empirical measure, i.e. Content Analysis, as 
the chosen methodology for this study.   
Berelson (1952) provides one of the first and more comprehensive definitions of the 
Content Analysis methodology: "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p. 18). Holsti (1969) 
emphasizes that content analysis is "any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (p.14). From this perspective, 
audiotapes, photographs and video clips and any other form of communication that can be made 
into text are amenable to the Content Analysis method. To that effect, Abrahamson (1983) also 
suggests “content analysis can be fruitfully employed to virtually examine any type of 
communication” (286), thus making content analysis an appropriate method of analysis for 
analyzing the videos included in this study. Additionally, more recently the historical definition of 
content analysis has been updated to include the new modes of human communication such as 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT’s), internet, and social media, the latter of 
which is the most relevant concept to this study. Earl Babbie’s (2015) definition is one such 
example that attempts to incorporate the new modes of human communication in order to keep 
the approach relevant in modern times: "content analysis is the study of recorded human 
communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws" (p. 323). Definitions such as 
Babbie’s are more comprehensive and appropriate for today’s research projects, encompassing 
the revolutionary new media of communication such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.  
This research adopts a Descriptive Content Analysis approach, which describes the content 
of and relationships among the variables in a message pool (Neuendorf, 2002, p.54). Considering 
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the deductive nature of this study implies adopting a descriptive/explanatory approach, this 
method of analysis renders appropriate. My dissertation uses the descriptive Content Analysis 
approach to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the Green Movement political uprising in Iran 
through the lens of video clips. According to Arif (2014) “Descriptive visual content analysis is not 
only the proper tool for finding commonalities of themes among the video clips of political protests 
under study, but it also provides a means of describing and contextualizing multiple angles and 
observations regarding these videos” (p.85).  
As per my previous discussion, this inquiry is of an exploratory study of YouTube videos and 
thus visual content analysis is the most appropriate approach to conduct critical discourse analysis. 
This method is made particularly more rigorous when combined with the descriptive content 
analysis of the videos. In other words, the qualitative discourse and visual analysis is essential for 
identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns and significant themes emerging from the collected 
data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
4.4.1 Units of Analysis 
Selecting Units of Analysis are one of the most crucial initial decisions made by an analytical 
researcher (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009). Neuendorf (2002) offers a functional definition for this 
concept:  
[A] Unit is an identifiable message or message component, (a) 
which serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a 
sample, (b) on which variables are measured, (c) or which serves as the 
basis for reporting analyses(p.71). 
Carney (1971) on the other hand suggests units can be words, characters, themes, time 
periods, interactions, or any other result of “breaking up a ‘communication’ into bits” (p. 52). Thus, 
in this study, each individual YouTube video is considered a unit.  
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My dissertation proposes to explain the 2009 Iranian political uprising through the lens of 
Giddens-Habermas framework as described in the previous chapters. Thus, it aims at finding and 
discussing the empirical observations of two of the concepts of the framework: various structures 
targeted for change, and different types of social action etc., within the data set of videos. 
4.4.2 Selection Criteria 
For my research, I selected videos of official campaign releases, state television interviews, 
and other speeches taken in between January 2009 and February 2011. This time period is selected 
because the presidential campaigning, although unofficially, began around January of 2009 and 
continued till the June 12th election date, when the protests began.  Mousavi and Karoubi, the two 
leaders of the Green Movement, were placed under house arrest on February 3, 2011 and banned 
from most communication with the outside world after they had urged their followers to organize 
in support of the Arab uprisings in the region.  Videos were selected specifically when validity 
claims were made regarding changing social structures. 
4.4.3 Sampling 
For the purpose of this inquiry, I have used purposive or judgment sampling (Neuendorf 
2002) to collect the most relevant and representative videos of the 2009 political uprising. 
According to Neuendorf (2002), this “type of sampling involves the researcher making a decision 
as to what units he or she deems appropriate to include in the sample” (p.88). Based on the 
guidelines provided by Neuendorf (2002), I conducted a content analysis of the Green Movement 
videos drawn at random from a keyword search of YouTube. I then coded the videos retuned by 
the YouTube search engine in response to the search queries both in English and Farsi, including 
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keywords such as “Green Movement”, “2009 Iranian presidential elections”. The sample was 
collected during a period of two months in June and July of 2014, and includes videos posted as 
early as the fall prior to the June 12, 2009 elections to the movement’s anniversary a year later. A 
total of 65 videos were analyzed, and after eliminating those that were not relevant to the Green 
Movement, and the duplicates, the final sample size included 27 videos. Significant effort was put 
into developing meaningful keywords to retain more representative data, such as including terms 
that incorporated the key actors (Khamenei, Mousavi, Karoubi), milestones (Ashoura 1388, Silent 
March 1388) and slogans (“where is my vote?”, “death to dictator”).  
YouTube was selected as the search engine of choice for this study for holding the largest 
number of videos available on the internet and also for being the platform of choice for posting 
videos of the movement. Next, only videos shot of the events in Iran were selected and the rest, 
including those of the events held by the Iranian Diaspora in support of the movement, were 
eliminated. This decision was made to keep the sample relevant and representative of those 
directly involved in the movement.  
It is important to note the sample is affected by several limitations as described below: 
Limitations of YouTube’s search tools: as per Google’s (YouTube’s parent company) 
guidelines, YouTube’s search results are limited to returning no more than 1,000 videos per query. 
To overcome this limitation, I ran multiple searches with my keywords using the sorting criteria 
available by YouTube as follows: most relevant (YouTube’s default), view count, and ratings. The 
sample of X was achieved by combining the results of these X searches (both in Farsi and English) 
and removing duplicates. 
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Availability of the Data: Despite my best efforts to access a larger collection of videos from 
different sources to gain a more comprehensive perspective of the movement through the lens of 
social media, YouTube essentially proved to be the most efficient and accessible choice. During my 
research, I came across a collection that the UCLA is putting together for their library comprised of 
largely unpublished, unedited videos of the Green Movement. However, after lengthy email and 
skype conversations, I was informed that the Iranian Green Movement Collection of Ephemera is 
still being processed and not yet available for public access. Being in the developing stages, the 
raw data had not yet been stripped of the senders information, which violated privacy rights but 
more importantly threatened senders’ security considering majority lived in Iran. In summer 2014, 
the curator, Ali Jamshidi, informed me during a Skype conversation that while the collection’s 
opening date was unknown, it was estimated to be no sooner than Fall 2015, which would have 
been too late for my purposes. I acknowledge, therefore, that my sample does not consist of all 
the videos that might be returned in response to a Green Movement query, neither does it contain 
all the relevant videos that might be available in the future on the subject.  
Despite the above limitations, I feel this sample accurately reflects a collection of videos 
accessible to and accessed by YouTube users. The data set is quite diverse, including videos of 
participating actors, significant milestones, and demands. I believe this sample represents the best 
possible survey of videos of the Green Movement currently accessible to the public.  
4.4.4 Coding 
I conducted the content analysis of the sample by carefully viewing each video and then 
coding them in Microsoft Excel (see appendix A). Each video was coded for instances of the Social 
Structures the actors aimed at changing (Structures of Signification, Domination or Legitimation), 
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based on the study’s theoretical framework and the code table discussed in chapter 3. To narrow 
down the research and arrive at a more workable data set, I decided to select two instances of 
proposed change from each of the three main categories of social structures. For example, since 
the initial content analysis revealed economy and women’s rights to be two major structures 
targeted for change, those two instances of Domination structures were selected for further 
analysis. That selection was based on the fact that both the economy and women’s rights 
dominated the campaigns of both Reformist candidates. Once the instances of structures were 
decided upon, I conducted another round of content analysis, transcribed every instance of 
discussions, promises and allusions to the selected topics from the videos. Next, since all the 
communications naturally occurred in Farsi, I translated everything to English. I am fully fluent in 
both Farsi and English and did my best to stay true to the message. However, I acknowledge that 
my work is not that of a professional translator and as such may not be perfect. Each Utterance or 
empirical material was then given an identification code EM1 to EM19. 
Once everything was written down in English, I conducted a critical discourse analysis on 
the empirical data and began coding for instances of violation from each of the four validity claims 
of truth, legitimacy, comprehensibility and sincerity. The analysis was done on individual 
utterances as well as on the entire corpus of the data as detailed by Habermas to determine the 
impact and implication of the speech as well as the orientation of the speaker. 
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 CHAPTER 5: PARTICIPATING ACTORS OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
5.0 An Overview of the Chapter 
In order to address the first three research questions (RQ 1 to 3), this chapter will provide 
an overview of the actors participating in the Green Movement of 2009 and the social structures 
they attempted to alter. I will provide a brief overview of both the ideological orientation and the 
intellectual underpinnings of the different actors that participated in the Green movement, their 
goals, their roles and their aspirations. This exploratory approach allows for a better understanding 
of the composition of the “Green Wave” and those in opposition to the movement, thus drawing 
a more comprehensive picture of the movement’s power struggles (RQ 3). 
The key actors of the Green Movement can be categorized into three groups: the Civil 
Society Groups, the Islamic Reform Front, and the Conservative Bloc. While civil society groups are 
by definition non-government organizations, the Reformers and the Conservatives are the outward 
manifestation of the two ideological factions amongst Iran’s political leadership elite. Reformers 
represent the Islamic-Left and the conservatives the Islamic-Right, among each of which there are 
smaller factions. However, as Buchta (2000) points out “the left- and right-wing designations used 
here refer respectively to the position of these factions on social and economic issues and should 
be seen within the Islamic context of contemporary Iran” (p. 11), which is different from the 
Western understanding of those designations. Lastly, while some of the organizations and groups 
studied below may carry a party designation in their naming convention, party politics carrying 
clearly defined agendas in a Western sense are not permitted in Iran. 
Studying the actors of the Green Movement, pro or against, also provides us with an 
overview of the Iranian political system and power distribution by mapping the organizations, 
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foundations (Bonyad), institutions and affiliations of the country, leading to a better understanding 
of the country’s complex power structure (RQ 3). Although the official opposition groups reside in 
the Iranian Diaspora post 1979 revolution, the Islamic Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), and 
an array of Marxists groups (Tudeh Party, The Communist Labor Party, Fadayian factions, 
Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Kumelah etc.) to name a few, they had little to no role in the 
movement and as such will not be studied here. 
5.1 Iranian Civil Society Groups 
 
A diverse cross section of the civil society participated in the Green Movement. Women’s 
rights groups (One million Signatures Campaign, The Feminist School, and The Change for Equity 
Group) and Human rights organizations (Committee of Human Rights Reporters, Defenders of 
Human Rights Center, Human Rights Activists in Iran) were notably active in the movement and 
therefore will be the focused on more. Student organizations (Islamic Associations, Tahkim-i 
Vahdat Office), professional organizations (Lawyers Association, Iranian Writers Association) and 
trade unions (Teachers Guild, Vahed Bus Drivers Guild) are among other prominent civil society 
groups that participated in the movement.  
On the eve of the presidential elections in June of 2009, a number of civil society 
organizations formed a coalition and published a manifesto titled “Iran’s Civil Society Demands”. 
The coalition presented their list of minimum demands to the representatives of presidential 
candidates ("Demands of the Coalition of the Iranian Civil Society Groups," 2009), which included: 
 Recognition of civil society as a social force 
 Guarantees for freedom of association 
 Respect for independence and non-interference in their internal affairs 
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 Review and reform of all laws and regulations which oversee the  
work of civil society organizations 
 Guarantees for freedom of speech, press freedom and media diversity 
 Recognition of the right to the free flow of information 
 Capacity building and empowerment of citizens and associations 
 Ratification and execution of conventions on labour laws 
 Reform and review of Iran’s discriminatory civil code 
 Membership on the Commission on the Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
 Respect for gender equality and gender justice 
 Response to professional demands 
 Protection of the environment (Razzaghi, 2010, p. 14). 
 
Around the same time another significant alliance, Convergence of Women’s Movement to 
Convey Demands During Elections, was formed to discuss women’s rights issues, their struggles for 
equality and to put forward their demands to the presidential candidates ("Convergence of 
Women’s Movement to Convey Demands During Elections," 2009). In a published statement the 
alliance details their demands for  
 Gender equality  
 Conformity to the International Women’s Rights Convention’s principles 
 Elimination of all forms of gender discrimination  
 Reform of discriminatory laws against women  
 Reform of divorce and family laws which don’t recognize a woman’s right to divorce 
or to have custody of her children 
 
The alliance included different chapters of One Million Signature Campaign, Mothers for 
Peace, Feminist School, and The Change for Equity Group, which are amongst the most prominent 
women’s rights groups, amongst many others. 
Clearly, there is a range of commonality amongst the above alliances that comprise of a 
large number of active civil society organizations. It is safe to say that these demands remained 
unchanged once the post-election protests erupted and women, youth and human rights groups 
were among the most active participants of the movement (Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010). It is 
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important to keep in mind the grave restrictions faced by the progressive civil society groups, both 
in their mandate, and their activities, compared to other groups such as the Reformers which will 
be discussed next. These advocacy organizations are frequently closed down by the Islamic 
government, their publications banned and their members arrested, jailed or forced to flee and 
leave the country. Shirin Ebadi, Shadi Sadr, Mansour Osanloo, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Mohammad 
Seifzadeh and many others are amongst lawyers, journalists and activists who suffered this fate. 
Those who manage to survive face continues harassment, intimidation and censorship even as 
they tried to stay within the legal, constitutional, and informal red tapes of the Islamic republic.  
Majority of the Civil Society groups participated and supported the post elections protests. 
By all accounts women, students and the youth were the movement’s largest supporters. It is 
important to note that while many Greens supported the movement in hopes of a better life, 
change, equality and greater liberties, they may not necessarily have supported the candidates 
Mousavi and Karoubi. While both candidates enjoyed significant popular support, many simply 
joined the protests to voice their dissatisfaction of the status quo, their outrage at the violence 
incited on the peaceful marchers and essentially their dissent to the established regime doctrine.  
The above two statements give us a general overview of what some groups within the Civil 
Society were looking to achieve: improvements on the rights of women, children and minorities, 
gender equality, fairness in labour relations, and above all the freedom of association, and 
expression and for their rights to be recognized, legislated and respected as a social force. These 
groups joined and at times participated in leading and guiding the direction of the movement to 
alter those oppressive social structures such as marriage, custody, and divorce laws, restricting 
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labour union regulations and legalized forms of harassment of their members in hopes of 
improving the lives of a large number of citizens.  
5.2 The Reformist Faction 
The Iranian Islamic Reform Movement is a coalition of political parties and organizations 
that brought forth the notion of reforming the system to embrace more freedom and democracy 
and to be more inclusive of all members of the society. Although rooted as far back as late 1990’s 
following the end of war with Iraq, the movement truly came to life in May of 1997 to support the 
presidential candidacy of a little known cleric Mohammad Khatami, who later won the elections 
in a landslide victory collecting over 20 million votes (70%) over the conservative hardliner Hojatol 
Islam Ali Akbar Nategh Noori, former Speaker of Majlis (the parliament). To commemorate that 
historical shift in the life of the country, the movement is often also called the 2nd of Khordad Front 
which refers to the date of Khatami’s landslide victory in the Persian calendar. Among the key 
figures of the movement are Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Abdolkarim Soroush, 
Hojatol Islam Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, Saeed Hajjarian, Akbar Ganji, amongst others. 
The Reform movement argues that the Islamic regime can be reformed from within to 
accommodate more “openness” democracy and freedoms, within the boundaries of Islam, 
essentially putting forth a different interpretation of the Shi’ite jurisprudential doctrine than that 
of the establishment. It believes in empowering the civil society within the boundaries of the 
constitution, Islam and pluralism and allowing for a more inclusive approach to political 
participation, engaging in dialogue with citizens as opposed to the established top down approach, 
and respecting their civil rights. The Reformers reading of the Shi’ite doctrine expresses no 
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discrepancies between Islam, civil rights, and democracy.  In what follows I will briefly describe 
some of the chief principles upon which the religious Reformist movement stands.   
5.2.1 Theoretical Foundations of the Movement 
The Reform movement is the brainchild of a group of Islamic scholars who actively 
participated in the construction of the Islamic Republic and institutionalization of a religious state. 
Disillusioned by clerical authorities and their excessive interference in every aspect of life which 
occurred especially in the years following the war with Iraq, those same figures began 
deconstructing the socio-political aspects of Islam to make room for rational and democratic 
decision making.  Some of the main theoretical influencers of the movement who later became 
known as the “religious intellectuals”, are Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, 
Hojatol Islam Kadivar, Hojatol Islam Yousofi Eshkevari, Hamidreza Jalaeipour, and Alireza Alavi-
Tabar (Jahanbegloo, 2012). The first three names on the list however, largely dominate the 
Reformist political discourse for their attempts at reconciling Islam with Modernity by introducing 
the concept of “religious democracy”, and for disputing the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (the 
Guardianship of the Jurisprudent), which not surprisingly proved highly controversial (see for 
example Jahanbegloo, 2012; Adib-Moghadam, 2006; England, 2011). To facilitate a better 
understanding of the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the movement, I have provided 
a short overview of their works as follows.  
ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH: 
Is a religious philosopher, is credited for having coined the term “Religious Democracy”, 
one of the foundational premises of religious Reformism (Holtan, 2005, p. 3). Soroush states 
religious democracy means that the values of religion play a role in the public arena in a society 
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populated by religious people” (Soroush, 2003). In essence Soroush believes that democracy can 
take many shades and hues depending on the society’s specific characteristics, hence there is more 
than one type of democracy i.e. secular democracy, religious democracy and so on. Soroush asserts 
that embracing religion is not at conflict with democracy but religious democracy is a perfect 
demonstration of how democratic principles can thrive in different cultural elaborations. He 
maintains that democratic values are not violated when faith is embraced by the state, only when 
religion becomes an ideology and belief is imposed and disbelief becomes punishable by law, is 
democracy in danger (Soroush, 2003). Soroush, who now lives in the United States, however fails 
to develop a framework for the institutional schema of his proposed “religious democracy” 
(Esposito & Voll, eds., 2001). Most of his arguments are abstract and don’t address how in a 
religious democracy the issues of women’s rights, freedom of religion and expression and the 
rights of minorities, are dealt with.  
To further argue the compatibility of Islam and democracy, Soroush maintains that while 
Shari‘a (Islamic law) remains static and unchanging, the human conception and knowledge of it 
(ma’refat) evolves over time, and since humans are in a constant state of change and flux, the 
evolution of theology and religious knowledge are also inevitable (Kamrava, 2008). The third 
theoretical notion by which Soroush parts ways with the traditional conservative philosophy, is his 
belief in de-ideologization of religion in society. While he maintains firm belief in Islamic values 
and asserts they should be embraced, he also argues that we must let reason reign supreme and 
avoid ideologizing religion for political purposes (Kamrava, 2008).  
For denying his role as one of the main architects of the “Cultural Revolution” of the early 
1980s, and for never fully acknowledging his close affiliation to the regime he is now critical of, 
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Soroush proves to be the most contentious of the three (See Moosavi, 2007; Derayeh 2006; 
Jahanbegloo 2012; Kurzman 1999). The Cultural Revolution saw the closure of universities for three 
years in order to Islamicize them, which lead to introducing a Shi’ite-friendly curriculum, banning 
many books, but above all purging, imprisonment, and execution of thousands of scholars, 
professors, and students for holding Western, Marxist or secular views.  
MOHAMMAD MOJTAHED SHABESTARI:  
Is an Islamic theologian and philosopher, similarly argues that religion by nature has limited 
knowledge and rules and thus is dependent upon additional sources. Mojtahed Shabestari argues 
that Islamic knowledge (Quran and Sunnah) and Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) are not capable of 
responding to the changing circumstances of our era and must be complemented with other 
modern sources. He asserts that for Islam to survive, we must complement Fiqh with modern 
science, since answers to many questions of the modern world cannot be searched in the original 
sources of Islam. Questions such as where the legitimate basis of a political system lie? Is capitalism 
an acceptable economic system? How far should governments interfere in individual lives and 
liberties? (Kamrava, 2008) 
Mojtahed Shabestari (2000) in his book A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion, applies 
modern Hermeneutics to Shiite jurisprudence, like Soroush, argues in favour of religious 
compatibility (specifically Islamic)  with democracy and modernity.. He suggests that divine 
providence has already anticipated for the separation of religious values and secular realities. He 
thus vigorously defends modern concepts of democracy, civil society, human rights and 
individualism, arguing they do not pose a conflict to religious values, and although they have not 
been specifically articulated in Quran and Sunnah, Islam is in no way antithetical to the most 
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important modern values of liberty and democracy (Kamrava, 2008). In response to the claims by 
a large body of Shi’ite jurists about essential and eternal values of Islam making the religion 
autonomous of any and all external sources, he maintains since such modern concepts as human 
rights are the product of human rationality and reasoning and evolve over time they could not 
have been provided for in Quran and Sunnah (the tradition of prophet Mohammed) yet they do 
not contradict the divine truth of Islam for that reason.  
Mojtahed Shabestari’s second but more critical theoretical notion is the concept of “free 
choice” maintaining that god created man free and without free choice belief is meaningless. 
Therefore, he asserts, when it comes to political systems, a democracy is the most conducive forms 
of governance to the fulfilment of religious beliefs: 
The logic of belief dictates that believers be aware of social and 
political realities, and themselves be responsible in political matters, so 
that they can consciously and freely search for their beliefs. (Mojtahed 
Shabestari, 1998, p. 79).  
 
Mojtahed Shabestari thus believes strongly in a religious democracy asserting, democracy 
is necessary for the survival of Islam and an Islamic democracy is a necessity for Iran.  
 
HOJATOL ISLAM MOHSEN KADIVAR:  
Is an Islamic theologian, cleric, and university lecturer, whose ideas stand in stark contrast 
to those of Ayatollah Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Republic) regarding the Guardianship 
of the Jurisprudent (Velayat-e Faqih). Khomeini’s Theory of Islamic Government details the 
principles of Government by Divine Mandate (Hokoomat e Velayi) in which Shi’ite clerics, as the 
mediators between God and people, rule the Muslim nations (Ummah). On the top of the clerical 
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hierarchy is the Supreme Leader who must be a Mojtahed or Source of Imitation (Marja’ Taghlid) 
for Muslims, which means he is an authority to interpret Islamic law and make legal decisions 
within those confines. Ayatollah Khomeini was Iran’s first Supreme Leader, a title which was later 
bestowed on his successor Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. In criticism Kadivar writes: 
Every member of society and every member of government is 
subject to the law. No one can be above it. Everyone has the same rights, 
yet the root of the faqih is inequality. He assumes he is above it. ... It is 
time for the supreme leader to be subject to the constitution too. After 
all, the Supreme Leader doesn't come from God! (Wright, 2008, p.296) 
 
He refutes the premises of Khomeini’s doctrine of Absolute Guardianship of the 
Jurisprudent that provides the theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic, Kadivar proposes 
that such rule has led to government by appointment instead of representative governance as 
principles of Republicanism in the constitution imply. He deems Government by Divine Mandate 
(Velayat e Faqih) as unnecessary and false: 
The principle of Velayat e Faqih is neither intuitively obvious, nor 
rationally necessary. It is neither a requirement of religion (Din) nor a 
necessity for denomination (Mazhab). It is neither a part of Shiite general 
principles (Osoul), nor a component of detailed observances (Forou') It is, 
by near consensus of Shiite Ulama, nothing more than a jurisprudential 
minor hypothesis (Subani, 2013, p.271). 
 
In 1999 the Special Court of Clergy (Dadgah-e Vizheh Rouhaniat) sentenced him to 18 
months in prison for criticizing the institution of the Supreme Leadership under the official charges 
of dissemination of falsehoods and disturbing the public opinion and propaganda against the 
Islamic state. He currently lives in the United States to avoid persecution in Iran. In 2009 elections 
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Kadivar supported the candidacy of Mir-Hossein Mousavi and sided with the Green Movement 
once the protests were suppressed. He became a key member and adviser of Jaras (or The Green 
Path of Hope), the policy making council for the internet networks of the movement, from July 
2009 to October 2011 (Kadivar, n.d.). 
Together Soroush, Mojtahed Shabestari, and Kadivar in large part formulate the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Reform Movement by opposing the absolutist theology of the current 
establishment and challenging the clerical hegemony. By utilizing indigenous forms of scholarship, 
such as hermeneutics, Western philosophy and sociology, together they represent the modern 
Iranian Islamic discourse that attempts to guard the spiritual and cultural values of Islam while 
attacking ideologizing theology and totalitarian Islam. They claim objective secularism and a 
religious democracy are a real political possibility for Iran and its only way out of the current 
disenchanted state. While Soroush emphasizes the evolving nature of theological knowledge, 
Mojtahed Shabestari and Kadivar underline its limited and varying essence.  
It is however important to remember the form of democracy that the Iranian religious 
scholars advocate implies separation of religion from government not politics. While they oppose 
institutionalized Islam, they are in favour of embracing religious values in the public arena. Largely 
considered as Islamic political revisionist by their secular counterparts (Nikfar, 1999; Moosavi, 
2007; Ghobadzadeh, 2013) the Iranian religious intellectuals remain either silent or vague on many 
crucial questions. They have been repeatedly asked to no avail how their interpretation of political 
Islam would guarantee democratic values such as freedom of expression? The rights of Women, 
minorities and none-believers?  
93 
 
 To sum up, the Reform movement is founded on a particular interpretation of Islam which 
argues democracy and religion can peacefully coexist. On another note, Reformists put forward 
such modern concepts as human rights, civil society, and individuality which Islamic teachings are 
largely silent on, and argue that those concepts too are not at conflict with Islam since they were 
developed over the course of time as the product of human reasoning. As such this movement 
advocates reforming current laws to accommodate the necessities of modern life within the 
boundaries of Islam.  
The topic of Guardianship of the Jurist is however approached with much caution by the 
Reform front for a variety of reasons, above all for fear of persecution. Arguments such as those 
of Kadivar’s and any criticism of the institution of Supreme Leadership is severely punishable by 
law and at the same time puts the Reform front at the risk of being accused of disloyalty to the 
regime and to the revolutionary ideals. Khatami, Mousavi and Karoubi and many others have 
always maintained their loyalty to the Supreme Leader and to the principles of Velayat e Faqih. 
However, over the years and specially post 2009 elections, many prominent Reformists 
(Abdolkarim Soroush, Ataolah Mohajerani, Akbar Ganji, Mohsen Kadivar, Mojtahed Shabestari, 
Yousofi Eshkevari etc.) left the country and once at the safety of a Western democracy, most 
openly stated their disagreement with the principles of Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (Velayat 
e Faqih) which is so central to the survival of the regime.  
5.2.2 Placing the Movement on a Political Spectrum 
It is important to note that the Reform front is not a homogenous community. The Reform 
umbrella houses a large spectrum of social, political and professional affinities. Following I will 
describe the chief organizations under that umbrella. 
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MAJMA‘-i- ROUHANYUN- i- MOBAREZ:    
Otherwise known as the Combatant Cleric Society5  is the most powerful group within the 
Reform camp. It’s former leader and a founding member Hojatol Islam Mehdi Karoubi, former 
Speaker of the House from 1989-1992, and 2000-2004, head of the powerful Bonyad-e Shahid 
(Martyr’s Foundation) from 1980-1992, is also one of the contesting candidates of the 2009 
presidential elections and a leading figure of the Green Movement, who is currently under house 
arrest for his role in the movement along with the movement’s other leader, Mousavi. The 
organization houses a broad spectrum of opinions from radical elements in favour of “export of 
the revolution” and enemies of the United States such as Hojatol Islam Mohtashami Pour, former 
Minister of Intelligence from 1985-1989, to Hojatol Islam Mousavi Khoeiniha (current Secretary 
General of the organization) the leader of the 1979 U.S embassy take over in Tehran, to more 
liberal voices represented by former president Hojatol Islam Khatami (current Chairman of the 
organization)(Buchta, 2000). In the 2009 presidential elections however, the party backed Mir 
Hossein Mousavi’s candidacy. Karoubi had left the organization four years earlier due to factional 
differences.  
SAZEMAN-i- MOJAHEDIN-i- ENGHELAB-i- ISLAMI:  
Also known as the Organization of the Mojahedin of The Islamic Revolution6  was originally 
founded in 1979 but was later dissolved, and was reactivated again in 1988. Behzad Nabavi is the 
founding member of the organization and currently Mohammad Salamaty serves as its Secretary 
General. Both men served in Mir Hossein Mousavi’s cabinet during his premiership from 1981-
                                                     
5 Not to be confused with the conservative Militant Clergy Association described in the next section. 
6 Not to be confused with Sazman-i-Mojahedin-i-Khalgh (MKO) which is an opposition group in exile.  
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1989 as Minister of Heavy Industries and Minister of Agriculture in respectively. The organization’s 
leadership and members are exclusively religious laypersons largely educated in technical fields 
(Buchta, 2000).  
JEBHEH -i- MOSHAREKAT-i- ISLAMI -i- IRAN:  
Also known as the Islamic Participation Front of Iran is an organization known for its 
openness to all Reform-oriented forces and is formed from a broad alliance of clerics, religious 
laypersons, Islamic-oriented labour forces, and religious women’s activist groups (Buchta, 2000, p. 
15). Mohammad Khatami (former President Khatami’s brother), is the former and Mohsen 
Mirdamadi, former Premier of the oil-rich province of Khouzestan and a founding member of the 
elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is the current Secretary General to the 
organization. Saeed Hajjarian, chief political strategist of the Reform movement who is now 
paralyzed due to an assassination attempt, Hamidreza Jalaeipour, a religious intellectual, are 
amongst other prominent members of this organization. Mosharekat emphasizes on a more liberal 
reading of Islam and advocates open market economy and political liberties, and normalization of 
the foreign policy to pull Iran out of its isolation. This organization too endorsed Mir Hossein 
Mousavi’s candidacy in the 2009 elections.  
All three groups firmly advocates “Khat-e Imam” which is the political line of Khomeini, but 
recently have been moving away from the social and cultural hardline of that era allowing more 
liberal voices to gain prominence. While Mir Hossein Mousavi has never officially belonged to any 
of the above groups he has be an ardent supporter of the movement even after his position as the 
Prime Minister was abolished by a constitutional amendment in 1989. 
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The alliance of the diverse groups under the Reform umbrella revolves around two 
imperatives of Islamism and preservation of the Islamic Republic regime through reform which is 
evident in the faction’s name. I will briefly describe the two trends below: 
5.2.3 Religious Affinity 
One common trend here is the religious nature of the movement bringing all these various 
groups together. While some members may privately believe in secularism, the movement has 
never openly embraced the concept. On the contrary, Reform’s figureheads from its intellectuals, 
to its leaders such as Khatami, Hajjarian, Mousavi, and Karoubi, have always maintained their faith, 
and their conviction in a government grounded in Islamic philosophy. It is important to note that 
Reformers don’t just embrace private faith, but similar to their conservative counterparts, they 
too believe in a political system informed by Islamic traditions being convinced that Islam is a 
political religion and not just spiritual. What differentiates this groups from their conservative 
counterparts is their particular reading of Islam and of religion in general that is somewhat more 
lenient and more in tune with modern times. Looking back the history of prominent members of 
the Reform Movement, one can observe their religious nature. Many now reside in United States, 
Canada, and Western Europe away from the regime’s repression yet majority such as Soroush and 
others maintain their religious beliefs, so fear of repression of the regime cannot be a factor here.  
5.2.4 Preserving the Regime 
The second common trend binding the gropes under the Reform umbrella is an ardent 
desire to preserve the regime. The Reformers argue that should the political elite fail to implement 
limited reforms, the continuous dissatisfaction and defiance of certain socio-political strata will 
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cause an upheaval similar to that of the 1979 putting the future of the regime in danger (Kamrava, 
2008). However, while the movement firmly believes in the necessity of systemic reform, the 
extent of those reforms are confined within the boundaries of Islam and the constitution of the 
Islamic Republic as advocated by the leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini. In one of his last 
official speeches Mir Hossein Mousavi says “I have come to save the Regime” (Keyhan, 2009), or 
in a gathering with post-secondary students in the province of Mazandaran Mousavi asserts “we 
have the Islamic Republic regime and wont a say a word more than Imam [Khomeini] has 
commanded us. Therefore republicanism has to be accompanied by Islamism and it hurts the 
country if either one of those is undermined” ("Mousavi: I don't dare ask Khatami for his help," 
2009), or Khatami’s assertion that “The Islamic Republic is an achievement of our revolution and 
we all have to safeguard it” ("Safeguarding and strengthening the Islamic Republic is a duty for all 
of us," 2014)”, or that “we are not looking to overthrow the regime and our goal is to safeguard 
the regime” ("Khatami: Many mistakes are made in the name of the regime," 2010)7.  
In other words the Reform Movement is considered by its secular opponents as the 
regime’s “pressure safety valve” implying that this group have heard the voice of dissent and 
dissatisfaction amongst large classes of the society and are trying to remedy that with systemic 
reforms. It is imperative to keep in mind that Khatami and others are almost all regime insiders 
who have been crucial to the establishment of the regime and are keen on preserving it. However, 
contrary to their conservative counterparts, the Reformers believe further oppression of those 
disenchanted by the regime will only threaten the survival of the regime. Systemic reforms are this 
movement’s remedy to restrain the dissent and discontent and guarantee the longevity of the 
                                                     
7 All translation from the original text in Farsi are the author’s 
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Islamic Republic.  By way of example, this movement does not challenge the attire and headscarf 
imposed on women, or has never publically acknowledged universal gender equality or the 
equality for religious and other minorities. Therefore it is important to remember, the movement 
as a whole does not advocate secularism nor overthrow of the regime. On the contrary, the 
Reformist discourse is a religious discourse that attempts to preserve the system by reforming the 
current laws and institutions of the regime to incorporate more modern concepts such as 
democracy, human, women and civil rights, and transparent governance. In other words, the 
Reformers are observing the crisis of legitimacy that the system is facing and are putting forward 
a viable solution to save it (Kamrava, 2008). 
5.2.5 Reformers and the Green Movement 
The Green Movement was largely formed in response to the disputed election results in 
2009. Mousavi and Karoubi, both Reformist candidates, disputed the election results that declared 
Ahmadi Nejad the winner by a landslide shortly after the polls closed. They asked their supporters 
to join in and voice their dissatisfaction in a peaceful march of silence on June 15th (3 days after 
the elections), in which hundreds of thousands of people marched the streets of Tehran and other 
major cities. The movement was dubbed The Green Movement, by both domestic and later foreign 
media largely due to the green symbols carried by Mousavi supporters. Following Western 
branding and political campaigning strategies, Mousavi’s camp had used the color green to set 
itself apart from the opponents. The significance of this choice of color will be discussed at length 
in later chapters. Prominent Reformist politicians almost entirely threw their support behind the 
Green Movement both before and after the elections when the protests erupted. Reformists such 
as Ataollah Mohajerani, Khatami’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ali Abtahi, Khatami’s 
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chief of staff, Emadedin Baghi, Reform strategist, and other staffed or endorsed Karoubi’s 
presidential campaign. Although a founding member of the Reform Movement and considered the 
Reformists Alliance’s endorsed candidate, Mousavi had maintained his independent candidacy 
during the campaign but welcomed support from all factions ("Mousavi: I Have Come 
Independently," 2009). Despite maintaining he did not belong to any one Reformist group, 
Mousavi’s presidential platform was closely defined based on Reformists principles. His candidacy 
was formally endorsed by Khatami, who withdrew at the early stages of the race in his favour 
("Khatami Drops His Presidential Candidacy in Support of Mousavi," 2009), and Alireza Beheshty 
(The son of Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, the assassinated former head of Judiciary in 1981), 
Mohammad Mahmoud Robati and many others from his past administration as the Prime Minister 
formed his campaign staff.  Once the election results were announced and protests erupted, many 
prominent members of the Reform front supported the Greens and were amongst those arrested 
and imprisoned.   
5.3 Complexities of the Iranian Power Structure 
Despite their religious affinities, and despite their devotion to the regime, the conservative 
bloc continuously accuses the Reformers of treason and disloyalty to the revolutionary ideals and 
has dubbed their brand of Islam as “American style Islamism” implying impure intentions and 
diluted faithfulness. Khatami’s election in 1997 was considered by many a major turn in the history 
of the Islamic Republic (Bokharayi, 2002) and facilitated the flourishing of a post-revolutionary 
discourse of Reform that had begun a few years earlier. However, during Khatami’s two terms as 
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president8 the movement was largely incapable of delivering its promises of transparent 
governance, more open political space, individual freedoms and a thriving civil society amongst 
other things. Suffice to say in 2005, at the end of Khatami’s second term, Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad, 
Tehran’s little known mayor and a conservative hardliner, was elected by large margins over 
Reform candidates.  
The Reform’s failures throughout the 8 years of Khatami’s presidency are largely attributed 
by the movement elite to structural factors within the system. While the front largely occupied the 
executive and legislative branches, the conservative hardliners still wielded considerable influence 
by controlling some of the most powerful institutions of the state. Kamrava (2008) describes some 
of the chief strongholds of the conservative hardliners as follows: 
… the office of the Faghih (Bonyad-e Rahbari), the Judiciary, many 
publications and the state-controlled radio and television network (IRTV), 
and many of the economic foundations (Bonyads) in charge of the 
commanding heights of the economy (p.31).  
 
Following is an overview of some of the structural roadblocks incorporated into the fabric 
of the Islamic Republic to ensure clerical conservative hardliner’s supremacy and grip on power. In 
the next few pages I will argue that the Supreme Leadership (Velayat e faqih) and the principle of 
Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (Velayat e Motlagheh Faghih) are stipulated in the constitution 
to ensure concentration of power in the hands of the traditionalist Right. Consequently, the 
Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Special Court of the Clergy, the Judiciary and countless 
other foundations (Bonyad) and institutions, are the political manifestations of the structural 
                                                     
8 Iranian constitution limits presidential candidates to two terms in the office.  
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requirements to preserve that institution which acts as the beating heart of the Islamic 
Government envisioned by Ayatollah Khomeini, and to ensure the balance of power continues to 
remain with the hardliner clerics.  
5.3.1 The Supreme Leader 
The Supreme Leader draws its legitimacy from the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, a concept 
developed by Ayatollah Khomeini during his exile (from 1964 to 1979). Khomeini argued that the 
purpose of the Islamic state is to prepare the Ummah (Islamic nation) for the reappearance of the 
12th Shi’ite Imam, Mahdi, who disappeared in 941 CE (Jones, 2011). In essence, Velayat-e Faqih 
means the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent or the rule of clerical authorities. Khomeini held the 
view that a just, and pious, religious leader “who surpasses all in knowledge” of Islamic law (a 
Marja’ or Source of Emulation) (Khomeini, 1970) must be at the helm to ensure that decisions and 
policies are consistent with Shari’a. Jurists (Foqaha, plural form of Faqih), according to this view, 
are the only sources of divine legitimacy after prophet and the Imams, responsible for maintaining 
the Ummah in a fit condition to hasten the reappearance of Imam Mahdi (Khomeini, 1970). 
Khomeini became Iran’s first Supreme Leader post 1979 Islamic revolution. 
 
On June 4, 1989 Hojatol Islam Ali Khamenei succeeded Grand Ayatollah Khomeini after his 
death and became Iran’s second Supreme Leader. The Iranian constitution required at the time 
that the Supreme Leader be a Marja’ Taqlid (Source of Emulation), but since Khamenei was not, 
the constitution was amended to accommodate for that and to legitimize his moral and religious 
supremacy. 
102 
 
To explain the significance of this move, we have to first explore the Shi’ite hierarchical 
clerical ranking. The Usuli Twelve Imam Shi’ites, the dominant group amongst the Shi’ite Muslim, 
believe in Ijtehad which means the use of critical reasoning in deriving new rules of Fiqh from 
Quran, and Sunnah which are the main sources of  law in Islam.  A distinguishing pillar of Usuli 
doctrine is Taqlid or "imitation", i.e. adhering to the religious rulings in matters of worship and 
personal affairs from someone regarded as a higher religious authority during the absence of the 
12th Imam, Mahddi. That higher authority is called a Marja’ Taqlid (Source of Emulation) or Marja’ 
for short (Momen, 1985). To reach the level of Marja’ and be a legitimate source of religious and 
moral authority, a cleric’s knowledge of Fiqh and Usul must have surpassed that of a Hojatol Islam 
and have been accorded the rank of Ayatollah or Mujtahid. A select few of astute Ayatollahs with 
expert opinions are then elevated to the rank of Grand Ayatollah or a Marja’. An absolute 
requirement of becoming a Marja is to publish a Resaleh, a book in which the jurist addresses the 
vast majority of daily Muslim affairs from marriage to worship and taxes and so on, and is referred 
to by those who emulate him (Moqalid) (Momen, 1985). Following a deceased Marja’ is forbidden 
in Usuli Shi’ite tradition. Grand Ayatollahs Khomeini, Behbahani, Tabatabayi, Mirza Shirazi, Ha’eri 
e Yazdi, Bayat e Zanjani, Sane’i, and Montazeri are amongst the past and present Marja’s in Iran 
that have also had a hand in shaping Iran’s political landscape. For more detailed discussion of the 
subject please see “An introduction to Shi’i Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism” 
(Momen, 1985). 
For a jurist to reach the rank and the religious authority of a Grand Ayatollah that 
legitimizes his Marja’iat, his scholarship has to be approved by other established senior Marja’s. 
In Khamenei’s case although the political establishment promoted him from a mid-ranking Hojatol 
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Islam to a Marja’ overnight, many senior religious authorities in the seminaries rejected his 
legitimacy often silently but sometimes openly. Grand Ayatollahs Hossein Ali Montazeri, 
Mohammad Shirazi (not to be confused with Mirza Shirazi), Hassan Tabatabayi  Qomi and 
Yasoubedin Rastgar Jooybari are amongst the Shi’ite authorities that disputed the legitimacy of 
Khamenei’s Marja’iyat citing his lack of religious scholarship, including not having written a 
Resaleh (Pike, 2009). Eventually those elements within the clerical system that are not supportive 
of Khamenei’s ultraconservative agenda were either silenced by the establishment through house 
arrests, public attacks and forcible defrocking (Montazeri was forced into house arrest and to 
remove his white turban signifying him as a cleric), or chose to be silent themselves. In 
understanding the role of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, Mehran Kamrava (2008) explains: 
Weather elected or appointed, an overwhelming majority of the 
country's political figures, only wield technical, administrative power in 
certain well-defined areas of activity, in all of which ultimate authority 
rests with none other than the Leader, Valiye Faqih and his narrow inner 
circle. Even many of the policy making purviews of these politicians are 
limited and are subject to final approval by the Leader, especially in key 
areas such as the economy, foreign and national security policy and the 
like (Kamrava, 2008, p.32). 
 
Since lacking the status of a Marja’ as described above, thus incapable of acting as a source 
of Taqlid, Khamenei sees himself especially beholden to the conservative faction of the clerical 
hierarchy and acts accordingly. Kamrava (2008), Buchta (2000) and others argue that both by 
design and by structural path dependence, the current political system in the Islamic republic is 
fractured along multiple lines of authority, all of which ultimately lead to the same institution and 
to the person of the Supreme Leader. However despite naïve observations by some Western 
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powers, the Islamic Republic is not a monolithic dictatorship ruled by the totalitarian minded 
clergy. The complex power structures ruling Iran will be discussed in the chapter.  
 The Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, the Judiciary, and the Special Court of the 
Clergy are amongst the most effective instruments of silencing the non-conformists including the 
Reformists Movement born on the 2nd of Khordad and the Green Movement elite. I will briefly 
describe those institutions in an effort to offer some insight into the intricate power structure of 
the Islamic Republic. 
5.3.2 Judiciary and the Special Court of the Clergy  
It is especially important to note that while article 156 of the constitution stipulates for an 
“independent judiciary”, this branch of the government is under the paramount control of the 
Supreme Leader who directly appoints the head of judiciary, who in turn appoints the Prosecutor 
General and the head of the Supreme Judicial Council. According to article 162 of the constitution 
had of judiciary, the Prosecutor General and the head of Supreme Judicial Council, all must be “Just 
Mojtahids” who are appointed to serve for a period of 5-years. The Ministry of Justice, the head of 
whom is appointed by the President and approved by the Parliament, is only a division of the legal 
framework and largely acts as the administrative body of the Judicial branch of the government 
according to article 160. Therefore in reality, Vali-e Faqih (the Supreme Leader) has direct oversight 
on how the judicial branch of the government is run which give the Conservative Right an effective 
instrument to oppress those they find in opposition to their views including the Reformists.  
Emadeddin Baqi (2003), a prominent Reformist thinker and a political prisoner, also argues 
that The Special Court of the Clergy, established by Ayatollah Khomeini in March 1987 to “protect 
the dignity of the clergy and the seminaries” (Kamrava, 2008, p. 31), is an especially effective 
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instrument in the Right’s efforts to silence the none-conformist clerics on the left. While under the 
judiciary’s umbrella, The Special Court of the Clergy is solely accountable to the Supreme Leader 
and functions independently from the regular judicial framework as described above. This court 
has prosecuted and punished a considerable number of clerics associated with the left for their 
sermons, writings and speeches. Figures such as Abdollah Noori, Interior Minister during Khatami’s 
first term as President, Hassan Yousofi Eshkevari, and Mohsen Kadivar, are amongst those clerics 
summoned before this court and punished for their views. Sentences range from jail time, house 
arrest, and defrocking, to lashes, fines, and publication bans.  
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri is by all accounts the most prominent dissident cleric in the 
history of the Islamic Republic and The Special Court of the Clergy. A close ally of Khomeini’s during 
the revolution, he was designated to be his successor, however that all changed in 1989 once the 
news of the mass executions of the political prisoners post Iran-Iraq war in late summer and early 
autumn 1988 at Khomeini’s undisputed directive surfaced. Montazeri wrote a letter to Khomeini, 
which was latter obtained and made public by the BBC, vehemently condemning the massacres 
and also criticizing Khomeini’s Fatwa (religious decree) against Salman Rushdie stating: "People in 
the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people" (Wright, 2000, p. 
20). That letter is said to have sealed Montazeri’s political faith: Khomeini strongly condemned 
Montazeri’s words and a few days later removed him from his position as the successor and 
stripped him from his title of Grand Ayatollah, his lectures and sermons were removed from state 
publications and all references to him were banned. Montazeri spent the next 20 years under 
house arrest in his home in Qom, until his death on December 19th, 2009, in the midst of the Green 
Movement. For his views on human rights, women’s rights, and religious minority rights (such as 
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Baha’is), and civil rights, and for his support of the Green movements and the regular harassment 
and the grave punishment he took for taking a stand, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri is considered the 
spiritual father of the Green Movement.  
5.3.3 The Guardian Council and the Principle of Approbation Supervision: 
The Judiciary is not the only branch of government standing in the way of the Reformers 
and by extension the Greens. While the Reformers managed to gain majority in the parliament and 
the city councils and some other elective assemblies during Khatami’s presidency the hardliners 
managed to pacify the legislation they passed through the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council 
of the Constitution (Shoray-e Negahban-e Ghanoon-e Assi) or the Guardian Council for short, is an 
appointed yet powerful assembly mandated by the constitution. The council is charged with 
“interpreting the Constitution of Iran, supervising elections of, and approving of candidates to, the 
President and the Majlis, and "ensuring ... the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly [i.e. Majlis] with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution". 6 of the 12 
members of the assembly must be just clerics appointed by the person of Vali-e Faqi. The 
remaining 6 are Muslim jurists, expert in various areas of law and the constitution nominated by 
the head of judiciary, who is in turn appointed by the Vali-e Faqih, and elected by the Majlis (Article 
91 of the constitution). As a result, the Guardian Council is typically occupied by the hardliners 
following the Supreme Leader’s agenda. 
 The principle of Approbation Supervision (Asl-e Nezarat-e Estesvabi), allows the Guardian 
Council, an appointed assembly, to basically overrule or veto any legislation passed by an elected 
assembly, the parliament, on the grounds that it violated Islam or the constitution. 
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For example when Khatami introduced what came to be known as the “Twin Bills” to the 
Majlis (parliament), the first bill was to expand his executive powers allowing for intervention to 
prevent and reverse action by judiciary that were in direct violation of the constitution. The second 
bill, introduced at the same time to Majlis, was aimed at curbing the Guardian Council’s powers by 
limiting the scope of principle of Approbation Supervision when it came to vetting and eliminating 
candidates. Expecting resistance from the Guardian Council Khatami famously said: “the Guardian 
Council can either say a bill is against Islam or the constitution. The bill I’ll present is part of the 
constitution and it is definitely not against Islam (Moaveni, 2002)”.  
Needless to say despite Khatami’s threat of resignation, the Guardian Council rejected both 
bills. By tactically undermining the president and the legislative which at the time was 
predominantly occupied by Reformers, the conservatives successfully caused the many Reformist 
policy agendas to grind to a halt and blocked any kind of reform that would loosen their grip on 
power. 
Observing the failure of the Reform movement is important because the Greens, or at least 
their prominent leaders, were Reformists planning on continuing on the path that started by 
Khatami’s election and became known as the Reform Era. However, the above structural 
limitations clearly demonstrate that the ruling conservative elite will not tolerate defiance to the 
official state doctrine and over the years they have successfully eliminated those who do through 
various provisions in the constitution as stated above. While eliminating the outsiders has been an 
agreed upon and a routine policy of this regime form the outset, while considered “insiders” by all 
accounts, Reformers and their ideas have also been the target of elimination through such 
institutions as the Special Court of Clergy, The Guardian Council, and so son, as described above. 
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Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, a prominent Reform thinker, says: “The principal problem that the Reform 
movement faces is that its opposition accepts neither its methodology nor its modes of operation. 
(Kamrava, 2008, p. 33)”. The Reform movement is admittedly committed to “gradualism” as a 
methodology for reforming the system from below, however, their opponents were not hesitant 
to change the rules of the game and resort to brutal tactics to maintain the status quo. Lastly, due 
to their position as regime insiders loyal to the principles of Islamic governance, the Reform 
discourse does not only put them at odds with the conservatives, it also puts them at odds with 
the secular discourse, and while they may be successful at gaining some sympathy from the latter, 
they fail to garner their support to face the full force of the former, leaving them to their own 
devices.  
This observation leads to a couple of conclusions: one, the evidence suggests that the 
political system of the Islamic Republic at its core will not tolerate defiance from the mainstream 
conservative doctrine even if it is by the brothers of yesterday and Reformers of today. Second, 
violence and brutality has been a major tool to keep the opposition in line since the birth of the 
Islamic Republic weather on the roof of the Refah School, or the mass execution of political 
prisoners, or assassination of exiled opposition. Therefore, history suggests they are not hesitant 
to use those same tactics to cripple the Reformers and by extension the greens by the same means.  
Lastly, the above tactics perhaps partly explains why the Green movement protests were crushed 
swiftly and brutally.  
5.4 The Conservatives 
Kamrava (2008) argues that the religious Right’s emphasis since the beginning of the 
revolution has been on the interpretation, preservation and strengthening of those notions of 
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Shi’ite Fiqh that legitimize and rationalize the conservative clergy’s tight hold on power. Typically, 
the conservative religious right avoids theoretical and doctrinal change unless political 
circumstances prove those changes absolutely necessary. Naturally, the religious conservatives on 
the Right have been reluctant to acknowledge and in responding to some of the consequences of 
modernity such as civil rights, globalization, pluralism etc. which are considered problematic by 
this faction. Despite external pressure however, it is argued (Kamrava, 2008; Buchta 2000) that 
there is very little chance the religious Right would change course in the near future in a way that 
would bring meaningful change to the Iranian political arena. The post-election events of the 
summer 2009 in which the government forces brutally crushed the Green Movement protests, are 
the most recent and tangible proof of this argument.  
Although there are close connections between the traditionally conservative, high ranking 
Shi’ite theologians and Grand Ayatollahs, and the most powerful office, namely the Beit-e Rahbari 
(Office of the Supreme Leader), the religious Right is not a homogenous faction. Kamrava (2008) 
argues that while the common purpose of preserving the doctrinal and institutional legacy of 
Ayatollah Khomeini has led to a symbiotic relationship between the current political system and 
the religious conservatism, the conservative theological current includes a diverse array of 
doctrinal and political persuasions. Table 5.1 summarizes the various persuasions of the 
conservative Right based on Kamrava (2008) and Buchta (2000):  
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Table 5.1: Disaggregating the Right 
TRADITIONALISTS MODERNISTS 
Radical Right Traditionalist Clergy Islamic Councils 
 
Modernist Right 
Thinkers 
 
Hey’at- e Mo’talefeh, 
Former Fadaiyan-e 
Islam members, 
traditionalist Bazaaris, 
former and present 
Basij members, Former 
Hojjatiyeh Society, and 
the loosely organized 
Hezbollah groups 
Politically influential 
conservative clerics based in 
Tehran, Qom, and the 
provinces, affiliated with the 
Howzeh Elmiyyeh, the Imam 
Khomeini Education and 
Research Institute, the 
Assembly of Experts, and the 
Jame’e Rouhaniyyat-e 
Mobarez group. Includes 
most Friday Prayer Imams, 
and the “Supreme Leader’s 
Representatives” in various 
organizations 
Active on university 
campuses and among certain 
professional groups. They 
are largely formed to ensure 
their members conduct 
complies with Islam and the 
regime ideology.  
Lay and Clerical 
scholars and thinkers 
generally supportive of 
the Islamic Republic 
system, though some 
calling for 
modifications to its 
modus operandi and 
certain institutional 
features. Including 
seniors clerics such as 
the late Grand 
Ayatollah Montazeri, 
and lay conservative 
thinkers such as Prof. 
Davari Ardakani 
 
At the broadest level, the Right can be divided into the traditional-modern spectrum. 
Within this broad spectrum four general categories of Right can be distinguished: beginning with 
the extreme Radical Right, followed by the Conservative Traditional Clerics, Islamic Councils and 
the Modern Right thinkers. In terms of engaging in an intellectual discourse Kamrava (2008) 
observes that of the four groups only the Traditionalist Clergy and the Modern Right Thinkers 
engage in a meaningful production of ideology. I will detail each category further below.  
5.4.1 The Traditionalist Right 
By and large, the Rightist traditionalist clergy produce the doctrinal output that forms the 
backbone of the Islamic Republic’s official ideology and discourse, which once discussed and 
approved internally it is then transmitted to the larger society through various organs and arms 
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such as the Hezbollah groups.  Alireza Alavi-Tabar calls the political outlook of the traditional clergy 
on this side of the spectrum as “Shari’at-Centric” (Kamrava, 2008, p. 85) with Fiqh as the primary 
resource within which the solutions to contemporary social, political and even economic problems 
are uncovered. They advocate safeguarding traditional institutions of family, Bazaar, private 
ownership and ritualized forms of worship. Most importantly though, this group is a staunch 
advocates of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih. Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi is one of 
the most vocal and combative theologians behind the traditionalist conservative religious current 
(Kamrava, 2008).  
HEY‘AT-i- MO‘TALEFEH ISLAMI:  
Also known as the Coalition of Islamic Associations, is a religious professional association 
and has been led by a number of high profile clerics and lay people on the Right such as former 
presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Ahmadinejad, and current speaker of the parliament Ali 
Larijani among others. Hey’at- e Mo’talefeh links the traditionalist ruling clerics to their single most 
important historical backers namely the Bazaar merchants (Buchta, 2000, p.15).  
JAME’-i-ROUHANIYYAT-i-MOBAREZ:  
Also known as the Militant Clergy Association (not to be confused with the Reformist 
Combatant Clergy Association) is the most influential group within the traditionalist right, which 
counts amongst its most senior members the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, former speaker of 
the house Ali Akbar Nategh Noori, and also Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Military Clergy Association’s 
sphere of influence goes further: the two power centres of Shoraye Negahban (the Guardian 
Council) and Majles- e Khobregan (the Assembly of Experts which is in charge of electing the 
Supreme Leader and approving constitutional amendments) are largely dominated by the 
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members of this group. Buchta (2000) similarly concurs that this group also has at its disposal a 
countrywide network of guilds, religious professional associations (such as the above Hey’at- e 
Mo’talefeh, and societies). Deriving their legitimacy primarily from the Islamic-theocratic 
components of the 1979 revolution and Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, the members of 
this group favour a theocratic socio-political model and for them the dominance of Islam takes 
clear precedence over the people’s collective will (Buchta, 2000). 
5.4.2 The Modernist Conservatives 
ISLAMIC COUNCILS (ANJOMAN - i - ISLAMI):  
As mentioned in table 5.1, the Islamic Councils are largely active on university campuses 
and to a lesser extent in professional associations such as the Engineers Association, and the state 
bureaucracy.  Their primary task is to ensure the compliance of the Civil Society with the regime’s 
official doctrine including monitoring none conformist professors and students. According to 
Kamrava (2008), these Associations produce little or no doctrinal output and instead act more as 
the guardians and enforces of the official orthodoxy.   
MODERNIST RIGHT: 
   It is important to note the distinction between the modern Right and the Reformers. The 
modern Right are aligned with the overall jurisprudential underpinnings of the Islamic Republic, 
however according to Kamrava (2008), they “advocate modifications to some of its [IR’s] specific 
features and, if possible, criticize the conduct of its officials” (p.85).This group does not question 
the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih unlike the Reform camp. Dr. Reza Davari Ardakani, philosophy 
professor at the University of Tehran, is perhaps the most notable lay conservative thinker 
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advocating for this group. The late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri was perhaps the most prominent 
spokesperson for this group.  
5.4.3 Conservatives and Dissent 
Clearly, the conservative actors were in absolute opposition to the Green Movement or 
any type of dissent in general and thus broke up the protests swiftly, brutally and effectively. The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-i Pasdaran-i Enghelab-i Islami) or the IRGC for short, a 
parallel military powerhouse charged with guarding Iran’s Islamic system and founded at the onset 
of the revolution at the behest of Khomeini, and the Basij militia, a paramilitary volunteer and 
auxiliary force subordinate to the IRGC, are essentially the oppressive muscles of the 
conservatives. Basij and the IRGC essentially provided the boots on the ground to beat, disperse 
and intimidate the protesters, during the 2009 protests. Those arrested were often beaten and 
tortured prior to being prosecuted and sentenced by the same judicial system that as described 
above is basically an executive arm of the institution of the Supreme Leadership. This is essentially 
how the oppressive machine of the Islamic Republic responds to any type of descent.    
5.5 Chapter Summery 
This chapter addresses RQ 1 to 3 necessary in order to answer my main research inquiry. 
In other words, in this chapter the key categories of stakeholders in the movement are identified 
along with their aspirations and power dynamic. While three distinct actors participated in the 
Green Movements, civil society groups are clearly the less influential of the three. Reformers, the 
main leaders of the group who triggered the events, while considered insiders and still hold 
considerable power and influence within the government, were essentially overpowered by the 
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ruling conservatives. The former wields power and asserts its hegemonic domination through 
various institutions and organizations the most important of all are the institution of the 
Supreme Leadership and the judiciary followed by smaller more targeted ones such as the 
Guardian Council and the Special Court of the Clergy. The increasingly powerful IRGC and the 
Basij militia provide the conservatives with the manpower required to break up the protests.    
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 CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
6.0 An Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter I will conduct a critical analysis of the political discourse of the two Reform 
candidates during the 2009 elections. The focus of this research is on the proposed changes to 
three different structures of signification, domination, and legitimation. Studying the data reveals 
that the majority of the changes proposed by the two candidates fall into the prevue of the 
structures of domination. Thus patriarchy and economy were selected by the author for this study 
for their significance and their domination of the 2009 election discourse.  
6.1 Structures of Domination: Patriarchy 
This section focuses on the dominating structure of patriarchy and the status of women in 
Iran. First, a brief background on the women’s movement in Iran. 
Women in Iran have a long history of participating in socio-political movements. Esfandiari 
(1997) points out that women's movement in Iran started in the late nineteenth century and in 
particular during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution that took place between 1905 and 1911, 
where women had participated in street protests. During the 1979 revolution Iranian women also 
had a strong presence. Esfandiari (1997) also indicates that “the revolution created a sense of 
participation among men and women from all classes”. In the marches that led to the revolution, 
women from different social backgrounds were strongly present and active agents of revolution. 
There were professional women without scarves and women from traditional backgrounds 
wearing the black veil (Chador) and women from lower- and middle-class families with their 
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children (Esfandiari, 1997) walking shoulder to shoulder with men, hoping that the revolution 
would bring for them improvement in their economic, social and, most importantly, legal status. 
Katouzian (2009) notes that both modern and traditional women had played an active role 
in the revolution. While the modern and professional women (e.g., university students, nurses, 
doctors, journalists, lawyers, engineers and workers in public and private sectors) were more 
visible, towards the end of the former regime some of them began to wear light hejab (scarves) as 
a gesture of defiance against the regime.  However, in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution, 
women were the first group to be neglected and oppressed by the new elite in power.  
However, after the 1979 revolution, the new Islamic government, naturally, adapted a 
more conservative view of women and their legal and political status in the society. This view, 
informed by the Shi’ite doctrine and championed personally by Ayatollah Khomeini, promoted an 
image of women as mothers, wives and homemakers, both through policy and propaganda. Citing 
the Shari’a, discriminating laws were encoded in the very first draft of the new constitution limiting 
a woman’s choice and activities with policies such as forced Hejab, barring women from seeking 
high political and judicial offices and reversed a number of initiatives taken under Mohammad 
Reza Shah.  
In 1967 the Shah created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and introduced the Family 
Protection Laws in 1967 and family courts in 1975 (Yeganeh, 1995). The Family Protection Act 
restricted polygamy, granted women equal access to divorce and legalized abortion in certain 
circumstances. Shari’a law has designated the age of consent for marriage for women at 9, but 
prior to 1967 the Iranian Civil code had amended it to 14, and finally the Family Protection Act had 
raised the age of marriage to 18 for women (Afshar, 1982). As one of his very first orders of 
117 
 
business, Ayatollah Khomeini reversed the Family Protection Act, and dissolved the family courts 
denouncing these measures as in direct contradiction to Qur’an’s text (Khomeini, 2008) and called 
upon fury of god upon those implementing and administering such laws. 
But perhaps no measure was as symbolic of religious persecution of women, as forcing 
them into veiling (hejab). On March 6, 1979 less than a month after the collapse of the old regime 
in a speech in the holy city of Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the subject of mandatory 
veiling: 
Islamic ministries should not have a sacrilegious atmosphere. 
Uncovered women should not come to Islamic ministries. Women may 
come but they should don Islamic covering” (Khomeini, 2008, Vol.6, 
p.286). 
 
 Two days later in a mass demonstrations staged to celebrate the International Women’s 
Day, women reacted widely and heavily to Khomeini’s comments. Among their chants were 
'Liberty and equality are our undeniable rights', ' We will fight against compulsory veil’, ‘Down with 
dictatorship', ' In the dawn of freedom, we already lack freedom',  and 'Women's Day of 
Emancipation is neither Western, nor Eastern, it is international'. 
Following further demonstrations and sit-ins the regime retreated. Prime Minister of the 
interim government, Mahdi Bazargan, announced that Ayatollah Khomeini’s statements were 
misunderstood and that compulsory veiling was not on their agenda (Tabari, 1980). However, once 
the dust settled, a few short months later veiling for women holding government positions became 
mandatory. The trend continued to all segments of the society until women were no longer able 
to appear in public without the hejab. The penalty of doing so, according to the constitution of the 
Islamic republic of Iran, is 74 strokes of leash. The situation is best described by this slogan adopted 
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by Hezbollah, the club wilding Khomeini supporters, addressing women: “Ya rusari ya tusari” 
meaning cover on the head or a blow to the head (Katouzian, 2009, p.335). Compulsory hejab is in 
effect to date. 
6.1.1 Women’s Rights Post 1979 Revolution 
Despite continuous and systematic persecution, women fought back against religious 
oppression through education and by organizing and actively fighting for their cause and 
developing one of the most visible and successful campaigns of the Iranian civil society particularly 
since the war ended in 1988. Since the revolution, due to a variety of socio-economic factors, 
young Iranian women have become highly educated in Iran. In September 2012, women made up 
more than 60 percent of all university students (Sahraei, 2012). The war with Iraq (1980-1988) 
which sent many men to the fronts and left women as the primary breadwinner, limitations placed 
on women’s employment and most other activities outside the home, and the activities of many 
women’s rights groups are amongst those factors contributing to higher levels of education 
amongst women. It certainly seems like the regime’s male centric policies indirectly pushed 
women to the only venue available to them: the universities. Additionally, because of the limited 
number of spots available in universities, students must pass a rather difficult entrance exam called 
Konkoor, to enter university, which also indicates that these young women are getting in on their 
own merit and not based on any affirmative action. Higher education for women over almost four 
decades has naturally introduced some changes to the largely traditional fabric of the Iranian 
society. It is commonly understood that higher education amongst women tends to be a 
contributing factor in such social shifts as: larger share of the labour force, significantly higher age 
of marriage, fewer children and higher rates of divorce.  
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While higher education has paved the way for some advances for women, the 
institutionalized gender discrimination embedded in the policies and laws of the country continue 
to oppress women and hinder their cause considerably. Iranian Family Law does not recognize a 
woman’s right to apply for divorce or to take custody of her children in most cases. Additionally, 
by law, polygamy and temporary marriages (Sigheh) are a man’s religious and legal rights to which 
his wife cannot object, the age of consent is basically none existent and in order for a married 
woman to enrolled in higher education, travel outside the country or seek employment, her 
husband’s explicit and legal consent is required . Under Shari’a law upon which the Iranian legal 
and punitive system is built, a woman’s life, her Diyeh (blood money), and her testimony are equal 
to half of that of a man.  
To battle systematic social and institutional discrimination against women in the name of 
religion and convention, a number of women began to organize to work and change the system 
from within. Women’s movement gave birth to action groups like One Million Signatures for the 
Repeal of Discriminatory Laws Campaign (or Campaign for Equality), and education and awareness 
raising groups like Feminism School and  Women’s Cultural Centre. Women’s rights activists come 
from all walks of life, ordinary citizens, lawyers, journalists, authors, filmmakers, scholars and 
artists all moving towards the same goal: to lobby the government, the Majlis, and the courts for 
more equality and to educate and raise awareness. Shirin Ebadi (Former Judge, Lawyer, Noble 
Peace laureate), Mehrangiz Kar (Lawyer, Scholar, Author), Parvin Ardalan (journalist, activist), 
Rakhshan Bani Etemad (Filmmaker), Mahboubeh Abbasgholi Zadeh (Journalist, Activist), are 
amongst the long list of women’s rights activists in Iran. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Islamic government has been systematically cracking down on the 
movement and taking harsh measures such as long jail terms, torture, exile, lifelong bans on public 
activity including practicing in their own professions, erratic arrests and physical and emotional 
harassment in response. The subject of women and their rights comes up in almost every 
presidential election, especially since 1997, and is always considered controversial but depending 
on the faction in power there are periods of more intense oppression and periods where activists 
have more room to maneuver. In the 2009 elections both Mousavi and Karoubi made women’s 
issues included women’s rights a theme to their platform. Considering Ahmadi Nejad had 
introduced a number of bills considered to further marginalize women and discriminate against 
them, women’s groups threw their support heavily behind the two Reformist candidates.  
Both candidates campaigned heavily on women’s rights and promised to introduce change 
and improve on their freedoms, to facilitate wider participation of women in the society and in the 
labour market, and to hire more women in their administrations. Vowing to alter this social 
structure, naturally drew significant support from women’s rights activists, ordinary citizens, 
students, and youth. 
6.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis: Claims About Women’s Rights 
In this section will apply the principles of critical discourse analysis to examine the validity 
claims of two Green movement leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Hojatol Islam Karoubi, regarding 
women’s rights and its political implications. To this effect, the four validity claims of truth, 
sincerity, legitimacy, and comprehensibility will be tested as described by Habermas (1984) and 
operationalized by Cukier et al. (2009).  
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6.1.3 Empirical Analysis of Truth Claims 
Truth claims are concerned with factual accuracy, biased and incomplete statements and 
logical consistency (see table 6.1 summarizing validity claims of truth). Upon closer examination of 
the truth claims on women and issues of gender discrimination, several logical inconsistencies are 
revealed in the discourse of the two leaders. It appears they both treat gender discrimination as a 
phenomenon external to the system and not something stemming from the structural foundations 
of the Islamic regime:  
Mousavi:  There are many things that under the name of Islam and securing family values, 
but in reality influenced by discriminatory gender views and legal issues, have created 
serious hurdles for women in the society (Empirical Material [EM] 8). 
 
This argument, and other similar ones (both EM1, EM15), however are logically 
inconsistent for several reasons. In actuality what creates “serious hurdles for women” are the 
discriminatory laws of the country that are written in accordance with the Shi’ite doctrine (fiqh) 
and the Shari’a. The above statement reduces the structural and systemic gender discrimination 
upon which the Islamic Republic’s legal and constitutional framework is founded, to a certain 
interpretation of Islam. A quick look at some of the articles of the Iranian penal and civil codes 
however refutes this argument and leaves little room for interpretation. Article 300 of the Iranian 
Penal Code states the value of a woman’s life is half that of a man’s, while article 102 asserts 
women must wear the full Islamic Hejab in public ("Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran," 
n.d.). Moreover, men can divorce their wives at any time if they choose to, but women can only 
apply for divorce under certain strict conditions ("Civil Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran," n.d.). 
Similarly Karoubi’s account of Khomeini’s stance on women (EM15) in politics conflicts with reality. 
While Khomeini did not object to women running for parliament, he refused to allow them to run 
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for the office of the president, or to be appointed a judge (articles 115, and 162 of the constitution) 
("The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran," n.d.). In fact as per Khomeini’s mandate in 1979 
after the revolution, all female judges were removed from the bench. Table 6.1 summarizes 
validity claims of truth: 
Table 6.1: Empirical analysis of truth validity claims on women’s rights. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF TRUTH 
EVIDENCE OF DISTORTION 
Unidentified woman: one of the most important 
topics in social justice is the issue of gender 
equality. Discussing that first and foremost our 
girls and boys must feel safe. 
EM1 
T1. Is this argument logically 
consistent? 
It is unclear how gender 
equity and the youth 
feeling safe are related 
Rahnavard: why shouldn't our women be safe in 
our society? Why are so many women killed? Why 
are so many women killed under the pretence of 
honor? Although, honouring the codes of chastity 
are not harmful if they are bound by law 
EM1 
T2. Is this argument true or 
false? 
"codes of chastity" and 
"honour" are harmful to 
women since they are 
oppressive to them 
Mousavi: Considering the turn of events in the 
past year, women and youth have a new 
understanding of themselves and a have renewed 
sense of identity. Their worldviews and thoughts 
have changed. Therefore a certain pain is felt that 
is related to this renewal of identity. Because our 
governing, legal and traditional structures are 
incompatible with this newly born identity. We 
have to study this issue. 
EM7 
T3. Is this argument factually 
true? 
Women and Youth's 
movements date much 
further back than the 
Green Movement of 2009 
Mousavi:  There are many things that under the 
name of Islam and securing family values, but in 
reality influenced by discriminatory gender views 
and legal issues, have created serious hurdles for 
women in the society. 
EM8 
T4. Is this argument logically 
consistent? 
The hearer or reader is left 
to decode what "many 
things" and "serious 
hurdles" are, and how 
those influence come into 
play? 
In response to a question about the One Million 
Signature Campaign for Repeal of Discriminatory 
Laws Against Women, and noting the Green 
Human Chain formed last year from Tajrish 
square to Railroad square as symbol of 
reconciliation and national unity he goes on to 
say: 
Mousavi: I consider that day a great 
representation of the Green Movement. In 
previous years we have put forth "reconciliation" 
as our motto, which was a good motto for our 
national unity which will solve and even brings 
forward our problems. Some benefit from not 
reconciling. Currently in different formats 
including the families of political prisoners , 
EM14 
T5. Is this argument factually 
true? 
This statement is false 
since women were 
organized under various 
umbrellas prior to the 
Green Movement already. 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF TRUTH 
EVIDENCE OF DISTORTION 
different groups and movements have been 
created which didn't have the possibility to 
organize prior to the Green Movement. Women's 
movement is of those movements too. 
Mousavi: Some women used to participate in 
certain activities under the umbrella of the One 
Million Signature Campaign against 
discrimination, that were even criminalized 
maybe because they were conducting those 
activities apart from each other. 
EM14 
T6. What evidence has been 
provided to support these 
arguments? 
These groups were 
penalized because of their 
demands and not because 
they were organized 
separately. No evidence is 
presented to the contrary 
Mousavi: But due to the colorful and diverse 
nature of the [Green] Movement, today they are 
joined with the extensive Green mass movement 
without the presence of suspicion against this 
group. 
EM14 
T7. Is this argument true or 
false? 
The assertion that there is 
no suspicion against these 
groups is false since the 
government was cracking 
down on them under 
various charges 
Karoubi: I will say this bluntly here, Emam 
[Khomeini] was very sensitive to moves that 
would demotivate people from participating in 
the elections and would readily oppose them. At a 
point in time, it hasn't been forgotten, that it was 
said that women shouldn't participate and don't 
get elected into the Majlis. Emam readily said that 
women must participate in the elections and be 
able to get elected to the Majlis 
EM15 
T8. Is this argument logically 
consistent? 
It is unclear who/which 
group suggested women 
should not be elected and 
in what context? 
 
Furthermore there are other assertions by both candidates that are factually untrue: Mr. 
Mousavi repeatedly suggests that women have found a voice under the Green umbrella (EM7, 
EM14), and were able to organize due to the diverse and tolerant nature of the movement. 
However as previously discussed, women were already organized years before the Green 
Movement, the one million signature campaign in fact was established in 2006. It is equally untrue 
to claim women’s rights groups enjoy some sort of a safe haven and were immune from 
punishment because they gathered under the Green umbrella. The Islamic regime arrested and 
imprisoned many women’s rights activists such as Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, Mahbubeh 
Abbasgholi Zadeh, and Nasrin Sotoudeh among others. Some of them such as Narges Mohammadi, 
Shiva Nazar Ahari, and Bahareh Hedayat are still carrying those sentences. 
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To sum up, when the standards of Habermas’s truth claims are applied, there are evidence 
of communication distortion. Logical inconsistencies attempting at framing institutionalized 
discrimination embedded in the constitution and various penal and civil codes as merely the 
interpretation of a certain group, is one such distortion. Additionally, there are statements made 
that are simply inaccurate and untrue that play to the heart of the Green leaders’ attitude towards 
the women’s movement. Mousavi’s repeated attempts to frame the long standing women’s 
struggle for their rights as a movement formed under the Green umbrella is a factually incorrect 
assertion made for political gain.   
6.1.4 Empirical Analysis of Sincerity Claims 
Sincerity implies consistency between what is expressed in the communication and the 
underlying intent. In examining the data, I paid particular attention to the congruity between what 
was stated in the political communications of the Green leaders and what was assumed. In other 
words, did they actually mean what their message implied to the audience or not. In table 6.2 
bellow I have summarized validity claims of sincerity.  
One subject that consistently comes up in the movement’s discourse is gender equality and 
discriminatory practices against women. In (EM1) for example the three women, Zahra 
Rahnavard (Mousavi’s wife), Fatemeh Mo’tamed Aria (a well-known actor), and an unidentified 
woman, talk about gender discrimination and its manifestations in the society such as needing 
their husbands and fathers’ consent for everything from staying in a hotel while traveling, to 
receiving medically required surgery. 
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    Table 6.2: Empirical analysis of sincerity validity claims on women’s rights. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF SINCERITY 
EVIDENCE OF DISTORTION 
Rahnavard: All forms of discrimination must 
be eliminated in the society. We are against all 
forms of discrimination. Discrimination 
disrupts human growth. Now gender 
discrimination is one of its forms...there has to 
be a new reading of the role of women. Women 
are saying we are present, we have 
expectations and we still want to take part in 
deciding our destiny.   
EM1 
S1. Is what is said 
consistent with how it is 
said? 
Ms. Rahnavard states this while 
wearing full Islamic cover 
which is contradictory to the 
universal concept of gender 
discrimination 
"Rahnavard, Rahnavard, stands for equality of 
men and women" 
EM3 
S2. Does this 
communication elicit an 
emotional response? 
gender equity is a highly 
charged and coveted concept in 
the Iranian society 
Mousavi: There are no differences between 
men and women when it comes to freedom and 
working towards achieving democracy, and 
everyone must march together on this path. EM6 
S3. What is missing or 
suppressed in the 
discourse? 
The fact that the country's laws 
are discriminatory against 
women and limiting their 
freedoms. Despite that, the 
speaker pledges to uphold the 
law to its fullest extent. 
Mousavi: Women's issues in our country won’t 
be solved unless they become a national 
problem and there should be no segregation 
between men and women. The gender 
segregation is the root of discrimination which 
renders the problem unsolvable.  
EM6 
S4.Is what is said consistent 
with what is implied? 
The speaker is silent on what 
he means by "gender 
segregation" and 
"discrimination". 
Mousavi: We cannot have a free and just 
society unless we solve the women's problems. 
EM6 
S5. Is what is said 
consistent with what is 
implied? 
The audience is left to decode 
what exactly are women's 
issues from Mr. Mousavi's 
perspective and how they need 
to be solved 
Mousavi: The faith of the Green Movement is 
tied to the women's movement in the future, 
and I don't think the Green Movement can 
achieve its goals without being accompanied by 
women every step of the way. The opposite is 
true too, meaning if we fail to make political 
change, women’s conditions won’t change 
either. 
EM10 
S6. Is what is said 
consistent with what is 
implied? 
What are the goals of the Green 
Movement regarding women? 
Mousavi: The Green Movement is after justice 
and freedom and the execution of the law, and 
if we achieve those, other issues stemming 
from those will be solved too. The reason we 
are facing actions that are causing us pain, is 
because our conditions are not aligned with the 
constitution and human dignity and honour.  
EM12 
S7. Does the text elicit 
emotional an emotional 
response? 
The language associated with 
adherence to the law invokes 
positive emotions and 
attributes "pain" and problems 
to unlawfulness 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF SINCERITY 
EVIDENCE OF DISTORTION 
Karoubi: We published our third campaign 
promise during the month of Farvardin which 
was about civil rights. Civil rights bound by the 
constitutional framework. Regarding ladies, 
regarding ethnicities, regarding the various 
religions that exist in Iran, regarding 
universities, regarding prisoners that people 
come to get into, pointless restrictions they 
place on people's lives and the bitter incidents 
[they have caused], pointless nuances, 
interfering in the private lives of families which 
Islam has so advised [against], civil rights in 
general bound by the constitutional framework 
or those principles of the constitution that are 
left vague. 
EM16 
S8. Is the user engaging in 
jargon? 
What are the "principles of the 
constitution that are left 
vague"? 
Female Voice Over: Karoubi considers solving 
women's problems an important and critical 
plans of his government and will try to execute 
the 6th Majlis's passed bill to join Iran to the 
[UN's] Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. He 
has certain plans to encourage and support 
none-governmental women's organizations 
and groups, and plans to have at least one 
female minister in his cabinet.  
EM19 
S9. Is what is assumed 
consistent with what is 
implied? 
Considering the speaker is fully 
aware of the legal and 
constitutional restrictions 
women face, and considering 
there already were women in 
the cabinet, is this appointment 
really going to help the 
women's cause? 
 
On that video, an official campaign release, Zahra Rahnavard openly and passionately protests 
the gender inequality present in the society and demands change: 
Rahnavard: All forms of discrimination must be eliminated in the society. 
We are against all forms of discrimination. Discrimination disrupts human 
growth. Now gender discrimination is one of its forms...there has to be a 
new reading of the role of women. Women are saying we are present, we 
have expectations and we still want to take part in deciding our destiny 
(EM1).  
 
Similarly, Mousavi in (EM6) asserts: “There are no differences between men and women 
when it comes to freedom and working towards achieving democracy, and everyone must 
march together on this path.” Along the same lines, Karoubi’s campaign video (EM19) makes a 
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point of mentioning “Karoubi considers solving women's problems an important and critical 
plan of his government and will try to execute the 6th Majlis's passed bill to join Iran to the 
[UN's] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women”. 
On the surface these statements could be interpreted to imply gender equality in the 
Western sense of the word. However, closer examination of these claims reveals a number of 
contradictions in the discourse. First, despite extensive research, I was not able to find any 
communication by either of the leaders’ that would detail their definition of the concept of 
“gender equality”. This paper recognizes the United Nation’s definition of gender equity which 
“refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and 
boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s 
and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born 
male or female” (The United Nations, n.d.). As per above discussions, however, Iranian laws 
have a different view of gender relations, one that is in stark contrast to the UN’s. Despite 
claiming to equity, both candidates repeatedly pledge to uphold the law and abide by the 
constitution, the very same codes that institutionalize gender discrimination in the country.  
Speaking of his campaign manifesto on Civil Rights, admittedly the first of its kind in the 
history of the regime, Karoubi lists a multitude of rights his government will address but as long 
as they are “bound by the constitutional framework or those principles of the constitution that 
are left vague” (EM16). Often when Karoubi uses the phrase civil rights (including the rights of 
women), he immediately adds the phrase “bound by the constitutional framework” (EM16, 
EM18). On more than one occasion Mousavi emphasizes the same adherence to the 
constitution and the law, for example he says “The Green Movement is after justice and 
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freedom and the execution of the law” (EM12) or in a campaign speech on women he says “The 
reason we are facing actions that are causing us pain, is because our conditions are not aligned 
with the constitution and human dignity and honor” (EM12).  
Phrases such as “gender equity” and “eliminating discrimination” have powerful 
associations for the segment of the society who formed the Green movement, and thus was 
used by the leaders to reinforce a vague notion of equity. Such terms elicit strong emotions and 
garner popular support, despite the evidence that the situation has little chance to change.  
Furthermore, what is missing in the discourse of the Green leaders is a concrete and 
practical roadmap to achieve more equality for women. Neither candidate provides any kind of 
detail on the actual laws they will target to amend, nor the policies would they put in place to 
further women’s rights. We won’t know for example if Mr. Mousavi is going to amend the law 
to make it easier for women to apply for divorce? Or is Mr. Karoubi going to propose to change 
Article 102 of the penal code and lift the mandatory Hijab since he alludes to its ineffectiveness 
when it comes to enforcing religion (EM17)? The answer is we don’t know since their discourse 
is distorted on the concept of gender discrimination. 
Examining those statements leaves a lingering thought however. The law, and the 
constitution, are considered to be the sources of institutional discrimination against women in 
the country. It is the Iranian law that states a woman’s life is worth half of that of a man, 
recognizes polygamy as a man’s right, that mandates women who refuse to sexually submit to 
their husbands be punishable, who denies a woman equal access to divorce and even denies 
them permission to set foot in a stadium to watch male sporting events. Both candidates also 
repeatedly declare devotion to Khomeini and his school of thought. On many occasions Mousavi 
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goes on the record to say his goal is to take the country back to the “Golden age of Imam”. But 
as explained above one of Khomeini’s first orders of business was to overturn the Family 
Protection Act which banned polygamy, reduced the age of consent for girls to 9, and so on. It 
was Khomeini who mandated forced Hijab to which large numbers of women are protesting in 
many shapes and forms to this date. One cannot achieve equality by promoting submission to 
laws that are deeply discriminatory, and by attesting devotion to a leader who has established 
a regime on the notion of women as subservient to men.  
To further demonstrate that women’s rights are on their agendas, both candidates go 
further than words and employ more visual signals. Mousavi was the first candidate in the history 
of the Islamic Republic to be accompanied by his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, while campaigning. 
Rahnavard, who holds a PhD in political science, served as the Chancellor of Alzahra University 
(women-only school) in Tehran from 1998 to 2006, and as a Political Adviser to the former 
President Mohammad Khatami. Karoubi soon followed suite with his wife Fatemeh Karoubi. 
Rahnavard, by far the more outspoken of the two, soon came to be viewed as a symbol of gender 
equality and women’s rights as is evident in this popular slogan chanted by young women in (EM3): 
"Rahnavard, Rahnavard, stands for equality of men and women". 
Curiously both women always appear in public in full Islamic attire or Chador (long 
traditional Hijab) which emphasizes their dedication both to this religious yet oppressive concept 
and to the core values of the Islamic Republic. Chador has always been the cover of choice of the 
great majority of the clergy including Khomeini, and although currently not enforced in public, is 
mandatory for many government employees. Therefore while presence of these women may 
signal progressive attitudes towards women and their rights, by keeping the appearance of 
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increased social participation, in my opinion they are misleading. This is a clear case of engaging in 
goal-oriented Dramaturgical action which according to Habermas is parasitic on communicative 
action and thus hampers the actors’ ability to reach mutual understanding (Habermas, 1984). This 
concept will be discussed further in the next few sections.  
Yet the chador-clad presence speaks volumes to the many contradictions and conflicts 
present in the makeup of the Green Movement.  This is not to limit a woman’s choice of clothing 
and step on religious rights but Dramaturgy is the presentation of self in a favourable light to the 
public, it is designed to be seen by others in an attempt to improve one’s self-image (Habermas, 
1984).  What a person, specially an individual in the position of power and influence, chooses to 
wear is testament to their religious and ideological beliefs, particularly in a highly ideological 
context of Iranian politics. Clearly the candidates seek to signal equality and respect for women’s 
rights through the visual of having their wives present on the campaign trail. However, their 
presence wrapped in chador also reinforces the very beliefs and institutional values that have 
objectified and oppressed women and trampled over their rights for decades.  
Moreover, further research reveals further contradiction in the discourse of Ms. Rahnavard 
regarding Hejab and a woman’s choice to choose. She has written an entire book titled Beauty of 
Concealment and Concealment of Beauty (1987) in defense and justification of forced hejab. She 
defends forced hejab according to “just and proper religious orthodoxy”, and its abolition by Reza 
Shah a “tragedy”, and an “imperialist” plot: 
As soon as this lofty and exalted flag of Islam and nobility fell down 
from the hands of the people, it was replaced by ignominy, dishonour, 
unlimited freedom, villainy, cruelty, ostentation, depravity, debauchery 
and loss of complete freedom and independence. May God break the 
hand of the Western and Eastern system of oppression that has thrown 
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us for the fast fifty years in the abyss of ignominy of the isolation from 
our exalted Islamic Self! (Rahnavard, 1987) 
In an interview on June 16, 2009, in the midst of protests, she supports the mandatory 
veiling of Iranian women in an interview with the BBC, adding she would not change that law: "it 
has always been in Islam that women have the veil, and it is written in the Koran - tell Muslim 
women to cover themselves" ("Profile: Zahra Rahnavard," 2009). Views such as above, are in direct 
contrast to the spirit of the women’s rights movement and to their right to choose. 
In summary, there are several inconsistencies present in the discourse of the Green 
leaders, especially on the topic of gender discrimination and its political implications. While 
equity and women’s rights were important issues in the 2009 elections, the evidence shows 
that perhaps there were different interpretations of the notion were present.  There is a gap in 
the communication of this concept, because although discriminatory practices in the society 
and the establishment are acknowledged, the evidence are not encouraging in terms of real 
change actually happening should either of the two men become president.  Thus examining 
the sincerity of those claims, the data point to distortion in communication.  
6.1.5 Empirical Analysis of Legitimacy Claims 
Analysis of legitimacy in this section are centred on conformity between an utterance and 
the norms of its social context. Additionally, I will discuss evidence of participation and focus on 
examining which stakeholders are included or excluded from the discourse. Studying the data 
reveals further evidence of communication distortion when the legitimacy of one of the main 
promises of both Mousavi’s and Karoubi’s campaigns are examined, namely appointment of 
female cabinet members. Appointing women to their cabinets and including them in high political 
offices are one of the promises both candidates repeatedly make. 
132 
 
In a speech on the status of women in the society, Mousavi asserts “In my opinion women 
must be present in the cabinet” (EM5). In another instant he states: 
Mousavi: We have a large number of female university students, who 
seem to face enormous problems once they want to enter the labour 
market. They feel discriminated against in this respect. We similarly have 
huge problems when it comes to domestic women. Part of the solution is 
women should be present in high ranking decision making (EM4).  
 
Rahnavard also echoes the same view: A government that is ran without women executives, will 
definitely be a harsh one (EM1). 
 
Karoubi similarly voices his plans “to encourage and support none-governmental women's 
organizations” and pledges “to have at least one female minister in his cabinet” (EM19). Table 6.3 
summarizes validity claims of legitimacy: 
Table 6.3: Empirical analysis of legitimacy validity claims on women’s rights. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY 
CLAIMS OF LEGITIMACY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: When people's incomes shrink, when they 
don't have employment prospects, you can be sure these 
youth that see no light at the end of the tunnel, turn to 
drugs and foul behaviour (bad akhlaghi) and these types 
of crimes will spread. But when in a society clear 
[economic] goals are stated, and there is hope for future, 
which was the case during the war era despite all the 
hardship, I think all these foul behaviours could be 
drastically reduced.  
EM22 
L1. What is missing or 
suppressed in the 
discourse? 
The speaker is reducing 
the multitude of factors 
underlying high crime 
rates, widespread drug 
addiction and moral and 
social issues to a single 
economic factor. 
Mousavi: I have described this [economic conditions] as 
turning a society based on higher values to a commercial 
society. In a commercial society everything becomes 
utility-based and monetary-based. Cultural values turn 
into market values and economic values where 
everything has a monetary price even human values are 
set a monetary value. There becomes a point for example, 
where a person bribes a member of the parliament 
$5million Tomans to buy their vote. This is a consumerist 
society. The current situation with this way of looking at 
a society and with false promises, and superstitious and 
such are far from the [value based] era we had been 
through [at the beginning of revolution]. 
 
EM24 
L2. What information is 
supressed or left silent? 
What led to this drastic 
change in socio-economic 
conditions is left silent. 
Mousavi: On one hand we export crude oil and on the 
other hand imported consumer goods are flooding our 
EM25 
L3. What information is 
supressed or left silent? 
The argument doesn't 
discuss the fact that 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY 
CLAIMS OF LEGITIMACY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
market at the cost of destroying our domestic 
production. 
President Ahmadi Nejad 
would not have been able 
to accomplish this had it 
not been for the support 
of higher powerhouses 
(House of Leadership, 
IRGC, etc.) 
Karbaschi: (video continues from previous section, 
while showing Karbaschi's tears): in the position of the 
president, are you determined to use any tool in your 
disposal, even your reputation, for this purpose? 
Karoubi: I will definitely do this. First of all, I'm not a 
hero, first of all. Second, we have, as you know, a certain 
record and that I’m not dependant on fake heroism. and I 
will truly go into my own prevue which is working as the 
country's president and solving problems, and I am 
willing, as your honour has seen, I, to free a prisoner, 
when I was the Majlis Speaker, I'd make a phone call to a 
colleague and he'd tell me you don't have to do this 
yourself, tell your office to call, you don't have to tell me, 
people’s problems, people's lives, people's dignity and 
authority are really important to us. 
EM48 
L4. Are all relevant 
information 
communicated without 
distortion and omission? 
The communication 
doesn't explain why the 
Speaker of the House 
should call to free a 
prisoner? Who is the 
prisoner? What about the 
legal avenues? 
Female voiceover: Are you still asking yourself why is 
Mehdi Karoubi running for president? Maybe you 
remember in the last election Mehdi Karoubi promised 
that if he gets elected as the president, he will set a salary 
of 50,000 Tomans a month for all Iranians 18 and older. 
Esma'il Gerami Moghadam: is this the continuation of 
your last plan, when you stated 50,000 Tomans a month 
will be given to all Iranians 18 and older, and ...it is also a 
solution for many unemployment challenges, is this a 
continuation of that plan and a more completed version 
of it? If this is the case please explain a little. 
Karoubi: This time around I think it is more 
comprehensive, it's better, meaning we have made it 
more detailed and clearer. 
Female voiceover: This plan, of course, was mocked by 
the other incumbents and was considered impossible. 
But after the elections many economists agreed with it 
and experts reviewed and completed it. Today this plan 
is completed under "assigning oil revenue shares to 
people", and is ready for execution.   
EM50 
L5. Who are the experts 
or economists? Who is 
excluded? 
The communication does 
not divulge who the 
expert economists 
approving this plan are. 
Additionally, the 
opponents of this plan 
don't have a voice in the 
discussion. 
Female voiceover: Karoubi has other economic plans to, 
including exempting small businesses from taxes and 
reinforcing the private sector in the fields of production, 
commerce and services, through tax exemption and 
through partnership with private and public banks. 
EM52 
L6. Who is marginalized 
or excluded? 
The critics of this 
economic plan are 
excluded from the debate 
 
A content analysis of both candidates campaign videos show young men and women 
holding signs that read “female cabinet members”. One of Karoubi’s official campaign video 
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releases consists of interview style questions put to him by his campaign advisors and would 
cabinet members. Ms. Jamileh Kadivar9 is a member of that team and upon further research I 
realized that she was also his advisor on the status of women, all of which signal women’s political 
participation. However, what is left silent in the discourse is considering the divisive and 
discriminatory nature of the Islamic Republic that disenfranchises and discriminates against many 
groups. The questions I pose here is what group of women can run and get elected to political 
office? Below I will explore the answer: 
The laws governing the executive branch, require all cabinet ministers to be, among other 
things, religiously observant, loyal to the regime and have no police record. Therefore by default 
many women are excluded: the Baha’i minority, activists with a prison record, regime critics, and 
those who don’t observe the strict religious codes such as Hijab. These women are all social actors 
with an interest in this particular discourse who are excluded from it. Therefore women in the 
discourse of the Green leaders doesn’t mean all capable and qualified women.  
Moreover, further content analysis of the videos of both candidates reveals a striking yet 
concealed trend: women who get an official voice on the video either as speakers, interviewers or 
ordinary citizens asking questions are all depicted in full and proper Islamic Hijab. However, when 
cameras roll to show the masses of supporters, women, and specially the youth, are dressed in 
more fashionable and modern styles which include loose and permissive hijab. This observation 
along with the above evidence of distortion, leads to the conclusion that only a select group of 
women who prescribe to the religious and political notions of the regime are included in this 
                                                     
9 Jamileh Kadivar is a Reformist and former member of the parliament. She was Karoubi’s campaign 
advisor of women’s affairs. Furthermore, she is Hojatol Islam Mohsen Kadivar’s sister and Ataolah Mohajerani’s, 
Khatami’s former Minister of Guidance and Culture and who supported Karoubi’s candidacy, wife. 
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discourse, and the rest of the interested parties, who hold different views are excluded. Those 
such as Bahareh Hedayat, Mahboubeh Abbas Gholi Zadeh, Shirin Ebadi and many more are 
excluded from political participation, despite their qualifications, interest and capabilities. 
Therefore when Karoubi and Mousavi speak of women’s political participation, there is a silent 
footnote excluding many women from that activity.  
Additionally, both camps only go as far as asserting women must be present in their 
respective cabinets, the two candidates make no other tangible promises. But since President 
Khatami in 1997, every government had had female advisors or ministers. President Ahmadi 
Nejad’s cabinet was actually the first in the history of IRI to included Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi as 
health minister. That same government however managed to pass one of the most oppressive 
amendments to the family laws that amongst other things makes polygamy even easier for men 
and applying for divorce even harder for women. Therefore while it is important to hire women 
in high political offices, their mere presence is not enough.  Once again the critical details such 
as the above left silent, leave the door open for interpretation and maybe even wishful thinking 
by women who are already oppressed and in desperate need for change. They leave the door 
open for misleading the public and for dishonesty by alluding to what they want to hear without 
having the intention, capability or the executive powers to achieve it.  
To summarize, holding the political discourse of the Green leaders up to the 
Habermasian validity claim of ‘legitimacy’, one can see evidence of distortion. Interested actors 
in the women’s movement, activists, community leaders and advocates, are largely excluded 
and their voices suppressed. Moreover, history shows simply appointing women to cabinet or 
other political positions from amongst those available to them by law (as previously discussed) 
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is not enough in alleviating their status and eliminating discrimination as they could become 
mere tools in the political apparatus to reinforce and reproduce patriarchal notions. 
6.1.6 Empirical Analysis of Comprehensibility Claims 
While comprehensibility claims can be assessed in a variety of ways, in this section I have 
focused on clarity, and completeness, specifically to ensure the communication is without 
omissions that are important to its meaning. Since at the time of the Green movement the Majlis 
was in the midst of debating a bill that would ease the conditions of polygamy and temporary 
marriage for men even further, the topic often came up during the 2009 elections. My research 
depicts the topic further in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Empirical analysis of comprehensibility validity claims on women’s rights. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES 
SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS  OF 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: "I am against the polygamy bill"  
EM2 
C1. What is left out from this 
communication? 
The communication 
omits the fact that the 
office of the President is 
very limited in terms of 
bills passed by the 
Majlis & The Guardian 
Council 
Mousavi: The issue of women in our country is 
both extensive and multidimensional. There are 
certain discriminations and disenchantments, 
both from a legal perspective, and from the 
execution perspective. Also from an employment 
perspective. We have a large number of female 
university students, who seem to face enormous 
problems once they want to enter the labour 
market. They feel discriminated against in this 
respect. We similarly have huge problems when 
it comes to domestic women. Part of the solution 
is women should be present in high ranking 
decision making. 
EM4 
C2. Is the level of detail too 
burdensome for the audience? 
Too many messages left 
for the audience to 
decode such as: 
"extensive and 
multidimensional", 
"certain discriminations 
and disenchantments" 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES 
SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS  OF 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
In response to a question about the Green 
Movement's strategy regarding some Friday 
Prayers' clerics about women's cover and 
eruption of earthquakes and also the resurgence 
of the Islamic Guidance crews:  
Mousavi: Certain events are happening in the 
society and certain decisions are being made 
that instead of solving problems they are after 
creating conflict. For example, our country is 
prone to earth quakes and parts of Tehran are 
on the quake line, which certainly is very 
dangerous and we have to stop it and the 
government is better off taking care of this, 
instead of mixing it to a dream or a deed like 
women's cover...this is diversion from truth to 
keep people busy with such discussions and 
create division. Even the purpose of Islamic 
Guidance crews is not really for rectifying 
scantily covered women, they are largely meant 
to create diversion in minds.  
EM11 
C3. Is the communication 
sufficiently clear? 
The speaker does not 
explain what he means 
by "diversion from 
truth". Which truth? 
Mousavi: They want to keep our minds busy 
EM13 
C4. Is this utterance complete 
and intelligible? 
Who is "they"? To what 
end do "they" want to 
keep our minds busy? 
Karoubi: We published our third campaign 
promise during the month of Farvardin which 
was about civil rights. Civil rights bound by the 
constitutional framework. Regarding ladies, 
regarding ethnicities, regarding the various 
religions that exist in Iran, regarding 
universities, regarding prisoners that people 
come to get into, pointless restrictions they place 
on people's lives and the bitter incidents [they 
have caused], pointless nuances, interfering in 
the private lives of families which Islam has so 
advised [against], civil rights in general bound 
by the constitutional framework or those 
principles of the constitution that are left vague. 
EM16 
C5. Is this utterance complete 
and intelligible? 
The speaker leaves the 
audience wanting to 
know what he means by 
"those principles of the 
constitution that are left 
vague". 
 Jamileh Kadivar: (Note 10, say who she is): Do 
you think forced Hejab on women is a wise idea? 
Has it worked? You are a cleric after all, do you 
think, based on Islamic principles and religious 
teachings, is it right to force hejab? 
Karoubi: I think we have to do two things. One 
thing is to remove the aggressive way because 
those haven't worked and in many cases they 
were counterproductive. 
EM17 
C6. Is the communication clear 
and without confusions? 
Mr. Karoubi does not 
provide a clear answer 
to the question 
Jamileh Kadivar: what about polygamy?  
Karoubi: Polygamy will destroy lives in our 
society for certain. 
EM17 
C7. What is left out from the 
communication? 
The communication 
omits the fact that the 
office of the President is 
very limited in terms of 
bills passed by the 
Majlis & The Guardian 
Council 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES 
SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS  OF 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Female Voice Over: If he [Karoubi] is victorious 
in the presidential elections, he intends to create 
an organization for the defence of human rights 
and civil rights and intends to study and correct 
the behaviours of governmental and national 
security institutions on a regular basis. 
EM18 
C8. Is the communication 
complete? 
What is the plan for 
correcting the 
behaviours of those 
organizations? How will 
conflicting interests be 
handled? 
 
When asked, Mr. Karoubi openly states “Polygamy will destroy lives in our society for 
certain” (EM17). Similarly Mousavi asserts that he is “against the polygamy bill” (EM2). Such 
assertions imply to the audiences that should either man be elected president, they would amend 
this law. However, as discussed in chapter 3, even if the president was to introduce bills to, for 
instance, amend the laws sanctioning polygamy, his limited authority in face of the strong 
powerhouses such as the Guardian Council make it impossible to pass even with a likeminded 
Majlis. Therefore even if either man intended to change the laws discriminating against women 
once elected president, their chances would be slim to none under current circumstances. Khatami 
and his twin bills described in chapter 4 are perfect examples of well-intentioned and progressive 
bills that never saw the light of day since they were quashed by the Guardian and the Expediency 
Councils. However, those realities are routinely omitted from the discourse while on the campaign 
trail to attract support from groups and individuals sensitive to this cause and prone to vote for a 
likeminded candidate. Moreover, a closer look at the data reveals a pattern of using confusing and 
unclear language which is at times difficult for the audience to decode. Claims such as “The issue 
of women in our country is both extensive and multidimensional” (EM4), “There are certain 
discriminations and disenchantments, both from a legal perspective, and from the execution 
perspective” (EM4), are vague and leave room for interpretation without really revealing the 
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speaker’s message.  Further to this point, in his communications Mousavi indicates “They want to 
keep our minds busy” (EM13), he also talks about “even the purpose of Islamic Guidance crews is 
not really for rectifying scantily covered women, they are largely meant to create diversion in 
minds.” (EM11). The reader or hearer is however left to decode who are ‘they’? What is their 
position and power over the matter? Why are ‘they’ trying to ‘create diversion in minds’? 
‘Diversion’ from what facts? And of what ‘truth’ is Mr. Mousavi talking about?   
On the topic of clarity it is important to note that Mehdi Karoubi specially, has a convoluted 
and at times confusing speaking style. He often leaves his thoughts unfinished and starts another 
one in the middle of the first sentence (EM15, EM16, EM17), and his communications often defy 
syntactic and grammatical rules: 
Karoubi: My first thing to do, my first manifesto, the manifesto that I published in [the 
month of] Bahman, my first manifesto was to revive [the centre for] planning and 
management, which unfortunately got dissolved (EM46). 
 
As you can see from the above, it is often difficult to understand and follow Karoubi 
grammatically and semantically. He often goes off topic and the leaves the questions put to him 
without an answer: 
Jamileh Kadivar: Do you think forced Hejab on women is a wise idea? 
Has it worked? You are a cleric after all, do you think, based on Islamic 
principles and religious teachings, is it right to force hejab? 
Karoubi: I think we have to do two things. One thing is to remove the 
aggressive way because those haven't worked and in many cases they 
were counterproductive (EM17). 
 
The topic of forced Hejab has been a source of contention and defiance between Iranian 
women and the government since its enforcement after the revolution, and thus is of considerable 
importance. Additionally, considering the candidate has made a point by including this excerpt in 
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his official campaign communications, it is safe to assume that his intention is to convey where he 
stands on the topic of forced veiling. However he goes off rail, and at the end of the clip the 
audience is left wanting for an answer, for a clear stance. On another note, in Karoubi’s campaign 
particularly, we notice the presence of dramaturgy again. Karoubi is a member of clergy, he holds 
the rank of Hojatol Islam, and wears the robe that signifies his status and also Shi’ite religious 
orientation. In other words he presents himself as Rouhani, or a member of clergy and who is 
running for political office which implies he believes in the practice of religious in the political 
sphere and mixing of the two. On another note, his communications imply he will address the issue 
of women’s rights and will work to improve their status, but we the audience never know where 
exactly he stands on the issue. We can draw certain conclusions based on his wife’s appearance 
and his presentation of his “self” that his definition of equity is not aligned with the benchmark we 
discussed above. But the confusion and the distortion occur because he appears to be advocating 
for women’s rights and we don’t know what those rights according to Karoubi are.   
Evidence of communication distortion are present when the data is tested for 
comprehensibility validity claims. Confusing and unclear concepts, and at time convoluted and 
grammatically incorrect sentences hinder understanding and conveying of meaning. 
6.2 Critical Discourse Analysis: Claims about the Economy 
As in most elections, especially in the developing countries, economy and economic 
development are one of the most important points on any campaign platform. Through control of 
allocative resources, the economy also becomes an important structure of domination. In the 
following pages I will examine the validity claims of the Green leaders on economy.  
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6.2.1 Empirical Analysis of Truth Claims 
Mir Hossein Mousavi served as the Iranian Prime Minister from 1981 until an amendment 
to the constitution abolished that office in July of 1989, a month after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. 
His premiership coincided with the 8-year Iran-Iraq war during which he gained popular acclaim 
for his stewardship of the economy, including implementing a ration system to distribute food 
supplies and other essentials. From 1989, when his position was eliminated, until 2009 when 
registered to run as a Reformist candidate, he was generally absent from political life for 20 years. 
Naturally, in his campaign he often made reference to his tenure as the “War-time Prime Minister”, 
and his management of the economy. I will show below the validity claims of truth in table 6.5: 
Table 6.5: Empirical analysis of truth validity claims on economic development. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY 
CLAIMS OF TRUTH 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: I have described this [economic conditions] as 
turning a society based on higher values to a commercial 
society. In a commercial society everything becomes 
utility-based and monetary-based. Cultural values turn 
into market values and economic values where everything 
has a monetary price even human values are set a 
monetary value. There becomes a point for example, 
where a person bribes a member of the parliament 
$5million Tomans to buy their vote. This is a consumerist 
society. The current situation with this way of looking at a 
society and with false promises, and superstitious and 
such are far from the [value based] era we had been 
through [at the beginning of revolution]. 
 
EM24 
T1. Is there an ideological 
claim that is unexamined? 
The claim that the post-
revolution era, while 
Mr. Mousavi himself 
was the Prime Minister, 
was a value-based, 
spiritual era, is not 
examined. 
Mousavi: I have come to advocate for the poor 
(mostaz'afan).Those whose backs are breaking under the 
pressures of inflation, and flawed economic policies have 
targeted their dignity.  
 
EM30 
T2. What evidence has 
been provided to support 
these arguments? 
No evidence is 
presented by the 
speaker that his 
economic policies will in 
fact improve the 
economic conditions of 
the poor. 
 
What appears as a communication distortion while testing those assertions is the notion that the 
economy was in better shape in the 80’s than it was in 2009: 
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Mousavi: I have described this [economic conditions] as turning a society 
based on higher values to a commercial society. In a commercial society 
everything becomes utility-based and monetary-based. Cultural values 
turn into market values and economic values where everything has a 
monetary price even human values are set a monetary value. There 
becomes a point for example, where a person bribes a member of the 
parliament $5million Tomans to buy their vote. This is a consumerist 
society. the current situation with this way of looking at a society and 
with false promises, and superstitious and such are far from the [value 
based] era we had been through [at the beginning of revolution] (EM24). 
 
The discourse of Mir Hossein Mousavi reinforces the idea that the economic hardships in 
the society are the result of President Ahmadi Nejad’s flawed policies. His economic discourse 
typically compares the economic conditions of the revolutionary era, and the war10 with Iraq 
during the past 4 years without any reference to the years in between (EM22): 
Mousavi: I have come to advocate for the poor (mostaz'afan). Those 
whose backs are breaking under the pressures of inflation, and flawed 
economic policies have targeted their dignity (EM30). 
 
The fact of the matter is that while the economy may have suffered during Ahmadi Nejad’s 
presidency, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both backing Mousavi’s campaign in 
2009, had each served two terms (8 years) prior to that and economic underdevelopment and 
unemployment had always been the number one issue on the agenda. Therefore, while it is 
expected for a political candidate to draw attention to his achievements and competencies (EM22, 
EM30), attributing the difficult economic conditions solely to Ahmadi Nejad’s policies is only half 
true, which results in incomplete statements and eventually communicative distortions. The 
                                                     
10 There was a small window between the revolution and the beginning of the war with Iraq (February 
1979 to September 1980) 
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condition of the economy in 2009 was essentially resulting from 30 years of the Islamic Republic’s 
policies, four years of which occurred under President Ahmadi Nejad. Considering both Khatami 
and Rafsanjani were known to be Mousavi’s political allies at the time, and the fact that 
questioning the system is considered crossing a red line, it is conceivable that Mr. Mousavi 
intentionally omitted some facts and only presented part of the truth. The data I have gathered, 
however, doesn’t indicate much variation from truth validity claim on the part of Karoubi on this 
subject. 
6.2.2  Empirical Analysis of Sincerity Claims 
When it comes to testing sincerity validity claims, Hojatol Islam Karoubi’s communications 
reveal several evidence of distortion, especially through statements that are typically made for no 
other reason than to elicit emotional responses. In table 6.6, I summarize the validity claims of 
sincerity and show also that Karoubi’s speaking style is the less clear and more ambiguous of the 
two.  
Table 6.6: Empirical analysis of sincerity validity claims on economic development. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS OF 
SINCERITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mohammad Najafi: (questioning the candidate’s stance on 
the following issue): …one of the most important issues 
regarding higher education of the youth is the expenses of 
that education. Both those who study in state universities 
and some of them have to go away far from home to other 
cities and covering their expenses is difficult for those in 
private universities whose primary concern is covering 
their tuition and  expenses. 
Karoubi: I [emphasis intentional] see how education affects 
people and families, and how difficult this burden is on 
them. 
EM45 
S1.Does the communication 
elicit an emotional response? 
Mr. Karoubi's 
response implies 
he feels the 
people's pain 
without offering 
any evidence to his 
assertion. 
Additionally he is 
not responding to 
the question asked 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS OF 
SINCERITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Gholamhossein Karbaschi: And I pointed out that you 
know the poverty line better than us, because you 
frequently specially deal with the veterans and martyrs 
(God's Heavens be upon them). In any case when this 
elections and the political discussions are over, at least 12 
million of our population are poor. What are you going to 
do for them as a cleric president? (he says this while 
chocking up) 
Karoubi: When Mr. Karbaschi remembers things, he 
unwillingly gets affected, and becomes upset. The other day 
too in a meeting which they came to my office and had a 
meeting, he got upset again. (he says all this while the 
camera zooms on Karbaschi's face and his tears).the 
answer is the same, you are sure I alone can't say, I have to 
think about it and sit on it first, the solution is with all the 
factions who want to work with me, and even those who 
may not work with us but they still feel for these issues. 
Let's sit down and think, I am ready to spend all my energy 
for things like this... 
Karbaschi (jumping in): I'm sure you are like that, all I 
want to say is, in the position of the president let's set all 
considerations aside. Talking about the poor and justice is 
easy. But feeding off of their share and not doing anything 
for them in the name of "we will be a world hero", saying 
things that end up putting more pressure on people, and 
not doing anything for them is not the decent thing to do.  
EM47 
S2.Does the communication 
elicit an emotional response? 
Mr. Karbaschi's 
tears, Karoubi's 
allusion to 
Karbaschi's 
emotional state 
imply to the 
audience their level 
of affection for the 
poor but the 
communication 
does not really 
offer a solution to 
the problem 
Karbaschi: in any case our main problem is the United 
States. If we can't enter the international political club and 
if we can't solve our problems, these issues, these 
problems' consequences will put more pressure on the 
people Mr. Karoubi. When you mention "our people's 
dignity", our people's dignity is their stomachs should be 
full. Poverty is befitting our leaders but they have to strive, 
at any price, so people are not poor. 
EM49 
S3.Is what is implied 
consistent with what is stated? 
Mr. Karbaschi was 
charged and jailed 
for embezzlement 
while he was the 
Mayor of Tehran. 
Female voiceover: are you still asking yourself why is 
Mehdi Karoubi running for president? Maybe you 
remember in the last election Mehdi Karoubi promised that 
if he gets elected as the president, he will set a salary of 
50,000 Tomans a month for all Iranians 18 and older. 
Esma'il Gerami Moghadam: is this the continuation of 
your last plan, when you stated 50,000 Tomans a month 
will be given to all Iranians 18 and older, and ...it is also a 
solution for many unemployment challenges, is this a 
continuation of that plan and a more completed version of 
it? If this is the case please explain a little. 
Karoubi: This time around I think it is more 
comprehensive, it's better, meaning we have made it more 
detailed and clearer. 
Female voiceover: This plan, of course, was mocked by the 
other incumbents and was considered impossible. But after 
the elections many economists agreed with it and experts 
reviewed and completed it. Today this plan is completed 
under "assigning oil revenue shares to people", and is ready 
for execution.   
EM50 
S4. Is the communication clear 
and complete? 
The plan’s 
comprehensiveness 
and advantage are 
open to debate 
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Moreover, his communications and campaigns videos are also designed to appeal to the 
electorates’ emotional side more than they are to provide factual value: 
Mohammad Najafi: …one of the most important issues regarding higher education of the 
youth is the expenses of that education. Both those who study in state universities and 
some of them have to go away far from home to other cities and covering their expenses 
is difficult or those in private universities whose primary concern is covering their tuition 
and  expenses. 
 
Karoubi: I [emphasis intentional] see how education affects people and families, and how 
difficult this burden is on them (EM45). 
 
The above conversation, which is highlighted in Karoubi’s official campaign release, offers 
very little in terms of a solution to the problem of the expenses associated with higher education. 
Rather, Karoubi’s response, and his mannerism and body language in the video, basically give the 
appearance of sympathy and nothing more.  
Similarly, the same campaign release highlights Karbaschi’s11 tears and displays of emotion 
when discussing the poor without actually offering a solution to their economic ordeal (EM47, 
EM48, EM49). Moreover, in response to Karbaschi’s question: “What are you going to do for them 
as a cleric (rouhani) president?” (EM47), we hear: 
Karoubi: When Mr. Karbaschi remembers things, he unwillingly gets affected, and becomes 
upset. The other day too in a meeting which they came to my office and had a meeting, he 
got upset again. (He says all this while the camera zooms on Karbaschi's face and his tears). 
The answer is the same, you are sure I alone can't say, I have to think about it and sit on it 
first, the solution is with all the factions who want to work with me, and even those who 
may not work with us but they still feel for these issues. Let's sit down and think, I am ready 
to spend all my energy for things like this (EM47).  
 
                                                     
11 Gholam Hossein Karbaschi was the mayor of Tehran from 1989 to 1998 when he was arrested, 
convicted and imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement. He belongs to the Reform front and his prison ordeal was 
largely considered a political maneuvering by the hardliner conservatives (The New York Times, 1999).  
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Not only does the above argument elicit an emotional response, it is incoherent, vague, 
and more importantly doesn’t address the question. The response is merely designed to imply to 
the audience that Karoubi is on the side of the poor or Mostaz’afan, which was also one of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s favourite buzz words.  
Similar arguments of distortion could be made about Karoubi’s highlighted “Oil Shares” 
plan to give everyone over the age of 18, 50,000 Tomans. The plan is described as “better” and 
more “complete” but the audience is not given any details or provided with any evidence to 
support this argument. Why is the plan better? What are some of the criticisms it received and 
how are they addressed? How is this plan different than Ahmadi Nejad’s “Yaraneh” or “subsidy” 
plan already in place that similarly offered cash to families?  
To sum up, Karoubi’s communications are often convoluted and ambiguous, and focus on 
prompting emotional responses and appealing to emotional sentiments rather than offering 
evidence to support the argument. All of which point to communication distortion and evidence 
of insincerity.  
6.2.3 Empirical Analysis of Legitimacy Claims 
In criticizing the economic conditions, as previously discussed, Mousavi often targets 
President Ahmadi Nejad and attributes the shortcomings and the pressures felt by the people to 
his mismanagement. By doing this, Mousavi is essentially separating the concept of Dowlat (the 
government) from Nezam (the system), and avoids crossing the red tape that tolerates some 
criticism of the president but not the system. In reality however, Ahmadi Nejad’s mismanagement 
is a symptom and not the cause of economic underdevelopment. Similarly, drug addiction, crime 
and in general “foul behavior” (EM22, EM35) have increasingly been present since before the 
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revolution, and although they have intensified in recent years, they are not simply the result of 
President Ahmadi Nejad’s economic policies. In fact, Iran has long had one of the world’s highest 
addiction problems (Navai, 2014). Furthermore Mousavi observes: 
Mousavi: On one hand we export crude oil and on the other hand 
imported consumer goods are flooding our market at the cost of 
destroying our domestic production (EM25). 
 
While that argument has merit, what is left silent in this argument is the fact that President Ahmadi 
Nejad is not solely responsible for this trend, especially considering the fact that the IRGC is 
increasingly involved in the economy, particularly imports and exports (Ilias, 2009; Wehrey et al., 
2009). In light of the IRGC’s increasing grip on the nation, the issue is not only far beyond Mr. 
Ahmadi Nejad but also far beyond the office of the president. Basic interpretive and critical 
understanding of argumentation tell us that when, in a society, “everything becomes utility-based 
and monetary-based” and when “Cultural values turn into market values and economic values 
where everything has a monetary price even human values are set a monetary value” (EM24), the 
issue goes far beyond mismanagement and ill-advised economic policies. This utilitarian and 
commercial view of life as per Mr. Mousavi (EM22, EM24), describes a tale of social and cultural 
paradigm shifts, which are out of the scope of this study, and not merely the result of the previous 
president’s economic policies. However, one conclusion that can be drawn is the fact that 
criticizing the president is tolerated but discussing IRGC’s economic domination is considered 
crossing a red tape, and thus avoided by the candidates. 
Additionally, the crises, economic, drugs, crime, morality, etc., that Mir Hossein Mousavi 
rightly speaks of, are systemic issues far beyond the office of the president. It is the system that 
not only hand selects candidates such as Ahmadi Nejad, who has little experience running a 
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country, but also gives rise to them to the point that the Supreme Leader Khamenei asserts his 
utmost support for him (Ahmadian, 2013; Kamali Dehghan & Borger, 2011). Let’s not forget that 
Ahmadi Nejad rose from the ranks of IRGC first to the mayor of Tehran and then to the country’s 
two-term president. There are several executive and legislative layers of government that act as 
checks and balances to maintain the status quo of the executive branch and avoid decisions that 
for example damage domestic productions (EM24, EM40). But if those decisions are happening as 
easily as described by the candidate, then we are facing a systemic issue that encircles more 
authorities, institutes and levels of government than just the executive branch. Table 6.7 
summarizes validity claims of legitimacy. 
 
Table 6.7: Empirical analysis of legitimacy validity claims on economic development. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF LEGITIMACY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: When people's incomes shrink, when they don't 
have employment prospects, you can be sure these youth 
that see no light at the end of the tunnel, turn to drugs and 
foul behvaiour (bad akhlaghi) and these types of crimes 
will spread. But when in a society clear [economic] goals 
are stated, and there is hope for future, which was the 
case during the war era despite all the hardship, I think all 
these foul behaviours could be drastically reduced.  
EM22 
L1. What is missing or 
suppressed in the 
discourse? 
The speaker is 
reducing the multitude 
of factors underlying 
high crime rates, 
widespread drug 
addiction and moral 
and social issues to a 
single economic factor. 
Mousavi: I have described this [economic conditions] as 
turning a society based on higher values to a commercial 
society. In a commercial society everything becomes 
utility-based and monetary-based. Cultural values turn 
into market values and economic values where 
everything has a monetary price even human values are 
set a monetary value. There becomes a point for example, 
where a person bribes a member of the parliament 
$5million Tomans to buy their vote. This is a consumerist 
society. The current situation with this way of looking at a 
society and with false promises, and superstitious and 
such are far from the [value based] era we had been 
through [at the beginning of revolution]. 
EM24 
L2. What information is 
supressed or left silent? 
What led to this drastic 
change in socio-
economic conditions is 
left silent. 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF LEGITIMACY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: On one hand we export crude oil and on the 
other hand imported consumer goods are flooding our 
market at the cost of destroying our domestic production. 
EM25 
L3. What information is 
supressed or left silent? 
The argument doesn't 
discuss the fact that 
President Ahmadi 
Nejad would not have 
been able to 
accomplish this had it 
not been for the 
support of higher 
powerhouses (House 
of Leadership, IRGC, 
etc.) 
Karbaschi: (video continues from previous section, while 
showing Karbaschi's tears): in the position of the 
president, are you determined to use any tool in your 
disposal, even your reputation, for this purpose? 
Karoubi: I will definitely do this. First of all, I'm not a 
hero, first of all. Second, we have, as you know, a certain 
record and that I’m not dependant on fake heroism. and I 
will truly go into my own prevue which is working as the 
country's president and solving problems, and I am 
willing, as your honour has seen, I, to free a prisoner, 
when I was the Majlis Speaker, I'd make a phone call to a 
colleague and he'd tell me you don't have to do this 
yourself, tell your office to call, you don't have to tell me, 
people’s problems, people's lives, people's dignity and 
authority are really important to us. 
EM48 
L4. Are all relevant 
information communicated 
without distortion and 
omission? 
The communication 
doesn't explain why 
the Speaker of the 
House should call to 
free a prisoner? Who is 
the prisoner? What 
about the legal 
avenues? 
Female voiceover: Are you still asking yourself why is 
Mehdi Karoubi running for president? Maybe you 
remember in the last election Mehdi Karoubi promised 
that if he gets elected as the president, he will set a salary 
of 50,000 Tomans a month for all Iranians 18 and older. 
Esma'il Gerami Moghadam: is this the continuation of 
your last plan, when you stated 50,000 Tomans a month 
will be given to all Iranians 18 and older, and ...it is also a 
solution for many unemployment challenges, is this a 
continuation of that plan and a more completed version of 
it? If this is the case please explain a little. 
Karoubi: This time around I think it is more 
comprehensive, it's better, meaning we have made it 
more detailed and clearer. 
Female voiceover: This plan, of course, was mocked by 
the other incumbents and was considered impossible. But 
after the elections many economists agreed with it and 
experts reviewed and completed it. Today this plan is 
completed under "assigning oil revenue shares to people", 
and is ready for execution.   
EM50 
L5. Who are the experts or 
economists? Who is 
excluded? 
The communication 
does not divulge who 
the expert economists 
approving this plan 
are. Additionally, the 
opponents of this plan 
don't have a voice in 
the discussion. 
Female voiceover: Karoubi has other economic plans to, 
including exempting small businesses from taxes and 
reinforcing the private sector in the fields of production, 
commerce and services, through tax exemption and 
through partnership with private and public banks. 
EM52 
L6. Who is marginalized or 
excluded? 
The critics of this 
economic plan are 
excluded from the 
debate 
 
Such corruption is evident, although not at the first glance, in the discourse of Mousavi: 
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Mousavi: There becomes a point for example, where a person bribes a member of the 
parliament $5million Tomans to buy their vote. This is a consumerist society (EM24). 
 
The above tells the story of a corrupt system more than it describes a lack of morals. It tells 
us that the Iranian parliamentary members, and perhaps other officials, are corrupt, and can be 
bought. Similar references could be found concealed in Karoubi’s rhetoric. In response to a 
question by Karbaschi that asks him if he is willing to use all his powers to help the poor, Karoubi 
states: 
Karoubi: I will definitely do this. First of all, I'm not a hero, first of all. 
Second, we have, as you know, a certain record and that I'm not 
dependent on fake heroism. And I will truly go into my own prevue which 
is working as the country's president and solving problems, and I am 
willing, as your honor has seen, I, to free a prisoner, when I was the 
Majlis Speaker, I'd make a phone call to a colleague and he'd tell me you 
don't have to do this yourself, tell your office to call… (EM48) 
 
Why would the speaker of the house need to make a phone call in order to free a political 
prisoner? Why would the system’s regular legal channels be bypassed by those who are meant to 
implement the law unless the system was corrupt and unresponsive? Finally, there is yet another 
concealed truth that speaks to this argument in the above sentence, and that is the manner in 
which the story is told. Karoubi makes reference to his phone calls to free political prisoners on 
several occasions in his campaign video (EM43). Considering this is an official campaign release 
and of public record, and considering the matter of fact manner the assertion is made by him and 
received by his interviewers, one is left to conclude that this is an accepted practice, a norm and 
not at all out of the ordinary practice of politics in the IRI. 
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6.2.4 Empirical Analysis of Comprehensibility Claims 
When it comes to examining the comprehensibility of Mousavi’s economic plans, what is 
missing from the conversation is an actual economic plan laid out by the candidate. Table 6.8 
summarizes validity claims of comprehensibility.  
Table 6.8: Empirical analysis of comprehensibility validity claims on economic development. 
CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: wealth distribution is both in our religious 
beliefs and [my] economic policy does not mean, 
obviously, that we would take money from one 
person's pocket by force and put it in another's. Our 
argument is that our collective economic policies 
should be designed in such a way that don't cause wide 
economic class gaps, and the middle class prospers so 
we can help the poor. But when over 50% of the 
society collapses into the lower classes it is impossible 
for the government to help the poor. Which is what is 
happening now. 
EM28 
C1. Is the communication 
sufficiently clear? 
Mr. Mousavi is not 
explaining his actual 
economic policy. i.e. 
how is he planning to 
improve the economic 
situation for the middle 
classes? The poor? 
Mousavi to a roaring crowd: Iran's destiny is not 
poverty 
EM33 
C2. Is the communication 
complete? 
The speaker remains 
silent on the factors 
contributing to the 
country's poverty 
Mousavi: We ask, during these past years, what great 
mission have you accomplished considering you spent 
$300 billion. 25% inflation means the downfall of 
social security. 25% inflation means addiction, foul 
behaviour. 25% inflation is like a tax the rich charge 
the poor. This is what the 'handout' economy 
(eghtesad sadagheyi) has inflicted on us. 
EM35 
C3: Is the level of detail too 
burdensome for the 
audience? 
Too many unexplained 
numbers and figures 
can obscure meaning 
Mousavi: what employment outlook do our 3 million 
university students have? It is easy to kick start a 
project, it is easy to kick start a project, [repetition is 
intentional] securing the outcome is difficult. 
EM36 
C4. Is the communication 
complete? 
It is not clear what the 
speaker would do to 
improve the 
unemployment 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Mousavi: when I was in the North, the discussion was 
that while the rice produced by Iranian farmers is left 
in the warehouses, Pakistan and India's Basmati rice is 
being sold at a lower price in the Rasht markets. On top 
of that they were also discussing oranges, saying our 
oranges are left unpicked on the trees and imported 
oranges such as Egyptian and so on are in the market 
and this is causing our fruited farmers to go bankrupt. 
They were talking about tea fields, I went to a tea farm 
where there were both tea farmers and tea specialists 
and I was in those green gardens and they showed me 
there how the fields are shrinking and talked about the 
problems they were facing. They were saying while 
there are over 180,000 metric tons of Iranian tea are 
left in the warehouses...our own markets are flooded 
with imported tea and this has eliminated the 
possibility of healthy competition and growth. The 
same problem appeared when I went to Kerman. Fruit 
farmers there were also telling me that their oranges 
are left [in the warehouse] while importing orange is 
increasing. Then I went to the silk industry, there I said 
the silk industry at some point was critical to the 
Safavid's economy. Shah Abbas was one of the major 
silk merchants in the country, who would both use silk 
imports to Europe for political purposes and also use it 
to find a way to preserve Iran's interests in the face of 
the Ottoman's threat.  
EM40 
C5. Is the communication 
sufficiently clear? 
While the utterance 
details problems 
associated with 
economic policies, he 
fails to present his own 
policy to rectify the 
situation 
Karoubi: Our second manifesto…was about oil 
shares…as we can see the large and unprecedented 
revenues that was at the disposal of the current 
honourable government in the past few years, 
hopefully they can explained what changes have they 
produced for our society with this unprecedented 
revenue where we sold oil at $100 and $120 [a barrel], 
it's obvious how much the revenue levels were.  
Inflation, unemployment, the high cost of living, and 
recession are things that people are fully familiar with.  
They don't need opinion polls and central bank 
benchmarks, which are their rights, they see their lives 
and how much it has changed. Therefore the oil shares 
as we detailed, which we are not going to get into how 
we're going to deal with them. 
EM41 
C6. Is the communication 
intelligible and without 
confusions? 
the language and syntax 
are unclear and 
convoluted 
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CLAIMS ON CHANGING STRUCTURES SOURCE 
GUIDING QUESTIONS TO 
IDENTIFY VALIDITY CLAIMS 
OF COMPREHENSIBILITY 
EVIDENCE OF 
DISTORTION 
Karoubi: And another more important issue, which is 
very very important to me, us, the government should 
oversea, the government shouldn't take over, the 
government should not interfere in the private sector 
and create limitations for them so much. The 
government should accommodate them, the 
government should create security for them so they 
can bring their capitals in with confidence and don't 
continue to take them outside [the country] and don't 
run away. This is the first point. Second we have many 
Iranians...we truly have many interested many Iranians 
all around the world who are willing to come and 
invest here and develop our economy, the government 
earns more taxes, earns more revenues, [the 
government] won’t be reliant oil so much, won’t use 
up, and sell and spend its capital so much. Next 
partnership with the foreign economies, and foreign 
investment, again we attract them and bring them in. 
First off professionals will come in, technology will 
come in, management will come in, we transfer our 
management to them, they transform their 
management to us, in all of this we will fully hold our 
national interests, our principles. 
EM42 
C7. Is the communication 
sufficiently clear and 
complete? 
Despite the simple 
language, the speaker 
fails to offer a concrete 
plan that details how to 
accomplish for example 
attracting foreign 
investment. The 
hearer/reader is left to 
decode that message. 
Karoubi: …and if I spend time, my own shortcomings, 
create crisis-making and dump it on this or that 
person, please note what hurdles are the private banks 
facing in our country? They have even gone to the 
verge of getting arrested. In a country like this that 
certain high ranking individuals or legitimate 
powerhouses have to intervene and prevent a certain 
bank CEO's arrest. Can investment be done in 
something like this? Is there security? If we want 
economic development, if we want high inflation to not 
exist, if we want sometimes we have to increase 
inflation we have to make it up, we have to couple it 
with extra revenues so we can make up for the 
inflation. 
EM43 
C8. Is the communication 
sufficiently clear and 
intelligible? 
The language and 
syntax are unclear and 
convoluted. Additionally 
in this communication, 
no solution is offered in 
only questions are 
posed. 
Karoubi: If we want everyone to be employed, we 
have no other way than to re-enforce the private sector 
and enter them into the job market. Naturally, we will 
oversee and we will take care, we have to do it so 
misuse doesn't happen, and that in itself doesn't create 
a new problem for us. And this is a very simple thing to 
do and it is regularly and frequently practiced. 
EM44 
C9. Is this utterance complete 
and intelligible? 
The language is 
convoluted, sentences 
are broken, and the 
intended message of the 
speaker is unclear. 
Morteza Alviri: if you become the president, what do 
you think the first thing to do, to set this train in 
motion to get to the higher goal so in any case we could 
have an economically developed country, is going to 
be? 
Karoubi: My first thing to do, my first manifesto, the 
manifesto that I published in [the month of] Bahman, 
my first manifesto was to revive [the centre for] 
planning and management, which unfortunately got 
dissolved.  
EM46 
C10. Is the communication 
complete and intelligible? 
Language is convoluted 
and difficult to 
understand. The 
speaker does not 
explain how his 
response is relevant to 
his objective of 
economic development 
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 While he criticizes the difficult economic conditions and the increased poverty faced by 
large numbers (EM33), Mousavi fails to detail his own platform:  
Mousavi: We ask, during these past years, what great mission have you 
accomplished considering you spent $300 billion. 25% inflation means 
the downfall of social security. 25% inflation means addiction, foul 
behaviour. 25% inflation is like a tax the rich charge the poor. This is what 
the 'handout' economy (eghtesad sadagheyi) has inflicted on us (EM35). 
 
In the above statement and others like it (EM33, EM34, EM36, EM40), Mousavi is not off 
base pointing to a variety of ills that have plagued the economy. However, what makes his 
communications unclear are, at times, the burdensome level of detail (EM35, EM40) as well as his 
failure to lay out his alternative plans. Karoubi’s campaign, on the other hand, provides more detail 
than his counterpart’s when it comes to proposing an economic development plan such as the “oil 
share plan” (EM50), strengthening the private sector (EM42, EM44, EM52) and small businesses 
(EM52), attracting foreign and domestic investment (EM42, EM43) and reinstating the office of 
planning and management (EM46).  
However, as detailed in the previous section, Karoubi’s conversations are often convoluted, 
sentences are broken and incomplete and it is often difficult to follow Karoubi grammatically and 
syntactically (EM43, EM44, EM46). Moreover, although Karoubi’s campaign offers more details 
regarding their economic plans, Mousavi often times stops at criticism and drawing comparisons 
with the post revolution and the war era 30 years before, when he was in charge of the economy.  
6.3 Structures of Signification and Legitimation 
The data I have gathered shows very little sign of the two leaders attempting to address 
the structures of signification and legitimation. The most obvious structure of Legitimation the 
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data points to is the presence of the candidates’ spouses in public election gatherings and Ms. 
Rahnavard’s outspoken and active participation in her husband’s campaign. As discussed in the 
previous section, this is the first time in the history of the regime that candidates are not only 
accompanied by their wives but the women are visibly active and speak in support of their 
respective campaigns and are celebrated by the electorate. That is a clear attempt at breaking the 
norms of a society in which women are largely excluded from political participation and 
discouraged from displaying such public expressions of opinion. Both candidates break this social 
and political norm, which lends a hand to legitimizing women’s public and political participation 
and their right to decide their own destinies. 
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 CHAPTER 7: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.0 An Overview of the Findings 
The empirical analysis discussed in the previous chapter illustrates the use of systematically 
distorted communication by the leaders of the Green Movement. In this chapter, I will offer a 
theoretical explanation of the impact and implications of distorted communication on the demise 
of the movement based on the Structuration-Communicative Action framework developed earlier 
in chapter 4.  While my primary focus is on the impact and implications of speech in the Green 
Movement, applying the framework allows us to draw further inferences regarding the Reform 
movement, the state of civil society as well as the public sphere in Iran. 
Thus, this chapter elaborates on the findings of this project and discusses their impact on 
the survival of the 2009 uprising as follows: 
7.1 Impacts and Implications of Distorted Discourse  
My analysis of the communications of Mousavi and Karoubi regarding changing the two 
structures of economy and patriarchy uncover frequent violation of the Habermasian validity 
claims of truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility, thus revealing orientation to success 
rather than mutual understanding. Furthermore, it is my contention that the Green leaders engage 
in systematically distorted communication since the evidence suggests they are participating in 
self-deception. As the evidence in chapters 3 and 6 reveal, the interests and aspirations of the 
three main categories of actors in the movement often stand in contrast to each other and very 
little is done to bridge that gap (RQ 4 and RQ 5). The evidence indicates that those contrary 
aspirations were never reconcilable, especially as far as Reformers and the civil society groups 
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were concerned. In other words, the leaders of the movement had no intention to achieve mutual 
understanding when it came to matters so important to civil society groups such as women’s 
rights. Thus, they engaged in systematically distorted communication to conceal their true 
intentions and generate popular support to get elected to office. 
As described in chapter 4, unconscious deception or systematically distorted 
communication requires at least one party to engage in self-deception. The two leaders along with 
their wives have been under house arrest since February of 2011 and under strict supervision. Prior 
to that, once the protests erupted, they were publically discredited and attacked by the ruling 
party, and excluded from politics for refuting the official recount results. Considering all they had 
to lose – their freedom, and their social and political status along with the humiliation, character 
assassination and the threat of execution hanging over their heads –leads me to conclude that at 
some level they believed in what they communicated to the people, however distorted it may 
prove to be. Consequently, although we can never be absolutely certain of what goes on in other 
actors’ minds, based on critical Hermeneutics, we can interpret the congruency between an actors 
utterances and their actions, and the actions of the two leaders of the Green Movement speak to 
self-deception rather than manipulation. Thus, it is my contention that based on the evidence 
above, the language of Mousavi and Karoubi is largely systematically distorted communication.  
As outlined in chapter 4, totalitarian regimes such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, rely on 
an ideology, i.e. Shi’ite doctrine of Velayat e Faqih, to dominate the population. The IRI’s 
hegemonic tendencies thus limit freedom of speech, critical debate and rational argumentation, 
where the only force is the power of the better argument aimed at mutual understanding not 
furthering the Islamic ideology of the regime. To put this in Habermasian terms, Islamic ideology 
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has colonized the public sphere in Iran with systematically distorted communication. Perhaps if 
freedom of speech was not so limited, journalists and other social actors could further publically 
scrutinize the validity claims of the Green leaders and point to the distortions present in their 
communication; and had those leaders not been concerned with crossing the multitude of red-
lines protected by the regime, they could put forth arguments that would present their message 
in a better light.  For example, it would be easier to question and receive an answer from Ms. 
Rahnavard regarding her attire, forced hijab and their contradictory nature to women’s rights 
when she brings up the subject of furthering that cause.  
In other words, the evidence suggests the two leaders of the Green Movement are 
expressing a somewhat altered version of the official regime ideology through systematically 
distorted communication. Additionally, the real and structural violence characteristic of the Iranian 
regime, including the harsh consequences hindering free critical debate, make it difficult for the 
citizenry, scholars and other stakeholders to investigate the validity of their claims, uncovering 
communication distortions and unexamined convictions (ideologies) present in their message.  
However, while investigating the claims of the Green politicians proves to be challenging in 
the Iranian public space, social actors still examine the political communications directed at them 
against the four validity claims. Critical theory posits that: 
1- Intelligent social actors are not mere receptacles of meaning directed at them, but they 
actively process, interpret and enact meaning into what they hear or read.  
2- Additionally, social actors are not restricted to merely interpret the messages they receive 
for consistency with mutual understanding, i.e. how well one actor comes to understand what 
the other means. They can also be critical of the message they receive.  
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3- Actors accomplish this by engaging in cycles of critical reflection (Giddens, 1984; 
Habermas 1984; Ngwenyama & Lee 1997); that is, continually assessing one or more validity 
claims present in the speaker’s discourse against the social context of their action. 
4- Therefore the inference of the actor’s reflection is not always mutual understanding and 
could lead to a more critical outcome in which he/she can emancipate themselves from 
distorted communicative acts. 
In the context of the Green Movement, this means protesters in their role as engaged 
readers or listeners (social actors) participating in the uprising, possessed the capability to not 
merely achieve mutual understanding with the leaders of the movement and to comprehend the 
political communications directed at them.; but they were also able to assess the truthfulness, 
clarity, sincerity and the legitimacy of those communications over a period of time. Both Habermas 
(1984) and Giddens (1984) suggest knowledgeable social actors critically examine the messages 
directed at them against their socio-political context. We know the supporters of the movement 
are engaged in the discourse and knowledgeable of their socio-political context because they 
would not otherwise be participating in the uprising. Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) state that the 
social context “serves as a reference schema that enables actors to act and to interpret the actions 
of others” (p.152). Through the mutual stocks of knowledge (shared set of norms, laws, rules, 
customs and traditions), as well as material and none material resources12, the social context 
affords the actors the potential and possibilities of social action.  
                                                     
12 As outlined in chapter 4, Giddens (1984), describes those resources as interpretive scheme, facility and 
norm. 
160 
 
 The concept of Reflexive Monitoring of Action (chapter 4) defined by Giddens (1984) 
reminds us that social actors continually monitor and critically reflect on their own actions, its 
consequences, the actions of others and also the domain of action within which they operate. It is 
due to the subconscious and continuous monitoring, and while critically reflecting on all that is 
happening from receiving the messages of their leaders to the consequences of protesting on the 
streets and facing the violence directed at them, that doubt arises and there is a breakdown in the 
communication. Doubt arises when actors fail to establish congruency between the messages they 
receive and their mutual stocks of knowledge and decide, although not always consciously, to test 
the validity claims. That is, through critical reflection and in a similar process to that of chapter 6, 
the protesters tested the communications of their leaders and detected evidence of distortion, 
such as half-truths, unclear language, and insincerity etc., in their discourse. At some point in the 
life of the movement they too, as intelligent social actors, were able to critically analyze Zahra 
Rahnavard’s brand of women’s rights or Karoubi’s promises of economic prosperity and detect 
evidence of systematic distortion in those messages. 
  According to the Theory of Communicative Action (1984), breakdown in communication 
occurs when doubts about the validity claims implied in a social action are raised, and an actor fails 
to observe orientation to mutual understanding. More specifically, at some point in the 
movement, the protesters realized their aspirations were not aligned with those of their leaders, 
and what was promised was not going to be delivered.  
7.1.1 A focal Point in the Movement 
Research shows that one such pivotal moment during which the breakdown in 
communication gave rise to doubts about the movement, was Neda’s shooting death on June 
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20th, 8 days after the elections. The below graph (figure 7.1) is adapted from a study on the 
causes of demobilization in the Iranian Green Movement by Kevan Harris (2012), and it 
demonstrates that the largest protest day of the movement was June 15th, 3 days after the 
elections, in which an estimated 1-3 million participated13.  
 
Figure 7.1:  Protest participation during and after 2009 elections. Source: Harris (2012) 
More significantly, the graph demonstrates that “the post-election uprising quickly spread 
beyond initial protest participants, peaked only a few days after the election, and then narrowed 
to a generally consistent size that continued to sporadically punctuate the post-election order” 
(Harris, 2012, p. 436). Looking closely at the graph, we can see that June 20th, the day Neda Agha 
                                                     
13 For a more detailed discussion of the data see Kevan Harris (2012): The brokered exuberance of the 
middle class: An Ethnographic Analysis of Iran’s 2009 Green Movement 
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Soltan 14 was shot, acts as a focal point in the movement after which participation sharply 
declines and demobilization of the masses sets in. A focal point is a temporal context that 
instigates action across a crowd in the absence of direct communication because it appears as 
the logical choice (Schelling, 1960, page 57). Collins (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, eds., 2001, p.41) 
adds that at this point in social movements individuals “decide” which route to take, which 
coalition to support: the insurgents or the status quo. The logical choice here seemed to be 
dispersion and consequently, demobilization of the protesters, essentially returning to the status 
quo. Thus, the evidence suggests Neda’s death acted as a focal point of the movement at which 
point protesters were forced to weigh their convictions about the movement against the 
consequences of continued participation, and large numbers decided against further street 
action. 
In short, the theoretical framework suggests the supporters of the Green Movement 
similarly became aware of the distortions in the discourse of the movement as both Habermas 
(1979, 1984) and Giddens (1984) suggest all knowledgeable actors essentially do. Critical 
monitoring and reflection thus empowers the protesters to emancipate themselves from distorted 
communicative acts. Some of the practical manifestations of emancipation from distorted 
communication stemming from ideological discourse (chapter 4) are to withdraw one’s support of 
the uprising, to stop participating in the protests, and essentially, disillusionment with the cause. 
According to the above data, Neda’s shooting seems to have provided one such occasion where 
                                                     
14 Neda Agha Soltan, was a 27 year old philosophy student whom according to the Human Rights Watch 
("Iran: Violent Crackdown on Protesters Widens," 2009) was a bystander to the protests when she was shot in the 
chest and died at the scene. She quickly became a symbol of the movement in the face of regime’s violent 
crackdown since she was widely believed to have been shot by a member of Basij militia. Her shooting and 
consequent death were captured on video and aired internationally on CNN, FOX, BBC etc. 
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protesters began weighing the consequences against what they were promised and deemed the 
cost of participation too high. This is evident in the downward shift in public presence that takes 
place post June 20th. Therefore, when evidence of communication distortion surfaces, and 
disillusionment with the direction of the movement gradually sets in, the protesters are no longer 
willing to endure the harsh consequences of further participation (getting beaten, arrested, jailed, 
and killed) in a cause that is not aligned with their goals. Reflexive monitoring is critical in the sense 
that it enables the actor to “free himself not only from false or unwarranted beliefs and 
assumptions about the other person or her action, but also from constraints to enacting coherent 
meaning of the situation and taking appropriate counteraction” (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997).  
In other words, being engaged audiences, the distortions in the communication of the 
leaders of the movement became evident to the protesters indicating that the movement no 
longer embodied their aspirations. While they originally believed they were fighting for values such 
as democracy, women’s rights, transparent and fair elections, economic development, etc. at 
some point they realized they were not going to achieved what was being promised by Mousavi 
and Karoubi. The government was cracking down on the participants harshly by beating, arresting 
and even shooting them down. Many were jailed, raped and tortured while under arrest, and were 
barred from going to school (particularly university students) or continuing in their profession 
(lawyers, doctors, activists etc.). Naturally, disillusionment with the movement meant they were 
no longer willing to face the violence and severe consequences they had previously endured, and 
thus, gradually abandoned the movement and stopped participating. If the people still believed in 
the cause of the movement, trusting it would help them in their struggle for democracy, they 
would continue to fight and the Green uprising would not have faltered.  
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While this doesn’t imply that the movement faltered solely because of demobilization, I 
suggest however that the systematic communication distortions of the leaders of the movement 
contributed to its demise considerably. Additionally, not all actors follow the same path to 
emancipation. Some fail to detect communicative distortions all together, while others engage in 
self-deception despite questioning the righteousness of what is being communicated (Habermas, 
1984); and yet some become disillusioned and withdraw their support. To this date, there are 
those who continue to view the path offered by Mousavi and Karoubi, and the Reform Front in 
general, as the only viable roadmap to democracy and achieving a more open and free state. This 
is despite both leaders’ numerous assertions that they were fighting to save the regime and uphold 
its values (chapter 5). Nevertheless, it is my view that the movement lost a significant share of its 
support once it was increasingly believed to be “more of the same old regime”. Building on the 
above discussion, I am lead to draw two conclusions: 1) the Reform strategy currently doesn’t 
seem like a plausible alternative, and 2) the absence of a strong civil society further feeds into the 
confusion created by the communication distortions of both sides. I will discuss both as follows.  
7.2 The Reform Philosophy as an Alternative 
The Reform philosophy as an alternative to the dominant regime ideology which has been 
put forth for almost two decades doesn’t seem to have the ability to serve that purpose. Reformers 
have been trying to use the presidential elections platform since 1997 to legally present and 
implement their ideas within the red-lined boundaries of the regime to ultimately steer the nation 
towards democracy. However, presidential elections in Iran are not a true exercise of democracy 
where ideas are critically debated in the public sphere and subsequently the citizenry speak their 
choice by popular vote. As discussed previously, institutions of the Guardian Council (Shoraye 
165 
 
Negahban) and the Assembly of Experts (Majles e Khobregan), two unelected bodies, among 
others, already limit the people’s choice and override democracy by vetting and hand selecting the 
presidential candidates to ensure their adherence and loyalty to the regime and its ideologies. 
Thus, in my opinion this is nothing more than a pseudo exercise of what looks like democracy, 
where elections are held every four years but the citizens don’t truly have a vote. Additionally, and 
perhaps more importantly, the distortions gripping the communications of Mousavi and Karoubi, 
make it difficult to discern their agenda and elections platform, to put it in Western terms. My 
analysis shows, once put to the test, most of those promises are vague at best, misleading the 
audience into interpretations that may not be true, without offering solid blueprints and plans. For 
example, although women’s rights is a major election issue, there are very little solid plans and 
programs offered to the electorate to elaborate on how the two candidates will set about fulfilling 
that promise. As the Green leaders represent the hopes and aspirations of the Reform movement, 
their communications can be extended to those of the movement’s, and it is from this I am able 
to draw my conclusions.  Furthermore, reviewing the constitutional framework of the country 
(chapter 5) and past events tell us that the office of the president is not the most powerful 
institution in the Iranian political hierarchy. The Supreme Leader holds the ultimate power and 
thus dictates policy and ensures its alliance with the official regime lines.  
Therefore, the systematically distorted communication of Mousavi and Karoubi, the two 
figureheads embodying the Reform Front’s ideals, obstruct our perception and hinder the process 
of reaching mutual understanding.  It is difficult for us, the audience, to determine where they 
stand on many controversial issues. In other words, what reforms they plan to implement to the 
system? E.g. is removing mandatory hejab on their agenda? Second, the structural limitations of 
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the Islamic Republic, at least at this point in time, don’t leave much room for reform, as that would 
mean some of the strong powerhouses would lose their tight grip on the nation. Thus, while this 
author is making this observation independent of presenting an alternative, the evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that the Reform Front is not a viable political alternative for the 
emancipation of the Iranian public. I, however, concede that the Reformers are the embodiment 
of the hopes and aspirations of a large segment of the Iranian society craving for change, for more 
freedoms and for a more open and transparent society. Nevertheless, the absence of a free and 
open public sphere where ideas can be freely debated has helped, over the years, to reinforce the 
illusion of reform in the Iranian social and political arena. 
7.3 Absence of a Strong Civil Society 
On another note, the absence of a strong civil society that could advocate and lead critical 
debate in the public sphere helps reinforce the illusion of reform in the Iranian social and political 
arena. Strong civic engagement help consolidate democracy by advocating for open and free 
debate which uncover communication distortions, contradictions and incongruences between 
speech and action on one hand, and mediate between the state and people on the other hand to 
reduce real and structural violence (Putnam, 2000). But since the Iranian political apparatus 
systematically restricts the activities of non-governmental organizations and discourages civic 
engagement beyond what is allowed in the confines of the regime ideology, the civil society has 
never had a chance to flourish. Ideally, with the help of the civil society members such as the One 
Million Signature Campaign, citizens could uncover discrepancies in the speech and actions of the 
political elite such as those under study here. However, in their absence to interrogate the 
communications and promises of political leaders, concepts such as gender equity and women’s 
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rights are largely devoid of their intended meaning and merely utilized as tools of furthering an 
ideology, in this case the IRI’s and by extension the Reformist doctrine.  
Moreover, both Green leaders engage in a rhetorical strategy of repetition of particular 
positive opinions and campaign promises (e.g. change, women’s right, economic growth) to embed 
them into the taken-for-granted lifeworlds of the masses as established facts. There is, however, 
very little in the data to support many of those opinions. Yet by repeating them over and over 
again, in the course of a few months, Mousavi and Karoubi and their respective campaign managed 
to establish these goals as attainable within the current regime framework. The absence of a strong 
civil society and free press has heightened this situation, since those largely unsubstantiated 
promises remain unexamined, but because they are powerful statements made in a systematically 
distorted discourse, they manage to colonize the lifeworlds of individuals.  
It is clear the data overwhelmingly supports the argument that the structures of 
domination are largely targeted, which speaks volumes to the dominating nature of a totalitarian 
regime such as that of IRI. This argument is further evident in the fact that while economic 
structures dominate the election campaigns, with social justice and class differences being 
discussed, and candidates paying lip service to women’s causes, women are largely excluded from 
economic debate. Social justice, and gender equality are practically meaningless if half the 
population is excluded from the conversation that essentially determines women’s economic 
powers. Thus, colonizing the public consciousness with half-truths and suppressing understanding 
by means of distorted communication will merely hinder emancipation from an oppressive 
government rather than bring about the change so often promised by Mousavi and Karoubi and 
other Reformists. In other words, based on the evidence, the two leaders are essentially another 
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tool to broadcast the ideology of a hegemonic regime. Habermas (1991) describes this process, 
albeit in democratic societies, as the colonization of the public sphere by those who have privileged 
access to it, such as politicians. Similarly, the Reformers colonize the Iranian political arena by 
systematically distorting its political communications and thus obstructing the consciousness of 
the general public on their path to democracy. The next section will discuss the public sphere and 
its implications in Iran in more detail.  
7.4 Public Sphere in the Iranian context 
Iran’s campaign for democracy is a lengthy one dating back to the Constitutional Revolution 
at the turn of the 20th century (Katouzian, 1998, Kamrava, 2008, Jahanbegloo, 2013), when the 
intellectual elite drafted the country’s first constitution in an attempt to limit the state’s absolute 
and arbitrary exercise of power, subjecting its practices to a legal framework and paving the way 
for a more representative government.  The 1979 Islamic revolution and the 2009 Green 
Movement are the continuation of the same quest to establish a democratic government 
dominated by the rule of law and prevalence of justice. Habermas points to the public sphere as 
the cornerstone of a democratic society for it stands up to the state authority through open debate 
that forms the public opinion, thus critically steering the political establishment in a democratic 
direction. In the absence of a critical public sphere, democracy suffers as the political elite, special 
interest groups and corporations colonize that space, strategically influencing the social and 
political decision making without being subjected to the deliberation of the citizens and the 
scrutiny of critically developed public opinion (Habermas, 1991, Cukier et al. 2009).  
As described in chapter 4, freedom of expression and political participation, without fear 
of reprisal or threats are fundamental to the concept of a free and flourishing public sphere. 
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Furthermore, an independent judiciary to mediate between the state and citizens at times when 
conflict about those rights arises is imperative to the survival of the public sphere, protecting 
individuals and their freedoms from state encroachment.  However, it is my contention that these 
conditions are not satisfied in the Iranian context as is evident by the large number of journalists, 
civil society activists and political figures that reside in the Iranian prisons, essentially for breaking 
out of the state sanctioned lines of discussion. Considering that these fundamental conditions are 
broken, it is my belief that the public sphere, based on the definition expressed by Habermas, does 
not exist in the Iranian context despite the multitude of references alluding to the concept in the 
literature in the field of Iranian studies.  Homa Katouzian (1998), in a paper titled “Problems of 
Democracy and the Public Sphere in Modern Iran”, states that the Iranian public sphere emerged 
alongside the constitutional movement towards the end of the 19th century in the form of 
voluntary associations and independent newspapers and journals. Graham and Khosravi (2002) 
state: 
The public sphere in Iran has a different history to that of European 
states and has been under much stricter control than in the Euro-
American democracies. But whatever the difficulties of expression, 
Iranians, like other people, discuss matters that concern them and 
exchange information on private occasions, in semi-private assemblies, 
such as religious rituals, or in public places such as coffee-houses and 
mosques (p.224). 
However, despite providing a clear description of the Habermasian public sphere in both 
papers, the concept is applied to a state where severe restrictions on freedom of expression, 
assembly, political participation and the absence of an independent judiciary, making the 
comparison unconvincing.  
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To further study the application of the theoretical concept of public sphere in the discourse 
of Iranian studies, I randomly collected 64 academic papers on the subject by both Iranian and 
non-Iranian authors written between 2004 and 2014 (the last 10 years). I then ran the articles 
through Nvivo (a data analysis software), searching for the term “public sphere” in each paper. The 
results are displayed in Table 7.1: 
Table 7.1: Public Sphere in Iranian Studies Literature 
NO. TITLE OF THE PAPER AUTHOR(S) FQ CONTEXT 
1 Can women act as agents of a de`mocratization of theocracy in Iran Homa Hoodfar, Shadi Sadr 9 Iran 
2 
Contentious Public Religion - Two Conceptions of Islam in Revolutionary Iran 
- Ali Shari'ati and Abdolkarim Soroush 
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi 7 Iran 
3 Democracy and Secularism in Iran - Lessons for the Arab Spring Paola Rivetti 2 Iran 
4 
Diasporic Disclosures - Social Networking, Neda, and the 2009 Iranian 
Presidential Elections 
Nima Naghibi 5 Iran 
5 
Discourses of Equality Rights and Islam in the One Million Signature 
Campaign 
Catherine Sameh 2 Iran 
6 
Excluded Icons Locating the Femina Sacra in the Green Revolution, the Arab 
Spring, and the Occupy Movement 
Roisin Berghaus 2 Iran 
7 
Good Iranian, Bad Iranian - Representations of Iran and Iranians in Time and 
Newsweek 
Sam Fayyaz, Roozbeh 
Shirazi 
1 Other 
8 
Green Women of Iran - The Role of the Women's Movement During and After 
Iran's Presidential Election of 2009 
Victoria Tahmasebi 3 Iran 
9 
Hypermedia Space and Global Communication Studies Lessons From The 
Middle East 
Marwan M. Kraidy, Sara 
Mourad 
1 Iran 
10 
Information and communication technology and women empowerment in 
Iran 
Farid Shirazi 4 Iran 
11 Iranian Women's Movement A Century Long Struggle - Ali Akbar Mahdi Ali Akbar Mahdi 6 Iran 
12 Iranian Women's Struggle for Empowerment in Contemporary Iran Mahsa Alimardani 7 Iran 
13 Beyond Islam vs Feminism Ziba Mir-Hosseini 1 References 
14 NEDA and Third-Spaces 
Editors: Stewart M. 
Hoover, Nabil Echchaibi 
10 Iran 
15 Persian bloggers, exile, nostalgia and diasporic nationalism Maryam Aghavmi 1 Other 
16 
Political Opportunities and Strategic Choice - Comparing Feminist Campaigns 
in Morocco and Iran 
Valentine M. Moghadam, 
Elham Gheytanchi 
5 Other 
17 
Reading Habermas in Iran - political tolerance and the prospect of non-
violent movement in Iran 
Omid Payrow Shabani 16 Iran 
18 
Revolutionary cells - On the role of texts, tweets, and status updates in 
nonviolent revolutions 
Daniel P. Ritter, Alexander 
H. Trechsel 
1 References 
19 Some Observations on Visual Representations of the 2009 Iranian Crisis Pedram Khosronejad 2 Iran 
20 
The agonistic social media cyberspace in the formation of dissent and 
consolidation of state power in postelection Iran 
Babak Rahimi 9 Iran 
21 The Green Movement in Iran Hamid Dabashi 2 Iran 
22 
The Green's Non‐Violent Ethos The Roots of Non‐Violence in the Iranian 
Democratic Movement 
Omid Payrow Shabani 6 Iran 
23 
The Iranian Green Movement - Fragmented Collective Actions and Fragile 
Collective Identity 
Arash Reisinezhad 1 Other 
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The analysis reveals that 27 out of the 64 original papers, almost 42%, mention the concept. 
A content analysis of each paper to place the results in context, show that 19 out of the 27 papers 
(70%), mention the term in the context of the Iranian society. The rest either mention the public 
sphere in the Western context or simply appear in the bibliography, both of which are irrelevant 
to our analysis and thus eliminated. It is noteworthy that while 19 out of 27 academic papers 
mention “public sphere”, almost none provide a theoretical description of the term. It is assumed 
that this arena of social life is naturally operating, as is often the case when discussing Western 
democracies, where the reality of public sphere is not in question. In what follows, I will argue that 
considering the restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly, and absence of an 
independent judiciary, the concept of public sphere as defined by Habermas is not applicable in 
the Iranian society. 
7.4.1 Broken Conditions and Principles of Public Sphere in Iran: 
The state authority in Iran, despite limited provisions in the constitution, increasingly 
infringes on its citizens’ right to freedom of expression (including freedom of speech and press) 
and continues to restrict expression through various mechanisms afforded to them through legal 
avenues as well as classified ones. Journalists, bloggers, civil rights activists, lawyers, trade 
unionists, artists, women’s rights activists, minorities (ethnic and religious), LGBTQ members, and 
human rights advocates are frequently arrested, prosecuted, and punished, including punishment 
24 The New Intellectuals in Iran Farhad Khosrokhavar 1 Iran 
25 
The Short-Term Society - A Study in the Problems of Long-Term Political and 
Economic Development In Iran 
Homa Katouzian 1 References 
26 
The significance of economic history, and the fundamental features of the 
economic history of Iran 
Homa Katouzian 1 References 
27 Women, Work, and Ideology in Iran Valentine M. Moghadam 6 Iran 
172 
 
by death, for crossing the government sanctioned red lines. United Nations’ Special Rapporteur’s 
Report on the situation of human rights in Iran (2014) states: 
 
As of 14 January 2014, at least 895 “prisoners of conscience” and “political 
prisoners” were reportedly imprisoned. This number includes 379 political activists, 292 
religious practitioners, 92 human rights defenders (including 50 ethnic rights activists), 71 
civic activists, 37 journalists and netizens, and 24 student activists. 
 
Moreover, freedom of expression assumes a secular backdrop, and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, evident by its very title, is a religious state whose laws and regulations must all be aligned 
with Shi’ite teachings. Although republicanism implies some degree of representative government, 
that aspect of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution is guided by Shi’ite philosophies. According 
to article 99 of the Iranian constitution the Guardian Council, an appointed body consisting of six 
Faqihs (clerics) appointed by the Supreme leader and six Jurists appointed by the Majlis 
(Parliament) is empowered by the principle of Approbation Supervision as discussed in chapter 3. 
Among other things, this principle means the legislation passed through the parliament has no 
legal status without the approval of the Guardian Council who scrutinizes the bills based on 
adherence to Islamic law. Additionally, the Approbation Supervision empowers the Guardian 
Council to veto the legislation passed by the elected representatives of the people if they are 
deemed to conflict with a strict reading of Shi’ite Islam. Moreover, the religious oversight 
embedded in the Iranian constitution constrains the parliament, which is amongst the main 
institutions of the public sphere, essentially stripping it of its role in providing a platform for open 
debate of matters of public interest. Consequently, in an environment where any and all aspects 
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of an Iranian citizen’s life are bound by religious red lines, freedom of speech and public use of 
reasoned argumentation are significantly restricted.  
The Habermasian public sphere is founded on the principles of communicative rationality 
that demand public use of reasoned argumentation, juxtaposing that to a regime that has 
legislated faith and demands undisputed belief in religious principles, the logical conclusion is that 
the public sphere cannot survive under these conditions.   
Next, I’d argue that freedoms of assembly and political participation are equally 
constrained. Presidential, parliamentary, and city council candidates, to name a few, are subject 
to approval by the Guardian Council and other monitoring bodies for adherence to Islam. However, 
in reality this process is an arbitrary process that gauges alignment with the dominant ideology of 
the regime, including allegiance to the concept of Supreme Leadership and the person of Ayatollah 
Khamenei. Over the years, many once influential regime insiders’ candidacy for various elected 
positions (sometimes the very same positions they held before) have been rejected by the 
Guardian Council for criticizing government policies or swaying from the official line defined by the 
institute of the Supreme Leadership. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Bayat Shirazi, 
Ayatollah Zanjani, Hashemi Rafsanjani , and lately Hojatol Islam Karoubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi 
are some of those that were once instrumental to the regime apparatus and have now fallen out 
of grace with the leadership.  
Peaceful assemblies and rallies are frequently and brutally broken up and participants 
arrested. Women, religious minorities and anyone with a record of political activism against the 
regime (albeit none proven in court) are barred from seeking office. Despite officially maintaining 
that there are no political prisoners in Iranian jails, political activists, and often their families, pay 
174 
 
a heavy price for their advocacy. They are routinely imprisoned, their rights to a lawyer denied, 
raped, tortured, forced to make false confessions and executed in secret. The violent crackdowns 
of peaceful protesters in 2009, and prior to that in 1999, are symbolic of how restricted political 
participation and freedom of assembly are in the Islamic Republic of Iran.   
The Habermasian public sphere assumes freedom of expression, and the right to political 
participation and assembly:  
The principles of the public sphere involved an open discussion of all issues of 
general concern in which discursive argumentation was employed to ascertain general 
interests and the public good. The public sphere thus presupposed freedoms of speech 
and assembly, a free press, and the right to freely participate in political debate and 
decision-making (Kellner, 2000, p. 262). 
 
However, in the Iranian society these principles are routinely violated which serves as an 
impediment to the formation of a public sphere in its true sense. Continuous persecution of 
opinions, restricting political participation and aggressive suppression of citizens along with 
imposed religious ideology interfere with the backdrop necessary for the public sphere to 
materialize. Perhaps the reform philosophy would have no leg to stand on had it been presented 
in a country with a flourishing public sphere, which in turn would give rise to a strong civil tradition, 
both of which are impediments to the spread of ideologies and their linguistic manifestations in 
the form of politically distorted communication. It is precisely because the Iranians’ access to an 
open public sphere where ideas could be critically debated is blocked that the illusion of reform 
has had a chance to flourish over the past two decades presenting itself as the alternative. 
7.4.2 Struggles for Establishment of Democracy and Free Public Discourse in Iran 
While I maintain that the public sphere in the Habermasian sense does not exist in Iran, my 
research reveals there is a strong political undercurrent in Iran attempting to create a public sphere 
175 
 
in the democratic sense. Post presidential elections events of the summer of 2009 speak of a strong 
tendency, specifically amongst women and youth, towards a realm of rational debate in which the 
public can openly discuss their collective concerns. The protests of June 2009 ostensibly began 
with a peaceful march of silence and the slogan “where is my vote?” I believe that this is the single 
most powerful slogan that emerged from the Iranian public psyche since the revolution, one that 
captures the soul of the Green Movement. On one hand, it points to the broken conditions of 
democratic governance (which republicanism implies, after all the country is called Islamic 
Republic of Iran) where there is an expectation of respect for the popular vote of the citizens, on 
another hand it recognizes their right to question the political authority and enter into rational and 
critical debate with it when those conditions are violated, which is the essence of the public sphere.  
The above example, although not unique, suggests that while a Habermasian public sphere has yet 
to form in Iran, a strong collective will amongst the youth, women, activists and the intelligentsia 
is working towards it.  
Studying the emergence of the public sphere within Iran from another view reveals while 
the physical manifestation of the concept has failed to form, the virtual space has been more 
welcoming to the idea.  Social media particularly has afforded an effective platform for those 
actively trying to develop the Iranian public sphere. The four major advantages of social media in 
the virtual world discussed in chapter 2: accessibility, usability, immediacy, and permanence, 
provide a better chance for the Iranian public sphere to form online when it’s manifestation in the 
physical world is faced with great resistance. While the Iranian authorities crush any attempts at 
creating an open space for critical debate and severely restrict freedoms of expression and political 
participation in the physical world, they have far less authority over the virtual space of which 
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social media is a big part. The four principles of Accessibility, Usability, Immediacy and Permanence 
discussed in chapter 2 contribute greatly to the development of a free and inclusive virtual public 
sphere which gives a voice to many who were otherwise voiceless. The multitude of blogs, Twitter 
and Facebook accounts, YouTube videos, podcasts etc. provide a wealth of information that was 
previously inaccessible and scattered. They essentially provide a platform for debate and the 
exchange of ideas by the Iranians inside and those in the Diaspora, bridging the gap that was ever 
widening between those groups since the revolution, a welcome phenomenon which was not 
possible before.  
While this is not to say that online activism is risk free in Iran, the anonymity, ease and 
global reach that internet affords, makes for a more democratic and tolerant atmosphere for 
political activists. As previously discussed, Iranian authorities continue to suppress internet 
activism by limiting access to internet by controlling the available bandwidth, filtration and 
censorship of the content, and by prosecuting known bloggers. But monitoring every blog entry, 
every Facebook post, and every video shared, requires unlimited resources. Thus, the Iranian 
activism online thrives, and while the authorities might be successful at crushing attempts to form 
a public sphere in the physical world, it has a better chance of emerging online.  
YouTube videos developed by the protesters (both within and without the country) 
throughout the Green Movement and beyond are of particular importance to this study, and to 
the struggle to form public sphere. A large number of videos were made and posted online during 
the Green Movement both prior to and after the disputed elections. While the majority of videos 
are of an informative nature, capturing the events of the movement such as demonstrations, 
discussions and confrontations with the security forces, a considerable number also engage in a 
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form of dialogue with the authorities. On June 14, 2009, two days after the disputed elections, 
footage of President Ahmadi Nejad calling those protesting the results “dust and dirt” (In Farsi:  سخ
کاشاخ و) caused an uproar.  Within a few days this video, which features a song by a young Iranian 
Artist Hamed Nikpay, lashes back at the president’s speech, lamenting him for calling the dissidents 
“dust and dirt”. Essentially, this video and many more like it are an attempt at engaging in a 
dialogue with the authorities, which goes to the heart of a free public sphere and demonstrates 
the Iranian struggle to create one. 
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 CHAPTER 8: CONTRIBUTION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1 Summary of the Findings 
In this study, I have presented a critical analysis of the discourse of the leaders of the Green 
Movement of 2009 based on empirical material collected from YouTube. My research is 
grounded in Critical Theory; more specifically, the theoretical framework was developed based 
on Giddens’ Theory of Structuration and Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. Social 
structures and their interactions with the agency were examined from a structuration point of 
view, while Habermas provided the theoretical foundations for such concepts as social action, 
political communications and the public sphere. Critical Discourse Analysis as conceptualized by 
Habermas in the TCA and operationalized by Cukier et al. (2009) provided the methodological 
foundations of the study.  Key findings of my research include: 
1. The make-up and aspirations of the movement: By identifying the key stakeholders of the 
movement, their aspirations and their power dynamic (RQ 1 to 3), my research essentially points 
to the three significant currents present in the Iranian political arena. My study then builds on 
those findings to reveal the uneven yet intricate power struggles of those groups, their 
contradictory notions of freedom and democracy, and their irreconcilable visions of human 
rights, including the rights of women and minorities (RQ 4). Finally, the empirical analysis 
illustrates that negligible effort was made by the Reformers as leaders of the movement to bridge 
the gap and reconcile those inherent contradictions with the civil society groups. Instead, the 
Reformers, and by extension the leaders of the movement, engaged in distorted communication 
tactics to conceal those contradictions in order to further their agenda (RQ 5).  
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2. Systematically Distorted Communication and its impact on the movement: The leaders’ 
engagement in systematically distorted communication instead of committing to a dialogue that 
would bridge the gap of contradictory aspirations present in the movement, contributed 
significantly to the failure of the uprising. My research reveals the frequent presence of 
confusion, misrepresentation, illegitimate arguments and false assurances in the discourse of the 
Green Movement. The evidence suggests by using loaded language, marginalizing critics, 
misrepresenting the facts and spreading falsehoods, the leaders of the movement participated 
in the production of systemic distortions. While such communications were initially successful in 
mobilizing the public in large numbers, after violent regime crackdown, and specifically after 
Neda’s shooting death, many participants eventually became disillusioned with the movement, 
as intelligent social actors often do. Demobilization due to intellectual cracks in the discourse of 
the cause then contributed significantly to the demise of the uprising as protesters withdrew 
their support.  
3. Ineffectiveness of the Reform Philosophy: Considering the leaders of the 2009 uprising 
draw their intellectual backing from the broader Reform movement, which suggests reforms are 
not only possible within the current framework but also critical to preservation of the regime, 
and considering the failure of such strategy during the events of the 2009 uprising, my research 
testifies to the ineffectiveness of Reform. Based on the presented evidence, I contend the Reform 
strategy extends from systemic communication distortions stemming from the hegemonic 
tendencies of an ideological state, and thus is incapable of fostering emancipation and freedom. 
It is my contention that Reform is inherently at odds with democratic values, and thus incapable 
of delivering a democratic alternative. 
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4. Absence of a Strong Civil Society: is one of the critical factors that contributes to the 
survival and popularity of the Reform school of thought. In the critical vacuum created by 
intimidating members of the civil society into silence, the IRI has essentially allowed for the 
Reform ideology to evade the kind of rigorous critical examinations that would reveal its 
irreconcilable nature with democratic values and eliminate it as an alternative.  
In other words, in the absence of a strong civil society that can critically engage political 
forces, communication distortions prosper and further hinder debate and rational understanding 
of the public. 
5. Hegemonic tendencies of the Iranian regime are evident in the data gathered which 
revealed very little effort was made to address or alter structures other than those of domination. 
Structures of signification and legitimation are largely left out of the public discourse. In other 
words, the theory suggests that emancipation from dominating policies was the most significant 
concern in the 2009 elections. 
6. The conditions of the public sphere in the Iranian context are broken according to 
Habermas’s conception. But more importantly, my thesis indicates although such an arena, 
where the only force is that of the better argument, is absent from the Iranian political scene, 
there a strong will aided by the internet and web technologies, struggling to establish a sphere 
of critical debate. More importantly, the study reveals while the Iranian government limits 
freedom of speech by such measures as disrupting the internet and telecommunication lines, 
prosecuting journalists, activists and other critics, censoring and banning critical publications, and 
imposing such punishments as banning individuals from post-secondary education, they also 
impose physical restrictions in order to dominate the public sphere. While media, including digital 
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media, are one of the most vital institutions of the public sphere and thus are amongst the first 
to be restricted, totalitarian regimes also suppress freedom of speech by limiting access to 
physical space. In other words, the IRI attacks the public sphere by violently cracking down on 
protests gathered on streets, by arresting and jailing protesters and ceasing their passports to 
prevent them from leaving the country, and also by placing the leaders of the movement under 
house arrest. The saloons, cafes and other gathering places of 19th century Europe, as well as the 
ability to physically participate in those spaces were as vital to the development of the public 
sphere as the media, and totalitarian regimes like IRI suppress both in order to restrict this critical 
arena. 
Finally, the evidence clearly illustrates that the Iranian government is not the only actor 
that breaks the conditions necessary for a thriving public sphere. By engaging in systematically 
distorted communication, the leaders of the movement, and thus the Reformers by extension, are 
also participating in colonizing this arena. Although, some of the Reformers, including the leaders 
of the Green Movement, who are currently under house arrest are themselves victims of this 
policy, they too participate, although covertly, in attacking the integrity of the public sphere. 
 
8.2 Research Contribution 
My thesis contributes specifically to the field of Iranian studies, by answering the research 
question: what were the impact and implications of the discourse of the leaders of the Green 
Movement of 2009 on the demise of the uprising? Iran is a country that has been on a quest for 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law for the past 150 years. This trend has manifested in 
various popular uprisings such as the Constitutional Revolution at the turn of the 20th century, the 
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oil nationalization movement by Dr. Mosadeq and the subsequent British-American Coup, the 
Islamic revolution of 1979, Khatami’s election in 1997 and, finally, the Green Movement of 2009. 
All of those movements have one common denominator: they all look for an alternative path to a 
democratic state. 
A finding central to my study illustrates the systematic distorted language of the Reformers 
in order to conceal this ideology’s irreconcilable nature with democratic values. With this 
realization, a key contribution of my research is the elimination of this strategy that has been 
presented over the past 2 decades as a democratic alternative to the conservative doctrine of the 
regime. Although further research is necessary in order to study possible alternatives to the 
current regime, my research eliminates the Reformers as a viable path to democracy. 
This study facilitates a better understanding of the genesis of the revolt, and the conditions 
that both gave rise to the movement and aided its failure, thus informing deeper insight into the 
evolving nature of this long road over the decades. Furthermore, by painting a picture of the 
diverse spectrum of actors impacting Iran’s democratic aspirations, my research assists in revealing 
the dominating forces hindering this path, essentially aiding in fostering emancipation.  In other 
words, by revealing the distorted language of the Reform Front and its ideological and oppressive 
tendencies, my research assists those involved in the struggle to emancipate themselves from 
deep seated and hegemonic conditions of their environment.  
Moreover, by studying the impact of political communication and distorted language, my 
project also contributes to the study of mass political movements, particularly to the wave of 
uprisings in the Arab countries in the region, the so called Arab Spring that followed the Green 
Movement.  
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 This thesis extends the reach of both theories of Structuration and Communicative 
Action by combining them together to study social movements. As such, this study also 
contributes to the field of critical theory by extending its application in this particular way, which 
provides a stronger, more rigorous framework of studying social action, multidimensional 
addressing structures, social action and discourse analysis.  
8.3 Limitations and Challenges 
In this section I will discuss some of the challenges and limitations I faced as a researcher 
while conducting this study. 
8.3.1 Data collection  
I had originally set out to collect data from various sources such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
micro blogs to depict a more comprehensive picture of the discourse of the movement. However, 
collecting those data 5 years after the fact proved to be quite challenging. I spent a significant part 
of summer 2014 trying to collect data from various sources, in order to present a larger more 
representative discourse surrounding the movement. In the end, after multiple attempts, I had to 
limit my dataset to YouTube. Twitter only sells historical data at a significant cost (I was quoted 
upward of $15,000), Facebook doesn’t make their data available due to privacy restrictions, and 
combing through blogs required specialized software which was not at my disposal. 
Furthermore, although I have been closely observing the events of the 2009 uprising since 
their inception, due to my status as an expat living abroad, I was not able to personally observe 
the shaping up of the movement. Therefore, to conduct my study I was limited to collecting 
fragments of the conversation that shaped the movement through the medium of the internet, via 
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YouTube videos, Twitter feeds, blog and Facebook posts and the news. In other words, I had to use 
secondary data rather than primary data collected from the field by direct participant observation, 
or through interviews with protesters and some of their leaders.  Thus, my conclusions are based 
on the best medium of communication that was available to me under the circumstances. It is 
however, safe to assume had I, as a researcher, had access to all the above sources of data, my 
research would present a richer understanding of the phenomenon. 
 Despite these limitations, YouTube proved to be a sound choice due to its popularity, wide 
reach and its rich audio-visual nature.  
8.3.2 Limitation of the Theory of Communicative Action  
In the TCA, Habermas (1984) defines the ideal conditions of public communication to 
which societies should aspire in order to emancipate themselves from communication distortions 
hindering democracy. To that end, he describes the ideal speech situation, and ideal conditions 
of the public sphere (Habermas, 1991), including the principle of communicative rationality 
(chapter 4), which implies freedom of speech to engage in debate and form rational 
argumentation. Essentially, the public sphere is an arena where social actors can speak truth to 
power without fear of reprisal or punishment. In that sense, some Western democratic countries 
are closer to those fundamental conditions of a thriving public sphere, and yet others are further 
away. As previously discussed, the IRI, for example, places severe restrictions on freedom of 
speech, thus making discourse analysis difficult in that context.  
More specifically, the Habermasian conception of public sphere assumes freedom of 
speech, but since such freedom is scarce in Iran, analyzing the political communications of the 
movement proved to be more challenging. In other words, we will never know if the leaders of the 
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movement, actually believed in forced veiling and tried to misrepresent their views to gain more 
support or if they didn’t believe in that concept but couldn’t express it for fear of reprisal. To 
overcome such challenges, I often had to go beyond just the videos, and consult other sources: 
newspaper articles, books they authored, posts on their blogs or public Facebook pages, and other 
available sources to be able to make a judgement call regarding the validity claims.    
8.3.3 Convictions of a Researcher 
My objective as the researcher conducting this study was to analyze and interpret discourse 
based on a set of rules – in this case, the rules of ideal speech situation. Critical theory makes its 
position clear that science is not value free (Ngwenyama, 1991), and thus researchers make value 
judgements which means the interpreters values, beliefs as well as biases and unexamined 
convictions influence their research. Therefore, as the interpreter of the data, I had to keep my 
own biases and deep convictions in check to curb their influences on the final product. 
Although I was born in Iran, I have spent most of my life and have been primarily 
educated in Western democracies. Additionally, I was raised in a politically opinionated family, 
which had an enormous impact on my upbringing, my beliefs and value system. Thus, it is safe to 
assume that my understanding of such concepts as gender equality, democracy and human 
rights may not necessarily be shared by my counterparts who live in Iran and had different 
exposures. Thus, early on in my research endeavour I was reminded of the influence I exhorted 
over the study for my role was not merely that of an observer, but as the interpreter I was 
continually making value judgements based on my own beliefs and experiences. To overcome 
that challenge, I tried to maintain a level of self-awareness of my own biases, and engaged in 
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frequent reflection and critical examination of my convictions, many of which have been with me 
as long as I can remember.    
8.4 Future Research 
The natural next steps that follow this study, which posits that Reform is not a viable path 
to democracy in Iran, is to investigate an alternative that would deliver that objective. Further 
research into this question could potentially point to other more progressive possibilities for Iran’s 
democratic aspirations. Additional research is required to systematically investigate the following 
questions: If not the Reformers, are there other forces capable of facilitating democracy? What 
are the essential characteristics of one such alternative in terms of political power, intellectual 
orientation and practical measures? Are there forces in the Iranian civil society that can contribute 
in a significant way to a democratic movement? What would be the impact of international forces, 
especially Western democracies, on this movement in terms of their policies towards Iran? Lastly, 
examining some of the less subtle ways through which the citizenry, the intellectuals and activists 
depict resistance to oppression and marginalization and their impacts and implication for 
democracy and human rights in Iran.   
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Kangas, P., Toivonen, S., & Bäck, A. (2007). "Ads by Google" and other social media business 
models. Espoo: VTT.  
Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and 
opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59-68. 
doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2009.09.003  
Katouzian, H. (1998). Problems of Democracy and the Public Sphere in Modern Iran. 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 18(2), 31-37. 
doi:10.1215/1089201X-18-2-31  
Katouzian, H. (2009). The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran (1st ed.). Yale 
University Press.  
196 
 
Keller, J. (2010, June 18). Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution. Retrieved July 6, 2015, from 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-
revolution/58337/  
Kellner, D. (2000). Habermas, the public sphere, and democracy: A critical intervention. 
Perspectives on Habermas, 259-288.  
Keyhan. (2009, May 27). Retrieved November 10, 2014, from 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fardanews.com%2Ffa%2Fnews%2F83762%2F%25D8%25A7%25D
8%25AE%25D8%25A8%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1-
%25D9%2588%25DB%258C%25DA%2598%25D9%2587-
%25DA%25A9%25DB%258C%25D9%2587%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586  
Khatami drops his presidential candidacy in support of Mousavi. (2009, March 15). Retrieved 
November 10, 2014, from http://www.iranianuk.com/article.php5?id=35856  
Khatami: Many mistakes are made in the name of the regime. (2010, April 9). Retrieved 
November 10, 2014, from 
http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/107346/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF-
%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8C-
%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-
%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-
%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C-
%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-
%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AF  
197 
 
Khomeini, R. (1970). Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist (H. Algar, Trans.). Tehran: 
The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's work.  
Khomeini, R. M. (2008). Sahifeh-Ye Imam:An Ontology of Imam Khomeini's Speeches, Massages, 
Interviews, Decress, Religious Permissions, and Letters (Vol. 1-22). Tehran: The Institute 
for Compilation and Publication of Imām Khomeini'̄s Works (International Affairs Dept.).  
Khosrokhavar, F. (2004). The New Intellectuals in Iran. Social Compass, 51(2), 191-202. 
doi:10.1177/0037768604043006  
Kietzmann, J. H., Hermkens, K., Mccarthy, I. P., & Silvestre, B. S. (2011). Social media? Get 
serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media. Business Horizons, 
54(3), 241-251. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2011.01.005  
Klee, R. (1997). Introduction to the philosophy of science: Cutting nature at its seams. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Krippendorff, K., & Bock, M. A. (2009). The content analysis reader. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Kurzman, C. C. (1999). Liberal Islam: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, 3(3), 11-19.  
Moaveni, A. (2002, August 28). Why Iran's President has Forced a Showdown. Retrieved 
November 5, 2014, from 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,345297,00.html 
198 
 
Lyytinen, K. J., & Ngwenyama, O. K. (1992). What does computer support for cooperative work 
mean? a structurational analysis of computer supported cooperative work. Accounting, 
Management and Information Technologies, 2(1), 19-37. doi:10.1016/0959-
8022(92)90007-f  
Macintosh, N. B., & Scapens, R. W. (1990). Structuration theory in management accounting. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15(5), 455-477. doi:10.1016/0361-
3682(90)90028-s  
Markel, N. N. (1998). Semiotic psychology: Speech as an index of emotions and attitudes. New 
York: Peter Lang.  
McLuhan, M., & Fiore, Q. (1967). The medium is the message. New York: Random House.  
Mojtahed Shabestari, M. (1998). Faith and Freedom. Tehran: Tarh-e No.  
Mojtahed-Shabestari, M. (2000). A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion. Tehran: Tarh-e 
No.  
Momen, M. (1985). An introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The history and doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism. 
Oxford: G. Ronald.  
Moosavi, N. (2007). Secularism in Iran: A hidden agenda? In B. A. Kosmin & A. Keysar (Eds.), 
Secularism & secularity: Contemporary international perspectives. Hartford, CT: Institute 
for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture.  
Morgan, N., Jones, G., & Hodges, A. (2012). ’Social media’, The complete guide to Social Media 
from The Social Media Guys. Creative Commons Attribution.  
Morozov, E. (2009). Downside to the "Twitter Revolution" Dissent, 56(4), 10-14. Retrieved July 
6, 2015.  
199 
 
Mousavi: I don't dare ask Khatami for his help. (2009, May 4). Retrieved November 10, 2014, 
from http://www.asriran.com/fa/pages/?cid=71438  
Mousavi: I have come independently. (2009, May 9). Retrieved November 10, 2014, from 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww1.jamejamonline.ir%2Fnewstext2.aspx%3Fnewsnum%3D1009063
03528  
Navai, R. (2014, May 13). Breaking bad in Tehran: How Iran got a taste for crystal meth. 
Retrieved August 15, 2015, from 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2014%2Fmay%2F13%2Fbreaking-
bad-tehran-iran-crystal-meth-methamphetamine  
Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
The New York Times. (1999, May 09). Iran's Ex-President Backs a Jailed Aide. Retrieved August 
15, 2015, from http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/09/world/iran-s-ex-president-backs-
a-jailed-aide.html  
Ngwenyama, O., & Nielsen, P. A. (2003). Competing values in software process improvement: 
An assumption analysis of cmm from an organizational culture perspective. IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage., 50(1), 100-112. 
doi:10.1109/tem.2002.808267  
Ngwenyama, O. (1991). The Critical Social Theory Approach to Information Systems: Problems 
and Challenges. Information Systems Research: Contemporary Approaches and 
Emergent Traditions, 267-280.  
200 
 
Ngwenyama, O. K., & Lee, A. S. (1997). Communication Richness in Electronic Mail: Critical 
Social Theory and the Contextuality of Meaning. MIS Quarterly, 21(2), 145. 
doi:10.2307/249417  
Nikfar, M. (1999). The essence of a thought. In Abdolkarim Soroush: Exploring the prophetic 
experience (pp. 29-82). Tehran: Serat.  
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. (2015). Petroleum: An Engine for Global Development (6th 
OPEC International Seminar). Vinenna, Austria.  
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (n.d.). Retrieved August 14, 2015, from 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Islamic_Penal_Code_in_Farsi.pdf  
Perlmutter, D. D. (1998). Photojournalism and foreign policy: Icons of outrage in international 
crises. Westport, CT: Praeger.  
Phillips, N., & Hardy, C. (2002). Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social construction. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Pike, J. (2009, July 14). Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/khamenei.htm  
Pleming, S. (2009, June 16). U.S. State Department speaks to Twitter over Iran. Retrieved July 
14, 2015, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/16/us-iran-election-twitter-
usa-idUSWBT01137420090616  
Pope, C., Ziebland, S., & Mays, N. (2006). Analysing Qualitative Data. Qualitative Research in 
Health Care, 63-81. doi:10.1002/9780470750841.ch7  
201 
 
Profile: Zahra Rahnavard. (2009, June 16). Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8101384.stm  
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster.  
Qualman, E. (2012). Socialnomics: How social media transforms the way we live and do business 
(2nd ed.). New Jersey: Wiley.  
Rahimi, B. (2011). The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent and 
Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran. The Communication Review, 14(3), 
158-178. doi:10.1080/10714421.2011.597240  
Rahnavard, Z. (1987). Beauty of concealment & concealment of beauty (S. Naqvi, Trans.). 
Islamabad: Cultural Consulate, Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Razzaghi, S. (2010). State of civil society in Iran. Retrieved October 25, 2014, from 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/150594437/STATE-OF-CIVIL-SOCIETY-IN-IRAN-Arseh-
Sevom  
Rohlinger, D. A., & Brown, J. (2009). Democracy, Action, and the Internet After 9/11. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 53(1), 133-150. doi:10.1177/0002764209338791  
Rutledge, R. (2009). Iraqi Insurgents’ Use of YouTube as a Strategic Communication Tool: An 
Exploratory Content Analysis. Florida State University. Electronic Theses, Treatises and 
Dissertations. Paper 1957  
Safeguarding and strengthening the Islamic Republic is a duty for all of us. (2014, June 6). 
Retrieved November 12, 2014, from  
 
202 
 
http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81190477/%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1/%D8%B3%DB%8C
%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8
C__%D9%88%D8%B8%DB%8C%D9%81%D9%87_%D9%87%D9%85%D9%87_%D9%85%
D8%A7_%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8_%D9%88_%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%
AA_%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C_%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D
8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C_%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA__%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA_%D8%
A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87_%D9%85%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C_%DA%A9%D
9%86%DB%8C_%D8%A7%D8%B2_%DA%86%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%87_%D9%87%D8%A
7%DB%8C_%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87_%D8%A7%D9%86%D9
%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA 
Safko, L., & Brake, D. K. (2009). The social media bible: Tactics, tools, and strategies for business 
success. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Sethi, A. (2013, August 07). Banistan: Why is YouTube Still Blocked in Pakistan? - The New 
Yorker. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/banistan-why-is-youtube-still-blocked-in-
pakistan  
Solis, B., & Breakenridge, D. (2009). Putting the public back in public relations: How social media 
is reinventing the aging business of PR. Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press.  
Soroush, A. (2003, December). Democracy and Rationality: An interview with Abdolkarim 
Soroush by Shargh newspaper. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from 
http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-20031200-1.htm  
203 
 
Special Rapporteur's March 2014 report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. (2014, March 13). Retrieved September 23, 2014, from 
http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/united-nations-reports/un-
reports/1000000443-special-rapporteurs-march-2014-report-on-the-situation-of-
human-rights-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html  
Sreberny, A., & Mohammadi, A. (1994). Small media, big revolution: Communication, culture, 
and the Iranian revolution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Stahl, B. C. (2007). Privacy and Security as Ideology. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine.  
Subani, H. (2013). The secret history of Iran. Cabal Times.  
Tabari, A. (1980). The Enigma of Veiled Iranian Women. Feminist Review, 5, 19-31.  
Tahmasebi-Birgani, V. (2010). Green Women of Iran: The Role of the Women's Movement 
During and After Iran's Presidential Election of 2009. Constellations, 17(1), 78-86.  
Tait, R. (2006, December 4). Censorship fears rise as Iran blocks access to top websites. 
Retrieved July 22, 2015, from 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Ftechnology%2F2006%2Fdec%2F04%2Fnews
.iran  
Thompson, J. B., & Held, D. (1982). Habermas, critical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R. D., & Janik, A. (1979). An introduction to reasoning. New York: Macmillan.  
Tusa, F. (2013). How Social Media Can Shape a Protest Movement: The Cases of Egypt in 2011 
and Iran in 2009. Arab Media and Society, 17.  
204 
 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2012). World Population Prospects: 
The 2012 Revision, Volume II: Demographic Profiles: The Islamic Republic of Iran (Rep.). 
doi:10.1787/9789264077478-70-en  
The United Nations. (n.d.). OSAGI Gender Mainstreaming - Concepts and definitions. Retrieved 
August 15, 2015, from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm  
Vakili, V. (2001). Abdolkarim Soroush and critic al discourse in Iran. In J. L. Esposito & J. O. Voll 
(Eds.), Makers of contemporary Islam (pp. 150-176). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Van Dijk, T. A. (1991). The interdisciplinary study of news as discourse (K. B. Jensen & N. 
Jankowski, Eds.). In A Handbook of qualitative methodologies for mass communication 
research. London: Routledge.  
Weaver, M. (2010, June 9). Iran's 'Twitter revolution' was exaggerated, says editor. Retrieved 
July 6, 2015, from 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2010%2Fjun%2F09%2Firan-
twitter-revolution-protests  
Wehrey, F. M., Green, J. D., Nichiporuk, B., Nader, A., Hansell, L., Nafisi, R., & Bohandy, S. R. 
(2009). The rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the domestic roles of Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research 
Institute.  
Wright, R. B. (2000). The last great revolution: Turmoil and transformation in Iran. New York: 
A.A. Knopf.  
205 
 
Wright, R. B. (2008). Dreams and shadows: The future of the Middle East. New York: Penguin 
Press.  
Yeganeh, N. (1993). Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran. 
Feminist Review, (44), 3-18.  
YouTube Statistics. (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2015, from 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html  
YouTube: The Press. (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2015, from http://www.youtube.com/yt/press  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
APPENDIX A: VIDEO TRANSCRIPTIONS  
Empirical Observations: Women’s Rights 
File 
Name 
Time 
Stamp 
The footage begins with the meeting of Zahra Rahnavard, Fatemeh 
Mo'tamed Arya and an unidentified woman:                                           - 
Rahnavard: "A government that is ran without women executives, will 
definitely be a harsh one. Women's presence in executive positions makes the 
society healthier, more equal, more balanced. It creates a more passionate 
and loving society.     
Unidentified woman: one of the most important topics in social justice is the 
issue of gender equality. Discussing that first and foremost our girls and boys 
must feel safe.                            
Rahnavard: "All forms of discrimination must be eliminated in the society. We 
are against all forms of discrimination. Discrimination disrupts human growth. 
Now gender discrimination is one of its forms...there has to be a new reading 
of the role of women. Women are saying we are present, we have 
expectations and we still want to take part in deciding our destiny.          
Mo'tamed Arya: If I want to travel to a different city I can't check into a hotel. 
Either my father, husband or brother has to accompany me.                                                                               
Rahnavard: worse than that, if you need surgery you are not considered to be 
in charge of your body. A man has to authorize the surgery as if saying: are 
you dying, no, wait till a man allows you to solve your problem.                                                              
Unidentified woman: Sadly there is no security for a woman who has lost her 
male protector.    
Rahnavard: why shouldn't our women be safe in our society? Why are so 
many women killed? Why are so many women killed under the pretence of 
honor. Although, honouring the codes of chastity are not harmful if they are 
bound by law.                           
Mir 
Hossein 
Mousavi 
Second 
Campaign 
Video - 2 
0:37 
In a speech to university students 
Mousavi: "I am against the polygamy bill"  
He says this to a loud uproar of the crowd. While we hear the above words the 
footage that is shown in the background is him holding a piece of paper on 
which is listed: gender-based admission policies (sahmieh bandi e jensiaty), 
and women's rights amongst other things. 
Mir 
Hossein 
Mousavi 
Campaign 
Video - 
Mehrjouyi 
2:00 
Young girls and boys chanting together:  
"Rahnavard, Rahnavard, stands for equality of men and women" 
Mir 
Hossein 
Mousavi 
Campaign 
Video - 
Mehrjouyi 
4:30 
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Empirical Observations: Women’s Rights 
File 
Name 
Time 
Stamp 
The video starts by Mousavi praising his wife's scholarly achievements and 
then he moves on to talk about women:  
Mousavi: The issue of women in our country is both extensive and 
multidimensional. There are certain discriminations and disenchantments, 
both from a legal perspective, and from the execution perspective. Also from 
an employment perspective. We have a large number of female university 
students, who seem to face enormous problems once they want to enter the 
labour market. They feel discriminated against in this respect. We similarly 
have huge problems when it comes to domestic women. Part of the solution is 
women should be present in high ranking decision making. 
Mousavi 
on 
Women 
0:33 
Mousavi: " In my opinion women must be present in the cabinet" Mousavi 
on 
Women 
2:06 
Rahnavard & Mousavi meet with Women's rights activists on the prophet's 
daughter Fatemeh's birthday. The voice over quotes Mousavi as follows. 
Mousavi: There are no differences between men and women when it comes 
to freedom and working towards achieving democracy, and everyone must 
march together on this path. 
Mousavi: I believe women play a critical role in the Green Movement. 
Women's movement is a part of the Green Movement. The future of the 
Green Movement is intertwined with all the democratic and justice-seeking 
movements including the women's movement.  
Mousavi: Women's issues in our country won’t be solved unless they become 
a national problem and there should be no segregation between men and 
women. The gender segregation is the root of discrimination which renders 
the problem unsolvable. We cannot have a free and just society unless we 
solve the women's problems. 
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
1:55 
Mousavi: Considering the turn of events in the past year, women and youth 
have a new understanding of themselves and a have renewed sense of 
identity. Their worldviews and thoughts have changed. Therefore a certain 
pain is felt that is related to this renewal of identity. Because our governing, 
legal and traditional structures are incompatible with this newly born identity. 
We have to study this issue. 
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
2:55 
Mousavi: There are many things that under the name of Islam and securing 
family values, but in reality influenced by discriminatory gender views and 
legal issues, have created serious hurdles for women in the society.  
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
3:15 
Mousavi: The concerns of Iranian women are the concerns of both men and 
women…Men and women's happiness are intertwined and we can only solve 
them by seeing them as one. 
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
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File 
Name 
Time 
Stamp 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
Mousavi: The faith of the Green Movement is tied to the women's movement 
in the future, and I don't think the Green Movement can achieve its goals 
without being accompanied by women every step of the way. The opposite is 
true too, meaning if we fail to make political change, women’s conditions 
won’t change either. 
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
4:27 
In response to a question about the Green Movement's strategy regarding 
some Friday Prayers' clerics about women's cover and eruption of 
earthquakes and also the resurgence of the Islamic Guidance crews: 
 
Mousavi: Certain events are happening in the society and certain decisions are 
being made that instead of solving problems they are after creating conflict. 
For example, our country is prone to earth quakes and parts of Tehran are on 
the quake line, which certainly is very dangerous and we have to stop it and 
the government is better off taking care of this, instead of mixing it to a dream 
or a deed like women's cover...this is diversion from truth that wants to keep 
people busy with such discussions and create division. Even the purpose of 
Islamic Guidance crews is not really for rectifying scantily covered women, 
they are largely meant to create diversion in minds.  
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
4:45 
Mousavi: The Green Movement is after justice and freedom and the execution 
of the law, and if we achieve those, other issues stemming from those will be 
solved too. The reason we are facing actions that are causing us pain, is 
because our conditions are not aligned with the constitution and human 
dignity and honour.  
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
5:35 
Mousavi: They want to keep our minds busy. Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
5:40 
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File 
Name 
Time 
Stamp 
In response to a question about the One Million Signature Campaign for 
Repeal of Discriminatory Laws Against Women, and noting the Green Human 
Chain  formed last year from Tajrish square to Railroad square as symbol of 
reconciliation and national unity he goes on to say: 
Mousavi: I consider that day a great representation of the Green Movement. 
In previous years we have put forth "reconciliation" as our motto, which was a 
good motto for our national unity which will solve and even brings forward 
our problems. Some benefit from not reconciling. Currently in different 
formats including the families of political prisoners, different groups and 
movements have been created which didn't have the possibility to organize 
prior to the Green Movement. Women's movement is of those movements 
too. Some women used to participate in certain activities under the umbrella 
of the One Million Signature Campaign against discrimination, that were even 
criminalized maybe because they were conducting those activities apart from 
each other. But due to the colorful and diverse nature of the [Green] 
Movement, today they are joined with the extensive Green mass movement 
without the presence of suspicion against this group.  
Mousavi 
about 
Women 
on Hazrat 
e 
Fatemeh's 
Birthday 
5:45 
Karoubi: I will say this bluntly here, Emam [Khomeini] was very sensitive to 
moves that would demotivate people from participating in the elections and 
would readily oppose them. At a point in time, it hasn't been forgotten, that it 
was said that women shouldn't participate and don't get elected into the 
Majlis. Emam readily said that women must participate in the elections and be 
able to get elected to the Majlis 
Mehdi 
Karoubi's 
First 
Televised 
Speech - 
Part 1 - 
May 25 
2009 
4:58 
Karoubi: We published our third campaign promise during the month of 
Farvardin which was about civil rights. Civil rights bound by the constitutional 
framework. Regarding ladies, regarding ethnicities, regarding the various 
religions that exist in Iran, regarding universities, regarding prisoners that 
people come to get into, pointless restrictions they place on people's lives and 
the bitter incidents [they have caused], pointless nuances, interfering in the 
private lives of families which Islam has so advised [against], civil rights in 
general bound by the constitutional framework or those principles of the 
constitution that are left vague. 
Mehdi 
Karoubi's 
First 
Televised 
Speech - 
Part 2 - 
May 25 
2009 
7:20 
All questions are directed at Karoubi. 
 Jamileh Kadivar: Do you think forced Hejab on women is a wise idea? Has it 
worked? You are a cleric after all, do you think, based on Islamic principles and 
religious teachings, is it right to force hejab? 
 
Karoubi: I think we have to do two things. One thing is to remove the 
aggressive way because those haven't worked and in many cases they were 
counterproductive. 
 
Jamileh Kadivar: what about polygamy? 
 
Karoubi: Polygamy will destroy lives in our society for certain. 
Mehdi 
Karoubi 
Campaign 
Video - 1 
5:16 
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Female Voice Over: If he [Karoubi] is victorious in the presidential elections, 
he intends to create an organization for the defence of human rights and civil 
rights and intends to study and correct the behaviours of governmental and 
national security institutions on a regular basis. 
Mehdi 
Karoubi 
Campaign 
Video - 1 
2:16 
Female Voice Over: Karoubi considers solving women's problems an 
important and critical plans of his government and will try to execute the 6th 
Majlis's passed bill to join Iran to the [UN's] Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. He has certain plans to encourage 
and support none-governmental women's organizations and groups, and plans 
to have at least one female minister in his cabinet.  
Mehdi 
Karoubi 
Campaign 
Video - 1 
4:45 
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Empirical Observations: Economy File Name 
Time 
Stamp 
Unidentified woman in chador: we were looking to return to an era 
where I can at least say class separation was minimal.  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 1 
0:55 
The clip shows a man on a bike with his child. He comes up the bus 
which carries Mousavi to complain of his employment and economic 
issues 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 1 
5:00 
Mousavi: When people's incomes shrink, when they don't have 
employment prospects, you can be sure these youth that see no 
light at the end of the tunnel, turn to drugs and foul behaviour (bad 
akhlaghi) and these types of crimes will spread. But when in a 
society clear [economic] goals are stated, and there is hope for 
future, which was the case during the war era despite all the 
hardship, I think all these foul behaviours could be drastically 
reduced.  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 1 
6:25 
The woman talking about how no job prospects and economic 
hardship have turned her son to drugs 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 1 
7:35 
Mousavi: I have described this [economic conditions] as turning a 
society based on higher values to a commercial society. In a 
commercial society everything becomes utility-based and monetary-
based. Cultural values turn into market values and economic values 
where everything has a monetary price even human values are set a 
monetary value. There becomes a point for example, where a 
person bribes a member of the parliament $5million Tomans to buy 
their vote. This is a consumerist society. The current situation with 
this way of looking at a society and with false promises, and 
superstitious and such are far from the [value based] era we had 
been through [at the beginning of revolution]. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 1 
8:15 
Unidentified woman: Excuse me Mr. Mousavi but for years we have 
been asking [the government] to solve the problem of 
unemployment. Employment should be for our own city first and 
then other cities. Not only this didn't happen, they brought in the 
Chinese. They fired thousands from domestic companies and 
brought in the Chinese [workers instead].  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 2 
2:15 
Mousavi: On one hand we export crude oil and on the other hand 
imported consumer goods are flooding our market at the cost of 
destroying our domestic production. 
 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 2 
5:31 
A scene in the northern provinces discussing how the tea industry is 
being destroyed because of excessive imports 
 6:40 
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Mousavi: wealth distribution is both in our religious beliefs and [my] 
economic policy does not mean, obviously, that we would take 
money from one person's pocket by force and put it in another's. 
Our argument is that our collective economic policies should be 
designed in such a way that don't cause wide economic class gaps, 
and the middle class prospers so we can help the poor. But when 
over 50% of the society collapses into the lower classes it is 
impossible for the government to help the poor. Which is what is 
happening now. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - 2 
7:08 
Unidentified young man #1: we have so many resources in this 
country, oil, gas, mining industry, what happened to those incomes? 
What happened to the $260 million that was mostly Khatami's and 
Rafsanajani's governments' oil income? 
 
Unidentified young man #2: we have so many charity donation 
boxes (sandgh sadaghat), why does the government gives people 
handouts (sadagheh)? We don't want a handout, we want jobs. 
 
Unidentified young woman: The country's projects have been left 
incomplete because Iran has been sanctioned against. My father 
works on oil, gas and mixed cycle projects, and because of 4 mere 
screws, because Mr. Ahmadi Nejad doesn't want to build relations 
with others [countries], all the projects are sanctioned against. 
Why? 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Campaign 
Video - Mehrjouyi 
4:08 
Mousavi: I have come to advocate for the poor (mostaz'afan).Those 
who's backs are breaking under the pressures of inflation, and 
flawed economic policies have targeted their dignity.  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
1:40 
Image reading: where are $270 billion oil incomes? Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
4:49 
Mousavi to a roaring crow while he wears a green scarf: Iran's 
destiny is not poverty, 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
5:04 
Mousavi (same speech as above): weakness in the national 
economy means humiliation in the world. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
5:30 
Mousavi: we are occupying our thoughts with rows outside [the 
country], mostly for domestic consumption, and have overlooked 
our vital interests in the region. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
5:34 
Mousavi: We ask, during these past years, what great mission have 
you accomplished considering you spent $300 billion. 25% inflation 
means the downfall of social security. 25% inflation means 
addiction, foul behaviour. 25% inflation is like a tax the rich charge 
the poor. This is what the 'handout' economy (eghtesad sadagheyi) 
has inflicted on us. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
5:42 
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Mousavi: if old age pension must rightly increase, why on the 
election night? If teachers' back pays must be paid, why on the 
election night? 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
6:19 
Mousavi: what employment outlook do our 3 million university 
students have? It is easy to kick start a project, it is easy to kick start 
a project, [repetition is intentional] securing the outcome is difficult. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
7:25 
Mousavi: Any policy that diminishes our national identity and our 
Iranian dignity and eminence is in the wrong. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
7:54 
Mousavi: Our people gave many martyrs because they believed in 
their future, they believed in the system's righteous directions. 
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 1 
8:33 
Mousavi: we have come to investigate the lost billions.  Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 2 
4:50 
Mousavi:  Even if one Ryal is given to the people by the 
government, that is the people's right not a present to them.  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 2 
4:53 
Mousavi: when I was in the North, the discussion was that while the 
rice produced by Iranian farmers is left in the wear houses, Pakistan 
and India's Basmati rice is being sold at a lower price in the Rasht 
markets. On top of that they were also discussing oranges, saying 
our oranges are left unpicked on the trees and imported oranges 
such as Egyptian and so on are in the market and this is causing our 
fruit farmers to go bankrupt. They were talking about tea fields, I 
went to a tea farm where there were both tea farmers and tea 
specialists and I was in those green gardens and they showed me 
there how the fields are shrinking and talked about the problems 
they were facing. They were saying while there are over 180,000 
metric tons of Iranian tea are left in the warehouses...our own 
markets are flooded with imported tea and this has eliminated the 
possibility of healthy competition and growth. The same problem 
appeared when I went to Kerman. Fruit farmers there were also 
telling me that their oranges are left [in the warehouse] while 
importing orange is increasing. Then I went to the silk industry, 
there I said the silk industry at some point was critical to the 
Safavid's economy. Shah Abbas was one of the major silk merchants 
in the country, who would both use silk imports to Europe for 
political purposes and also use it to find a way to preserve Iran's 
interests in the face of the Ottoman's threat.  
Mir Hossein 
Mousavi Second 
Campaign Video - 2 
7:25 
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Karoubi: Our second manifesto…was about oil shares…as we can 
see the large and unprecedented revenues that was at the disposal 
of the current honourable government in the past few years, 
hopefully they can explained what changes have they produced for 
our society with this unprecedented revenue where we sold oil at 
$100 and $120 [a barrel], it's obvious how much the revenue levels 
were.  Inflation, unemployment, the high cost of living, and 
recession are things that people are fully familiar with.  They don't 
need opinion polls and central bank benchmarks, which are their 
rights, they see their lives and how much it has changed. Therefore 
the oil shares as we detailed, which we are not going to get into 
how we're going to deal with them. 
Mehdi Karoubi's 
First Televised 
Speech - Part 2 - 
May 25 2009 
5:50 
Karoubi: And another more important issue which is very very 
important to me, us, the government should oversea, the 
government shouldn't take over, the government should not 
interfere in the private sector and create limitations for them so 
much. The government should accommodate them, the government 
should create security for them so they can bring their capitals in 
with confidence and don't continue to take them outside [the 
country] and don't run away. This is the first point. Second we have 
many Iranians...we truly have many interested many Iranians all 
around the world who are willing to come and invest here and 
develop our economy, the government earns more taxes, earns 
more revenues, [the government] won’t be reliant oil so much, 
won’t use up, and sell and spend its capital so much. Next 
partnership with the foreign economies, and foreign investment, 
again we attract them and bring them in. First off professionals will 
come in, technology will come in, management will come in, we 
transfer our management to them, they transform their 
management to us, in all of this we will fully hold our national 
interests, our principles. 
Mehdi Karoubi's 
First Televised 
Speech - Part 3 - 
May 25 2009 
0:03 
Karoubi: …and if I spend time, my own shortcomings, create crisis-
making and dump it on this or that person, please note what 
hurdles are the private banks facing in our country? They have even 
gone to the verge of getting arrested. In a country like this that 
certain high ranking individuals or legitimate powerhouses have to 
intervene and prevent a certain bank CEO's arrest. Can investment 
be done in something like this? Is there security? if we want 
economic development, if we want high inflation to not exist, if we 
want sometimes we have to increase inflation we have to make it 
up, we have to couple it with extra revenues so we can make up for 
the inflation. 
Mehdi Karoubi's 
First Televised 
Speech - Part 3 - 
May 25 2009 
4:45 
215 
 
Empirical Observations: Economy File Name 
Time 
Stamp 
Karoubi: If we want everyone to be employed, we have no other 
way than to re-inforce the private sector and enter them into the 
job market. Naturally, we will oversee and we will take care, we 
have to do it so misuse doesn't happen, and that in itself doesn't 
create a new problem for us. And this is a very simple thing to do 
and it is regularly and frequently practiced. 
Mehdi Karoubi's 
First Televised 
Speech - Part 3 - 
May 25 2009 
5:40 
Mohammad Najafi (questioning the candidate’s stance on the 
following issue): …one of the most important issues regarding 
higher education of the youth is the expenses of that education. 
Both those who study in state universities and some of them have 
to go away far from home to other cities and covering their 
expenses is difficult [for their families] or those in private 
universities whose primary concern is covering their tuition and  
expenses. 
 
Karoubi: I see how education affects people and families, and how 
difficult this burden is on them 
Mehdi Karoubi 
Campaign Video - 1 
5:54 
Morteza Alviri: if you become the president, what do you think the 
first thing to do, to set this train in motion to get to the higher goal 
so in any case we could have an economically developed country, is 
going to be? 
 
Karoubi: My first thing to do, my first manifesto, the manifesto that 
I published in [the month of] Bahman, my first manifesto was to 
revive the [centre] for planning and management, which 
unfortunately got dissolved.  
Mehdi Karoubi 
Campaign Video - 1 
6:35 
Gholamhossein Karbaschi: And I pointed out that you know the 
poverty line better than us, because you frequently specially deal 
with the veterans and martyrs (God's Heavens be upon them). In 
any case when this elections and the political discussions are over, 
at least 12 million of our population are poor. What are you going to 
do for them as a cleric president? (he says this while chocking up) 
 
Karoubi: When Mr. Karbaschi remembers things, he unwillingly gets 
affected, and becomes upset. The other day too in a meeting which 
they came to my office and had a meeting, he got upset again. (he 
says all this while the camera zooms on Karbaschi's face and his 
tears).the answer is the same, you are sure I alone can't say, I have 
to think about it and sit on it first, the solution is with all the factions 
who want to work with me, and even those who may not work with 
us but they still feel for these issues. Let's sit down and think, I am 
ready to spend all my energy for things like this... 
 
Karbaschi (jumping in): I'm sure you are like that, all I want to say is, 
in the position of the president let's set all considerations aside. 
Talking about the poor and justice is easy. But feeding off of their 
Mehdi Karoubi 
Campaign Video - 1 
7:50 
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share and not doing anything for them in the name of "we will be a 
world hero", saying things that end up putting more pressure on 
people, and not doing anything for them is not the decent thing to 
do.  
Karbaschi (video continues from previous section, while showing 
Karbaschi's tears): in the position of the president, are you 
determined to use any tool in your disposal, even your reputation, 
for this purpose? 
 
Karoubi: I will definitely do this. First of all, I'm not a hero, first of 
all. Second, we have, as you know, a certain record and that  I'm not 
dependant on fake heroism. and I will truly go into my own purview 
which is working as the country's president and solving problems, 
and I am willing, as your honour has seen, I, to free a prisoner, when 
I was the Majlis Speaker, I'd make a phone call to a colleague and 
he'd tell me you don't have to do this yourself, tell your office to 
call, you don't have to tell me, people’s problems, people's lives, 
people's dignity and authority are really important to us  
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Karbaschi: in any case our main problem is the United States. If we 
can't enter the international political club and if we can't solve our 
problems, these issues, these problems' consequences will put more 
pressure on the people Mr. Karoubi. When you mention "our 
people's dignity", our people's dignity is their stomachs should be 
full. Poverty is befitting our leaders but they have to strive, at any 
price, so people are not poor. 
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Female voiceover: are you still asking yourself why is Mehdi Karoubi 
running for president? Maybe you remember in the last election 
Mehdi Karoubi promised that if he gets elected as the president, he 
will set a salary of 50,000 Tomans a month for all Iranians 18 and 
older. 
 
Esma'il Gerami Moghadam: is this the continuation of your last 
plan, when you stated 50,000 Tomans a month will be given to all 
Iranians 18 and older, and ...it is also a solution for many 
unemployment challenges, is this a continuation of that plan and a 
more completed version of it? If this is the case please explain a 
little. 
 
Karoubi: This time around I think it is more comprehensive, it's 
better, meaning we have made it more detailed and more clear. 
 
Female voiceover: This plan, of course, was mocked by the other 
incumbents and was considered impossible. But after the elections 
many economists agreed with it and experts reviewed and 
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completed it. Today this plan is completed under "assigning oil 
revenue shares to people", and is ready for execution.   
Female voiceover: Karoubi has other economic plans to, including 
exempting small businesses from taxes and reinforcing the private 
sector in the fields of production, commerce and services, through 
tax exemption and through partnership with private and public 
banks  
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